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In	  2011,	  three	  democratic	  emerging	  powers,	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	  served	  as	  non-­‐
permanent	  members	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  (UN)	  Security	  Council.	  This	  was	  the	  same	  year	  
that	  civil	  wars	  in	  both	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  erupted.	  Using	  both	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  
methods,	  this	  paper	  examines	  the	  involvement	  of	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	  through	  
looking	  at	  their	  statements,	  actions,	  and	  votes	  made	  within	  the	  UN	  context.	  The	  qualitative	  
section	  focuses	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  the	  statements	  and	  actions.	  The	  quantitative	  section	  
builds	  on	  the	  qualitative	  section	  by	  analyzing	  the	  votes	  made	  within	  the	  UN	  General	  
Assembly,	  the	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Council,	  and	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  using	  factor	  analysis	  
and	  crosstabulation.	  My	  results	  show	  that	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa,	  despite	  their	  
limited	  joint	  diplomatic	  institutionalization,	  presented	  an	  impressive	  degree	  of	  
coordination,	  meriting	  them	  consideration	  as	  players	  within	  the	  international	  peace	  and	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CHAPTER	  1:	  INTRODUCTION	  
1.1.	  Introduction	  
The	  world	  is	  widely	  considered	  to	  be	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  change	  to	  the	  global	  system.	  
As	  the	  unipolar	  power	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (US)	  that	  dominated	  the	  latter	  portion	  of	  the	  
twentieth	  century	  fades,	  the	  power	  of	  developing	  countries	  and	  countries	  from	  the	  global	  
South	  has	  increased.	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  views	  of	  developing	  countries	  are	  properly	  
represented	  in	  the	  international	  community,	  many	  of	  these	  countries	  have	  banded	  together	  
to	  form	  diplomatic	  coalitions	  to	  magnify	  their	  influence	  on	  the	  global	  stage.	  The	  IBSA	  
Dialogue	  Forum	  (IBSA),	  containing	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	  is	  one	  of	  these	  coalitions	  
(Qobo,	  2011	  and	  Habib,	  2009).	  IBSA	  is	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  an	  association	  of	  emerging	  
powers,	  in	  reference	  to	  their	  high	  economic	  growth	  rates	  and	  these	  states	  have	  taken	  on	  a	  
more	  expansive	  role	  than	  the	  emerging	  powers	  title	  admits	  (Qobo,	  2011).	  Due	  to	  their	  
numerous	  similarities	  and	  shared	  interests,	  IBSA	  holds	  weight	  and	  is	  perceived	  as	  genuine	  
within	  the	  international	  community	  (Qobo,	  2011,	  p.17).	  The	  broad	  goals	  of	  IBSA	  are	  to	  
strengthen	  South-­‐South	  cooperation,	  share	  ideas	  and	  lessons	  learned,	  and	  further	  the	  
common	  goals	  of	  the	  three	  countries	  domestically	  and	  within	  the	  international	  community	  
(Brasilia	  Declaration,	  2003).	  	  IBSA	  has	  also	  used	  its	  platform	  to	  push	  for	  increasing	  the	  
geographic	  representation	  of	  the	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  
Council	  (UNSC).	  This	  has	  brought	  to	  attention	  IBSA’s	  leadership	  on	  peace	  and	  security	  
issues	  and	  speculation	  about	  what	  future	  changes	  in	  the	  geopolitical	  structure	  of	  the	  world	  
might	  look	  like.	  	  
Substantively	  and	  rhetorically,	  while	  IBSA	  devotes	  much	  of	  its	  time	  to	  trade	  and	  
energy,	  it	  has	  indeed	  been	  active	  on	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  issues	  (Flemes,	  2007,	  
p.6).	  The	  year	  2011	  presented	  a	  platform	  for	  IBSA	  to	  showcase	  its	  work	  on	  these	  issues	  
because	  all	  three	  countries	  served	  as	  non-­‐permanent	  members	  of	  the	  UNSC	  during	  that	  
period.	  	  As	  IBSA’s	  2011	  New	  Delhi	  Communiqué	  stated,	  “the	  concurrent	  presence	  of	  all	  
three	  IBSA	  countries…	  provides	  a	  unique	  opportunity	  to	  work	  closely	  together	  in	  order	  to	  
bring	  their	  perspectives	  into	  the	  work	  of	  the	  [United	  Nations	  Security]	  Council	  and	  
strengthen	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  South.”	  The	  simultaneous	  eruption	  of	  the	  “Arab	  Spring”	  conflicts	  
at	  the	  beginning	  of	  2011	  presented	  the	  perfect	  opportunity	  for	  the	  countries	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  




became	  two	  of	  the	  most	  watched	  countries	  during	  that	  time-­‐	  Libya,	  for	  the	  implementation	  
of	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  and	  the	  death	  of	  its	  41	  year	  dictator,	  President	  Muammar	  Gaddafi,	  and	  
Syria	  for	  its	  seeming	  inability	  to	  be	  resolved.	  Throughout	  the	  year,	  IBSA	  states	  took	  
advantage	  of	  their	  increased	  platform	  on	  the	  UNSC	  and	  acted	  very	  publicly	  on	  both	  conflicts.	  	  
1.2.	  Rationale	  	  
	  
There	  are	  several	  reasons	  why	  this	  study	  will	  prove	  useful.	  Firstly,	  this	  paper	  
represents	  the	  first	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  IBSA	  in	  the	  conflicts	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  while	  the	  
three	  countries	  were	  seated	  on	  the	  UNSC.	  The	  cases	  of	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  are	  important	  to	  
study	  because	  IBSA	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  influential	  in	  negotiations	  around	  current	  and	  
future	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  issues.	  Therefore,	  having	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  
IBSA’s	  role	  (specifically	  their	  cooperation	  and	  alignment)	  on	  the	  conflicts	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  
can	  help	  determine	  what	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  of	  similar	  emerging	  powers	  in	  future	  conflict	  
negotiations.	  Cooperation	  is	  a	  key	  goal	  of	  IBSA;	  therefore,	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  expect	  high	  
levels	  of	  it	  within	  IBSA’s	  actions.	  And	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  temporal	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  year	  that	  
IBSA	  states	  served	  as	  non-­‐permanent	  members	  of	  the	  UNSC	  means	  that	  the	  UN	  is	  the	  most	  
important	  lens	  from	  which	  to	  study	  their	  involvement.	  	  
Secondly,	  a	  comparison	  of	  IBSA’s	  actions	  regarding	  the	  conflicts	  in	  both	  Libya	  and	  
Syria	  can	  show	  the	  variation	  in	  IBSA’s	  cooperation,	  coordination	  and	  alignment	  during	  that	  
year.	  The	  Libyan	  and	  Syrian	  conflicts	  are	  two	  well-­‐documented	  conflicts	  that	  saw	  active	  
IBSA	  involvement;	  both	  were	  intra-­‐state	  insurgencies	  in	  dictatorial	  regimes	  and	  can	  be	  
generalized	  to	  conflicts	  of	  a	  similar	  nature.	  Despite	  there	  being	  numerous	  similarities,	  there	  
were	  many	  differences	  in	  how	  the	  international	  community	  and	  IBSA	  reacted	  to	  the	  two	  
conflicts.	  The	  Libyan	  conflict	  saw	  the	  UN	  make	  dramatic	  advances	  in	  implementing	  a	  
military	  intervention,	  while	  the	  Syrian	  conflict	  persisted	  as	  the	  UN	  proved	  unable	  to	  agree	  
to	  a	  suitable	  solution	  during	  that	  year.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  these	  negotiations,	  IBSA’s	  activities	  
could	  be	  found	  on	  both	  ends	  of	  the	  diplomatic	  spectrum-­‐	  from	  utter	  silence	  to	  the	  
specialized	  IBSA	  delegation	  that	  visited	  Syria	  to	  call	  for	  an	  end	  to	  the	  violence	  (Embassy	  of	  
India,	  Damascus,	  2011).	  That	  delegation	  visit	  showed	  an	  increased	  level	  of	  coordination	  for	  
IBSA	  beyond	  anything	  it	  did	  during	  the	  Libyan	  conflict	  where,	  in	  some	  cases,	  IBSA	  did	  not	  




Third,	  the	  behaviour	  and	  decisions	  of	  IBSA	  inevitably	  impacted	  the	  diplomatic	  
dynamics	  within	  the	  UN,	  at	  least	  to	  some	  degree.	  Both	  conflicts	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  managed	  
to	  polarize	  major	  actors	  of	  the	  international	  community,	  making	  2011	  a	  quarrelsome	  year	  
within	  the	  UN.	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone,	  the	  death	  of	  the	  Libyan	  President,	  and	  
discussions	  on	  how	  to	  handle	  the	  Syrian	  conflict	  all	  generated	  immense	  contention	  within	  
the	  UNSC.	  In	  2011,	  the	  least	  amount	  of	  UNSC	  Presidential	  statements	  was	  adopted	  in	  ten	  
years	  and	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  vetoes	  in	  five	  years	  was	  used.	  IBSA	  voted	  alongside	  the	  five	  
veto-­‐wielding	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  UNSC-­‐	  the	  US,	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (UK),	  France,	  
Russia,	  and	  China.	  During	  the	  negotiations	  on	  both	  the	  conflicts	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria,	  two	  of	  
the	  UNSC	  permanent	  members,	  Russia	  and	  China,	  largely	  managed	  to	  represent	  one	  side,	  
while	  the	  three	  other	  permanent	  members	  -­‐the	  US,	  UK,	  and	  France-­‐	  represented	  the	  other	  
(each	  side	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  separate	  “voting	  bloc”1).	  The	  UNSC	  can	  legally	  authorize	  the	  
use	  of	  force	  and	  is	  often	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  institutions	  in	  the	  field	  of	  
peace	  and	  security,	  raising	  the	  stakes	  of	  the	  diplomatic	  debate.	  	  
Also,	  the	  conclusions	  that	  I	  draw	  in	  this	  study	  can	  help	  explore	  IBSA’s	  leadership	  
potential	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  follows	  the	  lead	  of	  other	  major	  world	  actors.	  In	  recent	  
history,	  there	  has	  been	  an	  increased	  focus	  on	  emerging	  powers	  and	  their	  role	  in	  matters	  of	  
international	  peace	  and	  security.	  There	  is	  frequent	  speculation	  about	  how	  these	  emerging	  
powers	  will	  align	  with	  other	  powerful	  global	  actors	  on	  critical	  issues.	  Whether	  or	  not	  IBSA	  
aligns	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  or	  the	  US	  or	  the	  UK,	  etc.,	  can	  reveal	  what	  the	  continually	  
evolving	  international	  conflict	  resolution	  regime	  might	  look	  like.	  After	  all,	  the	  IBSA	  
countries	  were	  focused	  on	  making	  an	  impact	  and	  eventually	  gaining	  permanent	  seats	  on	  the	  
UNSC,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  this	  statement	  in	  regards	  to	  their	  non-­‐permanent	  seats	  on	  the	  UNSC	  
that	  year:	  “This	  augurs	  positively	  for	  enhanced	  cooperation	  efforts	  that	  will	  contribute	  to	  a	  
multilateral	  system	  that	  reflect	  participation	  by	  all	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  all”	  (Government	  of	  
South	  Africa,	  2011).	  If	  IBSA	  does	  receive	  permanent	  seats	  on	  the	  UNSC	  one	  day,	  it	  will	  
increase	  their	  diplomatic	  negotiating	  power,	  and	  make	  it	  even	  more	  important	  to	  
understand	  their	  alignment	  tendencies.	  	  
Finally,	  this	  study	  can	  address	  the	  future	  of	  IBSA,	  which,	  according	  to	  many	  
academics	  and	  commentators,	  seems	  to	  hang	  in	  the	  balance.	  Rumours	  about	  the	  possibility	  
of	  an	  IBSA	  merger	  with	  BRICS	  or	  the	  complete	  dissolution	  of	  IBSA	  have	  circulated	  (Taylor,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Voting	  blocs	  are	  "any	  group	  which	  consistently	  votes	  as	  a	  unit	  on	  all	  or	  particular	  kinds	  of	  
issues,”	  grounded	  in	  any	  number	  of	  similarities	  (Ball	  1951,	  p.3).	  




2012;	  Soule-­‐Kohndou,	  2013;	  and	  Stuenkel,	  2011).	  Some	  speculate	  that	  it	  is	  because	  the	  
work	  of	  IBSA	  is	  potentially	  redundant	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  BRICS	  (Soulé-­‐Kohndou,	  2013,	  
p.23).	  Even	  though	  the	  BRICS	  started	  to	  meet	  later	  than	  IBSA	  did,	  BRICS	  has	  become	  very	  
popular	  and	  closely	  followed	  by	  the	  media.	  IBSA,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  cancelled	  its	  June	  2013	  
meeting	  indefinitely	  and	  received	  extremely	  limited	  media	  coverage	  of	  the	  fact	  (Stuenkel,	  
2013).	  However,	  while	  IBSA	  formed	  of	  its	  own	  volition	  out	  of	  shared	  norms	  and	  values,	  the	  
catalyst	  that	  formed	  the	  BRICS	  came	  merely	  from	  a	  paper	  written	  by	  Jim	  O’Neill	  of	  Goldman	  
Sachs	  in	  2001	  (Qobo	  2011,	  p.6).	  In	  short,	  this	  study	  can	  contribute	  to	  explaining	  the	  
potential	  sustainability	  of	  IBSA	  on	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  issues	  over	  the	  long-­‐
term.	  	  
	  
1.3.	  Research	  Aim	  and	  Questions	  
	  
The	  aim	  of	  the	  research	  is	  to	  explore	  IBSA	  engagement	  and	  its	  level	  of	  internal	  
cooperation	  (called	  internal	  cohesion)	  and	  alignment	  on	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  
issues,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  2011	  violent	  intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria.	  I	  have	  
selected	  alignment	  and	  internal	  coherence	  because	  exploring	  alignment	  can	  reveal	  trends	  in	  
geopolitical	  positioning	  and	  internal	  coherence	  can	  show	  IBSA’s	  strength	  and	  coordination.	  
Highly	  coordinated	  diplomatic	  coalitions	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  effect	  international	  
diplomacy.	  	  In	  order	  to	  address	  these	  aims,	  I	  first	  qualitatively	  examine	  the	  statements	  and	  
actions	  of	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	  on	  the	  Libyan	  and	  Syrian	  conflicts	  separately	  and	  as	  
a	  unit	  to	  provide	  context	  and	  to	  see	  if	  there	  are	  /	  were	  any	  changes	  in	  their	  roles,	  views,	  
alignment	  or	  level	  of	  cooperation	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  year.	  Secondly,	  correlated	  to	  this,	  
IBSA’s	  voting	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  (UNGA),	  the	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  
Council	  (UNHRC),	  and	  the	  UNSC	  is	  examined.	  This	  can	  show	  the	  manifestation	  of	  IBSA’s	  
statements	  and	  actions,	  the	  degree	  of	  IBSA’s	  alignment	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  or	  the	  US,	  UK,	  
and	  France,	  and	  IBSA’s	  internal	  coherence.	  The	  project	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  provide	  
causality,	  but	  merely	  to	  examine	  the	  nature	  and	  strength	  of	  the	  internal	  coherence	  and	  
alignment	  of	  IBSA	  as	  manifested	  in	  the	  conflicts	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  my	  
research	  aim,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  following	  questions:	  
	  




! What	  is	  the	  level	  of	  internal	  cohesion	  of	  the	  IBSA	  states	  in	  their	  voting	  in	  the	  
United	  Nations?	  	  
! What	  is	  the	  level	  of	  internal	  cohesion	  on	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  
issues?	  	  
! How	  does	  resolution	  substance	  affect	  internal	  cohesion,	  particularly	  around	  




! Does	  IBSA	  align	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  or	  the	  UK,	  US,	  and	  France	  in	  the	  
United	  Nations?	  	  
! How	  does	  the	  resolution	  substance	  affect	  alignment,	  particularly	  around	  the	  
conflicts	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria?	  	  
	  
I	  expect	  to	  find	  strong	  internal	  coherence	  overall	  for	  IBSA	  states.	  They	  will	  vote	  
unanimously	  much	  of	  the	  time	  and	  rarely	  disagree	  completely.	  In	  comparing	  the	  internal	  
coherence	  of	  IBSA	  on	  the	  conflicts	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria,	  there	  will	  not	  be	  enough	  quantitative	  
data	  to	  determine	  through	  that	  method	  if	  one	  conflict	  saw	  more	  internal	  coherence	  than	  
another.	  However,	  limited	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn	  on	  internal	  coherence	  from	  the	  
quantitative	  analysis	  when	  I	  analyse	  the	  combined	  votes.	  Through	  the	  qualitative	  analysis	  I	  
show	  how	  IBSA	  actually	  did	  demonstrate	  internal	  coordination	  through	  the	  diplomatic	  
actions	  that	  it	  took.	  When	  I	  break	  down	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  votes	  into	  relevant	  
categories	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  analysis,	  I	  expect	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  internal	  coherence	  on	  
on-­‐going	  conflict-­‐related	  issues	  and	  human	  rights	  categories.	  Finally,	  I	  predict	  the	  lowest	  
levels	  of	  internal	  coherence	  on	  disarmament	  and	  terrorism	  issues,	  including	  nuclear	  related	  
issues,	  based	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  existing	  literature	  that	  will	  later	  be	  reviewed.	  	  
Regarding	  alignment,	  IBSA	  likely	  backs	  Chinese	  and	  Russian	  stances	  on	  all	  
categorical	  issues,	  before	  it	  backs	  the	  P3.	  Any	  variation	  in	  IBSA’s	  alignment	  likely	  depends	  
heavily	  on	  the	  resolution’s	  content.	  When	  analysing	  peace	  and	  security	  issues,	  IBSA’s	  
alignment	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  is	  probably	  strongest	  on	  human	  rights	  and	  disarmament	  
categories.	  IBSA	  votes	  independently,	  meaning	  with	  sufficient	  difference	  between	  its	  bloc	  
voting	  and	  that	  of	  the	  P3	  and	  China	  and	  Russia,	  a	  small	  percentage	  of	  the	  time.	  A	  good	  




and	  Russia	  vote	  in	  favour,	  and	  the	  P3	  abstain.	  Independent	  voting	  signifies	  a	  unified	  IBSA,	  
resistant	  to	  the	  influences	  of	  the	  powerful	  P5.	  If	  IBSA	  votes	  unanimously,	  regardless	  of	  
alignment,	  this	  shows	  there	  is	  some	  coordination	  and	  strength,	  whether	  inherent	  through	  
shared	  norms	  and	  values	  or	  actual	  coordination.	  2	  The	  low	  number	  of	  votes	  for	  Syria	  and	  
Libya	  mean	  that	  only	  limited	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  quantitative	  analysis	  
regarding	  alignment.	  The	  qualitative	  analysis	  will	  provide	  a	  much	  more	  in-­‐depth	  picture	  of	  
alignment.	  	  
	  
1.4.	  Research	  Design	  and	  Methodology	  
This	  empirical	  research	  project	  portion	  is	  done	  in	  two	  parts:	  one	  part	  qualitative	  
analysis	  and	  one	  part	  quantitative.	  As	  a	  whole,	  the	  study	  focuses	  on	  a	  macro-­‐level	  on	  
countries	  as	  actors	  within	  the	  UN	  longitudinally	  over	  the	  course	  of	  calendar	  year	  2011.	  It	  
begins	  with	  a	  qualitative	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	  of	  IBSA	  in	  the	  conflicts	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria.	  The	  
analysis	  contains	  primary	  source	  documents	  from	  the	  UN,	  IBSA,	  and	  the	  Indian,	  Brazilian,	  
and	  South	  African	  governments.	  Documents	  issued	  prior	  to	  the	  conflicts	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  
will	  be	  used	  to	  provide	  historical	  background	  information	  on	  IBSA	  and	  its	  perspective	  and	  
views	  on	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  issues.	  Additionally,	  secondary	  sources,	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  scholarly	  journal	  articles,	  organizational	  papers,	  and	  news	  articles,	  will	  be	  consulted.	  	  
In	  the	  qualitative	  analysis,	  I	  examine,	  but	  am	  not	  limited	  to,	  the	  following:	  changes	  in	  
discourse,	  dialogues,	  bilateral	  or	  multilateral	  actions,	  offers	  of	  help,	  and	  actions.	  The	  UNSC	  
is	  capable	  of	  legally	  authorizing	  the	  use	  of	  force	  and	  “has	  the	  legal	  authority	  to	  take	  
measures	  to	  maintain	  or	  restore	  international	  peace;”	  therefore,	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  analysis	  will	  
focus	  on	  that	  forum	  (Dreher	  et	  al,	  2008,	  p.3).	  	  However,	  UNGA	  and	  the	  UNHRC	  also	  dealt	  
with	  the	  conflicts	  and	  peace	  and	  security	  issues,	  so	  the	  qualitative	  analysis	  portion	  will	  
explore	  their	  involvement,	  but	  on	  a	  lower	  scale.	  Discourse	  is	  defined	  as	  written	  or	  spoken	  
communication;	  including	  statements	  made	  by	  IBSA	  states	  or	  IBSA	  as	  a	  unit.	  Actions	  include	  
delegations	  sent,	  votes	  made	  within	  the	  UN,	  and	  speeches	  given.	  Actions	  or	  statements	  may	  
have	  significance	  because	  they	  prove	  change	  or	  coalescence,	  such	  as	  the	  use	  of	  more	  
forceful	  language	  or	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  detail	  of	  request.	  By	  comparing	  the	  actions,	  I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Norms	  “are	  a	  standard	  of	  appropriate	  behaviour	  for	  actors	  with	  a	  given	  identity”	  




can	  determine	  if	  change	  occurred,	  although	  this	  study	  will	  be	  limited	  in	  explaining	  the	  depth	  
or	  causality	  behind	  the	  changes.	  	  	  
The	  quantitative	  analysis	  portion	  draws	  conclusions	  from	  an	  analysis	  of	  IBSA	  
members’	  voting	  behaviour	  within	  the	  UNSC,	  UNGA	  and	  the	  UNHRC-­‐	  looking	  at	  the	  votes	  
and	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  resolutions.	  Votes	  are	  a	  “succinct	  statement[s]	  of	  a	  state’s	  position	  
on	  a	  matter,”	  and	  indicate	  a	  state’s	  alignment,	  and	  thus	  an	  analysis	  can	  prove	  fruitful	  
(Graham,	  2012,	  p.410).	  The	  full	  dataset	  includes	  the	  66	  resolutions	  passed	  by	  the	  UNSC;	  the	  
348	  resolutions	  passed	  by	  the	  UNGA;	  and	  the	  99	  resolutions	  passed	  by	  UNHRC.	  All	  three	  
forums	  handled	  peace	  and	  security	  issues	  and	  passed	  resolutions	  related	  to	  the	  Libyan	  and	  
Syrian	  conflicts.	  China	  and	  Russia	  and	  the	  P3	  are	  focuses	  because	  of	  their	  proven	  history	  of	  
convergence,	  positioning	  on	  the	  UNSC,	  and	  the	  political	  positions	  they	  took	  during	  the	  
Libyan	  and	  Syrian	  conflicts.	  Unlike	  the	  UNSC,	  UNGA	  has	  no	  legislative	  authority	  and	  its	  
resolutions	  are	  not	  legally	  binding.	  However,	  this	  benefits	  the	  quantitative	  analysis,	  because	  
it	  can	  potentially	  mean	  there	  will	  be	  more	  contentious	  votes	  in	  UNGA,	  because	  the	  countries	  
can	  vote	  with	  less	  consequence	  (Hosli	  et	  al,	  2010,	  p.5).	  Resolutions	  adopted	  without	  a	  vote,	  
as	  commonly	  happens	  in	  the	  UNGA	  and	  UNHRC	  and	  those	  adopted	  unanimously,	  as	  occurs	  
in	  the	  UNSC,	  are	  included	  in	  parts	  of	  the	  analysis.	  While	  this	  dilutes	  the	  findings,	  it	  more	  
accurately	  represents	  the	  voting	  dynamics.	  Using	  the	  vote	  records,	  three	  separate	  variables	  
were	  constructed.	  The	  first	  shows	  the	  internal	  cohesion	  of	  IBSA,	  P3,	  and	  China	  and	  Russia,	  
the	  second	  shows	  the	  unification	  of	  those	  same	  voting	  blocs,	  and	  the	  final	  shows	  the	  
alignment	  of	  IBSA	  to	  the	  P3	  or	  China	  and	  Russia.	  
	  
1.5.	  Limitations	   	  
Regarding	  chronology,	  I	  use	  background	  information	  from	  before	  2003	  on	  India,	  
Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	  to	  give	  the	  brief	  history	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  IBSA.	  The	  bulk	  of	  my	  
paper	  focuses	  on	  IBSA	  and	  its	  member	  states	  beginning	  in	  2003	  and	  uses	  the	  most	  recent	  
sources	  necessary	  to	  cover	  IBSA	  engagement	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria.	  I	  do	  not	  attempt	  to	  draw	  
conclusions	  beyond	  international	  peace	  and	  security;	  issues	  outside	  of	  international	  peace	  
and	  security	  potentially	  imply	  a	  different	  set	  of	  diplomatic	  tools.	  My	  examination	  will	  only	  
look	  at	  the	  year	  2011-­‐2012,	  when	  all	  three	  IBSA	  countries	  served	  on	  the	  UNSC	  together.	  
Extending	  the	  analysis	  beyond	  that	  time	  frame	  goes	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  On	  the	  




statements	  and	  actions	  of	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  /	  or	  South	  Africa,	  such	  as	  regional	  organizations	  
or	  bilateral	  relationships.	  The	  qualitative	  analysis	  section	  does	  not	  try	  to	  determine	  or	  
quantify	  which	  influences	  were	  more	  significant	  or	  decisive;	  rather	  it	  merely	  explores	  those	  
separate	  influences.	  Diplomatic	  actions	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  one	  causal	  factor;	  rather	  the	  
actions	  are	  often	  the	  result	  of	  multiple	  causal	  factors.	  	  
There	  are	  several	  limitations	  inherent	  to	  the	  quantitative	  analysis	  portion	  of	  this	  
study.	  Firstly,	  IBSA’s	  strength	  as	  a	  voting	  bloc	  on	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  issues	  
does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  they	  are	  equally	  strong	  as	  a	  “bloc”	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  other	  issues	  
(Holloway,	  1990,	  pp.283-­‐284).	  Secondly,	  vote	  bargaining	  within	  the	  UN,	  called	  
“horsetrading,”	  undoubtedly	  occurs	  and	  is	  challenging	  to	  isolate.	  Horsetrading	  implies	  that	  
not	  all	  votes	  included	  in	  the	  sample	  are	  genuine	  reflections	  of	  a	  country’s	  policy	  
preferences.	  It	  occurs	  when	  a	  country	  or	  “bloc”	  offers	  to	  support	  or	  reject	  an	  issue	  in	  
exchange	  for	  support	  from	  another	  country	  or	  “bloc”	  on	  an	  entirely	  separate	  issue	  possibly	  
in	  a	  different	  forum	  (Dreher,	  at	  al	  2008).	  In	  a	  2008	  analysis	  by	  academics	  Dreher,	  Sturm,	  
and	  Vreeland	  (Dreher	  et	  al),	  the	  authors	  found	  a	  relationship	  between	  those	  serving	  as	  non-­‐
permanent	  members	  of	  the	  UNSC	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  benefits	  they	  received	  from	  
participation	  in	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  programs.	  This	  implied	  that	  the	  non-­‐
permanent	  members	  of	  the	  UNSC’s	  votes	  were	  traded	  for	  IMF-­‐related	  benefits	  (Dreher	  et	  al,	  
2008).	  Regrettably,	  this	  type	  of	  dynamic	  could	  only	  be	  uncovered	  through	  a	  targeted	  
examination	  (Long,	  2013).	  As	  for	  this	  project,	  votes	  will	  be	  accepted	  as	  is.	  	  
1.6.	  Chapter	  Outline	  
	  
The	  second	  chapter	  begins	  with	  the	  history	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  IBSA,	  brief	  histories	  
and	  explorations	  of	  the	  foreign	  policies	  of	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	  and	  what	  might	  
have	  motivated	  them	  to	  share	  the	  norms	  and	  values	  that	  they	  do	  and	  to	  participate	  in	  IBSA.	  
The	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  what	  was	  covered	  on	  international	  peace	  and	  
security	  in	  the	  initial	  IBSA	  meetings	  and	  summits	  to	  showcase	  the	  shared	  norms	  and	  values.	  
Also,	  the	  IBSA	  focus	  on	  increasing	  cooperation	  will	  be	  featured.	  The	  third	  chapter	  opens	  
with	  a	  background	  on	  the	  “Arab	  Spring”	  uprising	  in	  Libya	  in	  February	  2011	  until	  the	  point	  
that	  the	  international	  community	  began	  to	  play	  a	  role.	  It	  then	  explores	  the	  extent	  and	  
character	  of	  IBSA’s	  involvement.	  The	  second	  and	  final	  qualitative	  analysis	  will	  be	  on	  the	  




The	  fifth	  chapter	  consists	  of	  a	  quantitative	  analysis	  of	  IBSA’s	  voting	  record	  in	  the	  UN.	  It	  
measures	  and	  investigates	  the	  level	  of	  internal	  coherence	  of	  IBSA	  and	  compares	  it	  to	  the	  
voting	  blocs	  of	  Russia	  and	  China	  and	  the	  UK,	  US,	  and	  France.	  The	  concluding	  chapter	  
presents	  the	  theoretical	  exploration	  of	  the	  findings,	  neoliberal	  institutionalism,	  and	  looks	  at	  
soft	  balancing	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  IBSA’s	  rhetoric	  and	  behaviour.	  It	  finishes	  with	  a	  review	  


































CHAPTER	  2:	  THE	  FORMATION	  OF	  IBSA	  	  
2.1.	  Introduction	  	  
The	  idea	  of	  IBSA	  officially	  materialized	  in	  2003	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  the	  G8	  meeting	  in	  
Evian,	  France	  (Graham,	  2010,	  p.3).	  The	  G-­‐8	  is	  an	  informal	  international	  diplomatic	  grouping	  
that	  meets	  regularly	  to	  discuss	  a	  variety	  of	  global	  issues;	  it	  includes	  the	  world’s	  largest	  
economies	  and	  the	  P5,	  but	  does	  not	  include	  India,	  Brazil,	  or	  South	  Africa	  (UK	  Government,	  
2013).	  Exclusion	  meant	  that	  IBSA	  was	  rendered	  unable	  to	  voice	  their	  interests	  or	  shared	  
norms	  and	  values	  in	  the	  discussion.	  This	  largely	  helps	  to	  explain	  why	  IBSA	  formed,	  because	  
even	  as	  powerful	  economies,	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  debate	  critical	  international	  issues,	  not	  
only	  at	  the	  UNSC	  permanent	  members	  level,	  but	  also	  at	  the	  conventional	  G8	  level.	  Forming	  
IBSA	  was	  a	  way	  for	  the	  countries	  to	  magnify	  their	  influence	  at	  the	  international	  level	  and	  
push	  for	  increased	  responsibility.	  Consequently,	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	  had	  “on-­‐
going	  trilateral	  consultations”	  that	  led	  to	  IBSA’s	  official	  formation	  in	  June	  2003,	  with	  the	  
signing	  of	  the	  Brasilia	  Declaration	  by	  the	  member	  countries’	  Foreign	  Ministers	  (Graham,	  
2010,	  p.3).	  President	  Thabo	  Mbeki	  of	  South	  Africa,	  President	  Lula	  Da	  Silva	  of	  Brazil,	  and	  
President	  Atal	  Vajpayee	  of	  India	  officially	  announced	  the	  formation	  at	  the	  September	  2003	  
UNGA	  meeting	  (Taylor,	  2009,	  p.48).	  IBSA	  now	  has	  regular	  consultations	  at	  the	  senior	  level;	  
ministerial	  meetings,	  which	  tend	  to	  occur	  on	  an	  annual	  basis;	  and	  Heads	  of	  State	  and/or	  
Government	  levels,	  although	  those	  only	  occur	  every	  other	  year.	  IBSA	  also	  arranges	  “Track	  
II”	  Diplomacy,	  meaning	  interactions,	  meetings	  and	  consultations	  amongst	  academics,	  
businesses,	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  and	  other	  sectors	  of	  civil	  society	  (IBSA	  
Trilateral,	  2013).	  The	  meetings	  and	  consultations	  provide	  opportunities	  for	  the	  countries	  to	  
discuss	  issues	  vital	  to	  the	  coalition.	  	  
India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	  are	  governed	  democratically,	  have	  the	  largest	  
economies	  of	  their	  respective	  regions,	  and	  maintain	  strong	  interests	  in	  international	  peace	  
and	  security	  (CIA,	  2013;	  CIA,	  2013a;	  and	  CIA,	  2013b).	  Firstly,	  their	  democratic	  systems	  of	  




According	  to	  Mzukisi	  Qobo,	  the	  differing	  governance	  systems	  (China	  and	  Russia	  both	  have	  
authoritarian	  governments)	  and	  Chinese	  and	  Russian	  problems	  with	  “massive	  corporate	  
governance	  weaknesses”…	  are	  not	  to	  be	  easily	  bridged	  among	  the	  BRICS	  (Qobo,	  2011,	  p.17).	  
Academics	  Alden	  and	  Vieira	  also	  cite	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa’s	  statuses	  as	  
democracies	  as	  a	  crucial	  commonality	  among	  them	  (2005,	  p.1090).	  Comparing	  IBSA	  to	  the	  
BRICS,	  Flemes	  states	  that	  cooperation	  will	  be	  stronger	  for	  IBSA	  than	  for	  the	  BRICS	  because:	  	  
“IBSA’s	  common	  identity	  is	  based	  on	  values	  such	  as	  democracy,	  personal	  freedoms	  
and	  human	  rights.	  The	  participation	  of	  China	  and	  Russia,	  both	  not	  known	  for	  their	  
democratic	  practices	  and	  commitment	  to	  human	  rights,	  would	  not	  only	  undercut	  
collective	  norms	  and	  identities	  but	  also	  compromise	  the	  credibility	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  
the	  group	  pursuing	  the	  milieu	  goals	  of	  international	  relations.”	  (Flemes	  2007,	  p.25)	  
	  
Participatory	  democracy	  is	  considered	  a	  value	  that	  “underpins”	  IBSA	  (Tshwane	  Declaration,	  
2011,	  pt.1).	  The	  democratic	  identities	  of	  IBSA	  will	  undoubtedly	  affect	  their	  diplomatic	  views	  
and	  strategies.	  	  
Secondly,	  the	  language	  in	  the	  2003	  Brasilia	  Declaration	  of	  “three	  countries	  with	  
vibrant	  democracies,	  from	  three	  regions	  of	  the	  developing	  world,	  active	  on	  a	  global	  scale”	  
implies	  that	  each	  country	  is	  considered	  a	  leader	  of	  its	  geographic	  region/continent	  (Brasilia	  
Declaration,	  2003,	  p.2).	  Regardless	  of	  other	  regional	  perceptions	  of	  this	  leadership,	  IBSA	  
states	  have	  “taken	  on	  a	  self-­‐appointed	  role	  as	  leaders	  in	  various	  Southern	  alliances	  such	  as	  
the	  G77	  at	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  G20	  at	  the	  WTO”	  (Stephen,	  2012,	  p.	  290).	  Alden	  and	  Vieira	  (2005,	  
p.4)	  argue	  that	  not	  only	  does	  economic	  and	  military	  strength	  justify	  their	  leadership,	  but	  so	  
does	  “their	  activism	  in	  the	  name	  of	  international	  norms	  and	  /	  or	  their	  position	  as	  an	  
intermediary	  for	  those	  states	  (developing	  countries	  in	  fact)	  excluded	  from	  the	  ranks	  of	  
power.”	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	  received	  recognition	  of	  leadership	  from	  other	  
powerful	  international	  countries,	  which	  helped	  increase	  their	  legitimacy	  (Alden	  and	  Vieira,	  
2005,	  p.1091).	  	  
Finally,	  regarding	  issues	  of	  international	  peace	  and	  security,	  IBSA	  shared	  the	  same	  
positive	  appraisal	  of	  international	  law	  and	  working	  within	  it,	  their	  desire	  to	  strengthen	  the	  
UN,	  and	  “the	  exercise	  of	  diplomacy	  as	  a	  means	  to	  maintain	  international	  peace	  and	  security”	  
(Brasilia	  Declaration,	  2003,	  pt.3).	  More	  specifically,	  the	  IBSA	  countries	  also	  share	  an	  interest	  
in	  democracy	  promotion,	  rule	  of	  law,	  human	  rights,	  and	  global	  governance	  reform.	  IBSA	  
began	  to	  discuss	  issues	  of	  peace	  and	  security	  at	  its	  first	  meetings	  in	  Brasilia,	  Brazil	  and	  New	  
Delhi,	  India	  in	  2004	  and	  has	  discussed	  them	  ever	  since	  (Alden	  and	  Vieira,	  2005,	  p.1089	  and	  




and	  interest	  in	  peace	  and	  security	  established,	  this	  chapter	  now	  goes	  on	  to	  explore	  the	  
motivations	  and	  histories	  of	  the	  three	  countries	  that	  has	  helped	  power	  their	  participation	  in	  
IBSA.	  Then	  follows	  an	  explanation	  of	  IBSA’s	  goals	  of	  sectoral	  cooperation	  and	  global	  
governance	  reform,	  which	  are	  critical	  for	  this	  study.	  	  
2.2.	  Shared	  Motivations	  and	  History	  	  
2.2.1.	  India	  
Post-­‐colonial	  history,	  an	  independence	  struggle,	  and	  its	  economic	  and	  demographic	  
leadership	  within	  the	  Asian	  sub-­‐continent	  all	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  India’s	  strategic	  
role	  in	  the	  international	  community	  and	  can	  lend	  explanatory	  power	  to	  the	  reasons	  India	  
joined	  IBSA.	  	  India,	  which	  received	  independence	  from	  the	  UK	  and	  became	  a	  democracy	  in	  
the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  has	  an	  identity	  that	  is	  still	  affected,	  debatably	  to	  this	  day,	  by	  
its	  independence	  struggle	  (Smith,	  2012,	  p.373).	  India’s	  once	  limited	  material	  resources	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  its	  post-­‐colonial	  status	  demanded	  increased	  reliance	  on	  diplomatic	  power;	  
therefore,	  it	  participates	  in	  several	  key	  diplomatic	  groupings	  in	  addition	  to	  IBSA.	  India’s	  
Former	  Prime	  Minister	  Nehru	  was	  a	  founding	  father	  of	  the	  Non-­‐Aligned	  Movement	  (NAM),	  
to	  which	  South	  Africa	  also	  belongs,	  but	  Brazil	  does	  not	  (Beri,	  2003,	  p.217).	  	  India	  also	  
belongs	  to	  the	  G77,	  which	  is	  a	  UN-­‐based	  alliance	  of	  Southern	  hemisphere	  developing	  
countries	  (Smith,	  2012,	  p.7).	  Throughout	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s,	  India	  supported	  many	  
liberation	  movements	  in	  Africa-­‐	  in	  particular	  those	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Namibia	  (Beri,	  2003,	  
p.218).	  It	  provided	  support	  to	  the	  movements	  through	  multilateral	  institutions	  and	  
diplomatic	  support	  by	  recognizing	  political	  organizations	  like	  the	  South	  West	  African	  
People’s	  Organization	  (SWAPO)	  in	  Namibia	  and	  the	  African	  National	  Congress	  (ANC)	  of	  
South	  Africa	  (Beri	  2003,	  p.218).	  In	  recent	  history,	  India	  has	  seen	  an	  increase	  in	  its	  soft	  
power,	  democratic	  institutions,	  and	  strong	  support	  for	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  
(The	  Economist,	  2013).	  India	  sees	  itself	  as	  a	  leader	  of	  the	  developing	  world	  and	  is	  strongly	  
invested	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  developing	  countries.	  This	  interest	  and	  lingering	  anti-­‐western	  
tendencies	  have	  led	  India	  to	  seek	  increased	  alliances	  with	  Southern	  countries	  and	  improved	  
South-­‐South	  cooperation	  (Smith,	  2012,	  pp.377,	  381);	  all	  of	  which	  are	  benefits	  India	  would	  





2.2.2.	  South	  Africa	  	  
	  
South	  Africa	  was	  largely	  motivated	  to	  join	  IBSA	  because	  of	  its	  history	  as	  a	  post-­‐
colonial	  state,	  its	  emergence	  from	  apartheid,	  and	  its	  position	  as	  the	  dominant	  economy	  on	  
the	  African	  continent.	  South	  Africa	  transitioned	  to	  democracy	  after	  approximately	  half	  a	  
century	  of	  apartheid	  rule	  in	  1994	  (Habib,	  2009).	  South	  Africa	  is	  Africa’s	  dominant	  economy	  
with	  strong	  western	  ties;	  it	  frequently	  appears	  to	  have	  scattered	  foreign	  policy	  identities	  as	  
a	  result	  of	  trying	  to	  satisfy	  its	  African	  and	  Western	  relationships	  (Rawoot,	  2012	  and	  
Cornelissen,	  2009).	  The	  leadership	  of	  the	  first	  President	  of	  democratic	  South	  Africa,	  Nelson	  
Mandela	  of	  the	  ANC,	  had	  a	  strong	  focus	  on	  values	  that	  included	  human	  rights.	  Membership	  
in	  IBSA	  for	  South	  Africa	  has	  given	  them	  an	  opportunity	  to	  speak	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  African	  
continent,	  furthering	  their	  image	  and	  self-­‐perception	  as	  an	  African	  leader.	  In	  South	  Africa’s	  
post-­‐apartheid	  diplomatic	  history,	  it	  has	  made	  actions	  and	  statements	  in	  support	  of	  its	  
South-­‐South	  partners	  and	  its	  desires	  for	  global	  governance	  reform,	  which	  are	  both	  key	  IBSA	  
goals.	  In	  2011,	  South	  Africa	  released	  a	  white	  paper	  delineating	  its	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  called	  
“Building	  a	  Better	  World.”	  The	  paper	  expands	  on	  global	  governance	  reform,	  the	  importance	  
of	  South-­‐South	  cooperation,	  internationalism,	  and	  the	  necessity	  of	  building	  partnerships	  
among	  developing	  countries,	  and	  many	  other	  ideas	  and	  norms	  that	  IBSA	  prioritizes	  (2011).	  
The	  White	  Paper	  (2011,	  p.14)	  elaborates	  on	  global	  governance	  reform	  by	  emphasizing	  
South	  Africa’s	  desire	  to	  see	  global	  governing	  institutions	  reflect	  “new	  political	  realities.”	  
South-­‐South	  cooperation,	  particularly	  around	  trade,	  is	  highlighted	  (2011,	  pp.13,	  28,	  and	  33).	  
Also	  within	  the	  paper,	  BRICS	  is	  mentioned	  twice,	  India	  is	  mentioned	  at	  least	  four	  times	  
(2011,	  pp.	  24,	  29,	  and	  30)	  and	  Brazil	  is	  mentioned	  twice	  (2011,	  pp.17	  and	  34).	  IBSA	  is	  
mentioned	  once	  and	  in	  reference	  to	  multilateral	  groupings.	  The	  White	  Paper	  states	  that	  it	  
“supports	  the	  use	  of	  such	  groupings	  as	  an	  important	  mechanism	  for	  consensus	  building”	  
(White	  Paper,	  2011,	  pp.25-­‐26).	  Membership	  in	  IBSA	  would	  allow	  South	  Africa	  to	  build	  
cooperation	  around	  the	  mutual	  goals	  of	  the	  coalition.	  	  
2.2.3.	  Brazil	  	  
	  
Brazil	  ended	  its	  rule	  under	  an	  authoritarian	  military	  dictatorship	  in	  1985	  when	  the	  




economy	  has	  grown	  dramatically-­‐	  some	  have	  recently	  called	  it	  “an	  engine	  of	  regional	  
growth”	  (Bodman	  et	  al,	  2011,	  p.55).	  When	  Brazil	  joined	  IBSA	  in	  2003,	  its	  President	  was	  Lula	  
Inácio	  da	  Silva,	  who	  kept	  his	  eye	  on	  his	  desired	  permanent	  seat	  on	  the	  UNSC	  for	  the	  
duration	  of	  his	  tenure.	  For	  Brazil,	  joining	  IBSA	  provided	  a	  way	  to	  work	  in	  a	  more	  strategic	  
fashion	  and	  on	  a	  team	  towards	  its	  goal	  of	  a	  permanent	  seat	  on	  the	  UNSC.	  Lula,	  a	  founder	  of	  
the	  Worker’s	  Party	  (Partido	  dos	  Trabalhadores),	  devoted	  much	  of	  his	  time	  to	  building	  
relationships	  with	  other	  Southern	  states	  and	  membership	  in	  IBSA	  brought	  him	  another	  
opportunity	  to	  further	  the	  critical	  South-­‐South	  relationships	  (Alden	  and	  Vieira,	  2005).	  Lula’s	  
successor,	  Dilma	  Rousseff,	  took	  power	  in	  2011	  and	  also	  wanted	  a	  permanent	  seat	  on	  the	  
UNSC	  and	  to	  continue	  prioritizing	  South-­‐South	  partnerships.	  The	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  
Relations’	  2011	  Brazil	  report	  stated	  that	  in	  Rousseff’s	  youth,	  she	  was	  tortured	  and	  
imprisoned	  for	  her	  “underground	  activities,”	  to	  which	  the	  conclusion	  was	  drawn	  that,	  based	  
on	  these	  experiences,	  she	  could	  “be	  a	  powerful	  voice	  for	  human	  rights	  and	  democratic	  
values	  in	  Latin	  America”	  (Bodman	  et	  al,	  2011,	  p.54).	  By	  extension,	  this	  can	  partially	  explain	  
the	  human	  rights	  and	  democracy	  focus	  that	  Brazil	  has	  had	  recently	  in	  the	  international	  
peace	  and	  security	  realm.	  	  
Brazil	  rarely	  maintains	  a	  consistent	  identity	  in	  international	  relations.	  Prior	  to	  
President	  da	  Silva	  Lula,	  Brazil	  aligned	  with	  the	  US	  and	  only	  with	  President	  Da	  Silva’s	  
presidency	  has	  this	  shifted.	  President	  Rousseff	  entered	  office	  in	  2011	  after	  President	  da	  
Silva	  and	  President	  Rousseff	  had	  many	  competing	  priorities:	  increasing	  South-­‐South	  
cooperation,	  integrating	  South	  America	  even	  further,	  in	  addition	  to	  managing	  a	  complex	  and	  
growing	  relationship	  with	  China	  (Bodman	  et	  al,	  2011,	  p.9).	  Besides	  China,	  Brazil	  must	  also	  
consider	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  US,	  the	  other	  economic	  power	  of	  the	  Western	  hemisphere	  
(Bodman	  et	  al,	  2011,	  p.17).	  The	  maintenance	  of	  these	  relationships	  is	  laden	  with	  
implications	  and	  destabilizes	  Brazil’s	  political	  identities.	  As	  Brazil’s	  economy	  has	  grown,	  it	  
has	  seen	  its	  leadership	  role	  on	  the	  continent	  increase.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  show	  world	  
leadership	  capabilities	  and	  further	  their	  bid	  for	  a	  permanent	  seat	  on	  the	  UNSC,	  Brazil	  has	  
been	  one	  of	  the	  top	  15	  world	  troop	  contributors	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping	  (Alden	  and	  Vieira,	  
2005,	  p.1091	  and	  Bodman	  et	  al,	  2011,	  p.47).	  It	  has	  sent	  troops	  to	  more	  than	  twenty	  UN	  
peacekeeping	  missions	  since	  1985,	  when	  the	  military	  dictatorship	  ended	  (Bodman	  et	  al,	  
2011,	  p.47).	  In	  2004,	  Brazil	  began	  leading	  the	  UN	  Stabilization	  Mission	  in	  Haiti,	  which	  has	  a	  
Chapter	  7	  mandate	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  use	  of	  force	  (Norheim-­‐Martinsen,	  2012,	  p.4).	  This	  




dealing	  with	  the	  infrequently	  used	  UN	  use	  of	  force	  mandate	  that	  would	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  
conflict	  in	  Libya.	  
2.3.	  Sectoral	  Cooperation	  and	  Global	  Governance	  Reform	  
2.3.1.	  Sectoral	  Cooperation	  
	  
The	  first	  official	  IBSA	  document,	  the	  Brasilia	  Declaration,	  says	  that	  any	  “new	  
threats…	  must	  be	  handled	  with	  effective,	  coordinated	  and	  solidary	  international	  
cooperation,	  in	  the	  concerned	  organizations	  based	  on	  respect	  for	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  States	  
and	  for	  International	  Law”	  (2003,	  pt.5).	  And	  the	  purpose	  of	  IBSA,	  according	  to	  Alden	  and	  
Vieira	  (2005,	  p.1088)	  was	  “to	  share	  views	  on	  relevant	  regional	  and	  international	  issues	  of	  
mutual	  interest	  as	  well	  as	  promote	  cooperation.”	  Cooperation,	  to	  IBSA,	  will	  help	  the	  
countries	  achieve	  their	  social	  and	  economic	  development	  goals	  and	  was	  expected	  to	  include	  
areas	  as	  diverse	  as	  science,	  technology,	  trade,	  travel,	  and	  tourism	  (Brasilia	  Declaration,	  
2003,	  pt.	  9).	  The	  sentiment	  that	  traditional	  power	  states,	  such	  as	  the	  G8	  members,	  are	  
operating	  outside	  of	  the	  realm	  of	  international	  power	  organization	  structure	  by	  dictating	  
the	  decision-­‐making	  on	  their	  own	  (or	  by	  dictating	  the	  decision-­‐making	  of	  international	  law)	  
drives	  much	  of	  this	  desire	  for	  South-­‐South	  and	  genuine	  international	  cooperation.	  	  While	  
cooperation	  indeed	  covers	  many	  sectors,	  IBSA	  does	  not	  have	  a	  formal	  secretariat	  or	  any	  
sort	  of	  “home	  base.”	  Many	  of	  the	  IBSA	  meetings	  and	  working	  groups	  are	  held	  on	  an	  ad	  hoc	  
basis	  in	  different	  locations	  and	  some	  academics	  have	  speculated	  that	  IBSA’s	  coordination	  is	  
adversely	  affected	  by	  this	  lack	  of	  institutionalization	  (Flemes,	  2007,	  p.25).	  Flemes,	  for	  
instance,	  believed	  that	  with	  expanded	  institutionalization,	  IBSA	  could	  potentially	  increase	  
its	  coordination	  and	  achieve	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  its	  goals.	  He	  thought	  that	  more	  frequent	  
interactions	  among	  the	  states	  could	  further	  shared	  culture	  and	  ideas,	  bringing	  the	  states	  
into	  even	  closer	  normative	  alignment	  (Flemes,	  2007,	  p.25).	  	  	  
	  
2.3.2.	  Global	  Governance	  Reform	  
A	  key	  goal	  of	  IBSA	  is	  the	  countries’	  desire	  to	  expand	  the	  UNSC.	  In	  the	  2003	  Brasilia	  
Declaration,	  the	  IBSA	  states	  “stressed	  the	  necessity	  of	  expanding	  the	  Security	  Council	  in	  
both	  permanent	  and	  non-­‐permanent	  member	  categories,	  with	  the	  participation	  of	  




2006,	  which	  was	  a	  result	  of	  the	  meeting	  that	  included	  IBSA	  Heads	  of	  State,	  “reaffirmed	  the	  
need	  for	  a	  decision	  regarding	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  Security	  Council,	  without	  which	  no	  
reform	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  will	  be	  complete.	  They	  reiterated	  their	  conviction	  that	  the	  
Security	  Council	  must	  be	  expanded	  to	  include	  developing	  countries	  from	  Asia,	  Africa,	  and	  
Latin	  America…	  ”	  (Joint	  Declaration,	  2006,	  pt.10).	  IBSA	  has	  been	  driven	  to	  reform	  
international	  institutions	  and	  strengthen	  its	  role	  in	  them	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  
institutions	  have	  increased	  in	  quantity	  and	  in	  governing	  capacity	  in	  recent	  history	  and	  are	  
perceived	  to	  have	  “failing	  health”	  (Stephen,	  2012,	  p.	  290	  and	  Alden	  and	  Vieira,	  2005,	  
p.1090).	  Alden	  and	  Vieira	  believe	  that	  the	  perceived	  poor	  health	  has	  led	  to	  IBSA’s	  push	  for	  
permanent	  regional	  representation	  on	  the	  UNSC,	  to	  not	  only	  help	  “re-­‐legitimise	  these	  
institutions”	  but	  to	  increase	  their	  own	  leadership	  as	  well	  (2005,	  p.1090).	  	  
India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	  specifically	  advocate	  for	  the	  UNSC	  to	  expand	  both	  
permanent	  and	  non-­‐permanent	  membership	  to	  include	  members	  from	  Asia,	  Africa,	  and	  
Latin	  America-­‐	  one	  seat	  for	  each	  of	  them	  (Flemes,	  2007,	  pp.11-­‐12).	  The	  countries	  believe	  
that	  the	  current	  configuration	  of	  the	  UNSC	  is	  not	  representative	  of	  the	  current	  geopolitical	  
configuration	  of	  the	  world	  (Devraj,	  2011).	  IBSA’s	  2006	  Joint	  Declaration	  stated	  that	  reform	  
of	  the	  UNSC	  would	  help	  it	  “reflect	  contemporary	  realities	  and	  make	  it	  more	  democratic,	  
legitimate,	  representative	  and	  responsive”	  (2006,	  pt.10).	  The	  combined	  population	  of	  the	  
IBSA	  countries	  equals	  more	  than	  a	  sixth	  of	  the	  world’s	  population	  and	  IBSA	  countries	  would	  
like	  a	  more	  powerful	  platform	  on	  which	  to	  advocate	  for	  their	  needs	  (Alden	  and	  Vieira,	  2005,	  
p.1090).	  The	  UN	  Charter	  gives	  the	  UNSC	  “responsibility	  for	  maintaining	  international	  peace	  
and	  security”	  and	  holding	  these	  seats	  would	  increase	  IBSA’s	  power	  and	  enable	  them	  to	  
further	  their	  agenda	  (Chapter	  5,	  UN	  Charter).	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  IBSA	  invests	  its	  diplomatic	  
resources	  and	  energies	  in	  resolving	  violent	  conflicts	  like	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  in	  order	  to	  prove	  to	  
the	  international	  community	  that	  its	  members	  are	  capable	  of	  playing	  leadership	  roles	  in	  the	  
preservation	  of	  peace	  and	  security	  and	  to	  maximize	  existing	  power	  and	  influence.	  
IBSA’s	  partners	  in	  the	  BRICS	  coalition,	  China	  and	  Russia,	  possess	  permanent	  UNSC	  
seats,	  creating	  a	  serious	  power	  imbalance	  within	  that	  coalition	  as	  the	  present	  power	  
dynamic	  favours	  the	  permanent	  UNSC	  members	  because	  they	  also	  have	  veto	  power.	  The	  
balance	  cannot	  be	  rectified	  without	  UNSC	  reform.	  Despite	  disproportionate	  media	  attention	  
on	  the	  BRICS,	  this	  power	  imbalance	  impels	  IBSA	  toward	  being	  a	  stronger	  emerging	  power	  
coalition	  based	  more	  on	  shared	  interests	  and	  values.	  Consequently,	  IBSA	  has	  continued	  to	  




(Flemes,	  2007,	  pp.11-­‐12).	  India	  and	  Brazil	  even	  joined	  Japan	  and	  Germany	  in	  the	  G4	  in	  2012	  
to	  push	  for	  an	  expanded	  and	  reformed	  UNSC.	  South	  Africa	  was	  not	  included	  in	  the	  G4,	  but	  it	  
still	  campaigned	  for	  UNSC	  reform	  (MOFA	  Statement,	  2012).	  South	  Africa	  supported	  the	  
African	  Union’s	  guidelines	  for	  UNSC	  reform	  of	  “equitable	  continental	  representation”	  (Habib,	  
2009,	  p.153	  and	  Flemes,	  2007,	  pp.11-­‐12).	  The	  G4’s	  push	  included	  “the	  importance	  of	  Africa	  
to	  be	  represented	  in	  the	  permanent	  membership	  of	  an	  enlarged	  Council”	  within	  its	  
Ministerial	  statement	  (MOFA	  Statement,	  2012).	  Permanent	  seats	  on	  the	  UNSC	  would	  make	  
IBSA	  countries	  more	  visible	  actors	  in	  international	  diplomatic	  debates,	  thereby	  increasing	  
their	  political	  leverage.	  	  
2.4.	  Initial	  IBSA	  Meetings	  
	  
I	  now	  briefly	  explore	  what	  was	  said	  in	  the	  IBSA	  meetings	  before	  2011,	  to	  give	  a	  
baseline	  understanding	  of	  IBSA’s	  mutual	  goals	  and	  interests	  surrounding	  peace	  and	  security	  
and	  to	  highlight	  the	  emphasis	  placed	  on	  improving	  their	  cooperation.	  
The	  opening	  Brasilia	  Declaration,	  issued	  in	  2003,	  is	  actually	  the	  briefest.	  At	  only	  four	  
pages	  long,	  it	  is	  clearly	  only	  an	  agenda-­‐setting	  document.	  It	  lays	  out	  initial	  plans	  for	  IBSA	  
that	  included	  UN	  reform,	  social	  development,	  poverty	  alleviation,	  a	  commitment	  to	  
documenting	  lessons	  learned	  and	  plans	  to	  meet	  again	  in	  the	  following	  year.	  Cooperation	  
among	  the	  three	  countries	  is	  prioritized;	  in	  the	  four-­‐page	  document	  it	  is	  mentioned	  nine	  
times	  (New	  York	  Communiqué,	  2003).	  According	  to	  the	  document,	  “trilateral	  cooperation	  
among	  themselves	  is	  an	  important	  tool	  for	  achieving	  the	  promotion	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  
development	  and	  they	  emphasized	  their	  intention	  to	  give	  greater	  impetus	  to	  cooperation	  
among	  their	  countries”	  (New	  York	  Communiqué,	  2003).	  Neither	  peace,	  nor	  security,	  nor	  
conflict	  is	  mentioned	  one	  time	  (New	  York	  Communiqué,	  2003).	  This	  is	  likely	  the	  result	  of	  it	  
being	  merely	  an	  agenda-­‐setting	  document	  and	  would	  evolve	  and	  grow	  as	  IBSA	  developed	  a	  
shared	  history.	  	  
	   As	  can	  be	  expected,	  while	  the	  opening	  IBSA	  meeting	  briefly	  laid	  out	  goals	  and	  
principles,	  the	  first	  official	  Ministerial-­‐level	  meeting,	  called	  the	  “New	  Delhi	  Agenda	  for	  
Cooperation,”	  in	  2004	  went	  far	  more	  in	  depth.	  This	  was	  the	  first	  meeting	  that	  presented	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  discuss	  progress	  made	  and	  the	  Ministers	  took	  advantage.	  Cooperation	  was	  
one	  of	  the	  most	  serious	  priorities	  of	  the	  meeting-­‐	  in	  addition	  to	  earning	  a	  spot	  in	  the	  title	  of	  




issues	  from	  the	  first	  meeting,	  including	  UN	  reform,	  international	  peace	  and	  security,	  social	  
development,	  terrorism,	  and	  economics	  issues	  (New	  Delhi	  Agenda	  for	  Cooperation,	  2004).	  
They	  agreed	  to	  enhanced	  coordination	  and	  consultations	  among	  themselves	  to	  further	  one	  
of	  IBSA’s	  primary	  goals	  of	  South-­‐South	  cooperation.	  IBSA	  also	  discussed	  intensifying	  
cooperation	  in	  their	  multi-­‐lateral	  negotiations	  at	  the	  G-­‐20,	  on	  sustainable	  development,	  
sharing	  of	  expertise,	  and	  on	  a	  UNSC	  Resolution	  related	  to	  terrorism	  (New	  Delhi	  Agenda	  for	  
Cooperation,	  2004,	  pts.	  11,	  13-­‐14,	  &	  20).	  Two	  points	  of	  the	  document	  included	  a	  push	  for	  
democratic	  reform	  of	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  UNSC	  (New	  Delhi	  Agenda	  for	  Cooperation,	  2004,	  pts.	  
5-­‐6).	  The	  2005	  Ministerial-­‐level	  meeting	  focused	  on	  initiatives	  related	  to	  social	  
development	  and	  economic	  programs.	  Reform	  of	  international	  institutions	  clearly	  played	  a	  
major	  role	  in	  the	  2005	  final	  document,	  as	  did	  increasing	  South-­‐South	  cooperation-­‐	  not	  just	  
within	  IBSA,	  but	  also	  among	  the	  broader	  global	  South.	  	  
The	  final	  Communiqué	  of	  the	  2006	  Ministerial	  meeting	  covered	  more	  issues	  critical	  
to	  this	  study:	  UN	  reform,	  South-­‐South	  cooperation,	  the	  Middle	  East	  conflict,	  and	  
cooperation.	  The	  introductory	  section	  reiterated	  IBSA’s	  support	  for	  the	  UN’s	  role	  in	  
managing	  conflict	  worldwide	  (Rio	  de	  Janeiro Communiqué,	  2006)	  while	  the	  section	  on	  UN	  
reform	  continued	  to	  push	  for	  expansion	  of	  the	  UNSC,	  increasing	  the	  stakes	  of	  what	  would	  
happen	  if	  the	  IBSA	  countries	  ever	  were	  to	  be	  on	  the	  UNSC	  together.	  For	  instance,	  the	  
Communiqué	  emphasized	  that	  the	  UNSC	  needed	  to	  echo	  “contemporary	  realities	  and	  not	  
those	  of	  1945”	  (Rio	  de	  Janeiro	  Communiqué,	  2006,	  pt.8).	  The	  concept	  of	  human	  rights	  was	  
only	  mentioned	  during	  an	  innocuous	  welcome	  of	  the	  2006	  creation	  of	  the	  UNHRC	  and	  an	  
encouragement	  to	  follow	  the	  UN	  international	  human	  rights	  charter	  (Rio	  de	  Janeiro	  
Communiqué,	  2006).	  Also,	  even	  though	  this	  was	  after	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  2005	  World	  
Summit	  Outcome	  Document	  where	  the	  concept	  of	  “responsibility	  to	  protect”	  was	  first	  
included,	  it	  was	  not	  mentioned	  in	  the	  Communiqué,	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  glean	  the	  thoughts	  
of	  IBSA	  as	  a	  whole	  (Rio	  de	  Janeiro Communiqué,	  2006).	  Finally,	  2006	  was	  the	  same	  year	  as	  
IBSA’s	  first	  Summit-­‐level	  meeting,	  which	  included	  all	  the	  IBSA	  Heads	  of	  State.	  The	  document	  
from	  this	  meeting,	  the	  “Joint	  Declaration”	  prioritized	  cooperation;	  in	  the	  19	  pages,	  







With	  the	  foundation	  of	  mutual	  IBSA	  goals	  and	  principles	  established,	  it	  can	  be	  
shown	  that	  the	  desire	  to	  cooperate	  in	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  was	  fundamental.	  
However,	  given	  their	  limited	  meetings	  and	  lack	  of	  infrastructure,	  most	  of	  their	  goals	  
remained	  solely	  rhetoric	  and	  the	  first	  eight	  years	  of	  IBSA	  saw	  little	  more	  than	  scheduled	  
meetings.	  During	  the	  course	  of	  2011,	  the	  conflicts	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  and	  the	  international	  
community’s	  reaction	  to	  them	  forced	  them	  to	  evolve,	  increase	  their	  coordination	  and	  even	  
























CHAPTER	  3:	  THE	  CONFLICT	  IN	  LIBYA	  
3.1.	  Introduction	  
In	  one	  of	  the	  most	  notorious	  incidents	  thus	  far	  in	  the	  21st	  century,	  a	  Tunisian	  fruit	  
vendor,	  Mohammed	  Bouazizi,	  self-­‐immolated	  on	  the	  steps	  of	  the	  local	  municipality	  office	  in	  
Sidi	  Bouzid,	  Tunisia,	  which	  hours	  earlier	  had	  refused	  to	  see	  him	  to	  hear	  his	  complaints.	  
Bouazizi	  had	  been	  disgusted	  with	  the	  corruption	  and	  abuses	  committed	  against	  him	  by	  
Tunisian	  police	  and	  when	  he	  had	  sought	  justice	  from	  the	  local	  city	  authorities	  and	  been	  
ignored,	  Bouazizi	  felt	  as	  though	  he	  had	  no	  other	  option.	  His	  self-­‐immolation	  sparked	  
immense	  outrage	  and	  Tunisians	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  to	  protest	  the	  regime	  that	  had	  been	  
ruled	  by	  the	  same	  President,	  Zine	  Ben	  Ali,	  for	  approximately	  30	  years	  (Abouzeid,	  2011).	  
Bouazizi	  did	  not	  die	  immediately;	  he	  was	  admitted	  to	  the	  hospital	  with	  serious	  wounds.	  The	  
protests	  continued	  for	  28	  days	  and	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  time,	  President	  Ben	  Ali	  fled	  in	  exile	  a	  
mere	  10	  days	  after	  Bouazizi	  had	  died	  (Abouzeid,	  2011).	  	  	  
A	  month	  later,	  Libyans	  planned	  their	  own	  “Day	  of	  Rage”	  for	  Thursday,	  February	  17,	  
2011	  (Hilsum,	  2012).	  Libyans	  protested	  high	  levels	  of	  unemployment,	  limited	  housing,	  and	  
the	  total	  lack	  of	  political	  opposition;	  the	  Libyan	  President,	  Muammar	  Gaddafi,	  had	  been	  in	  
power	  for	  more	  than	  41	  years	  (BBC	  News,	  2011).	  The	  “Day	  of	  Rage”	  began	  with	  a	  popular	  
uprising	  in	  Benghazi,	  Libya	  and	  spread	  like	  wildfire	  to	  other	  cities.	  However,	  Gaddafi’s	  
government	  forces	  quickly	  reversed	  the	  successes	  of	  the	  rebels	  and	  by	  March	  had	  closed	  in	  
on	  the	  “epicentre”	  of	  rebel	  power	  in	  Benghazi	  (Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  2011,	  p.838).	  
Although	  President	  Ben	  Ali	  of	  Tunisia	  left	  power	  with	  little	  impertinence,	  Gaddafi	  would	  not	  
do	  so.	  President	  Gaddafi	  refused	  to	  give	  in	  to	  the	  protesters	  and	  numerous	  media	  outlets	  
and	  NGOs	  reported	  the	  Libyan	  Government	  used	  violence	  against	  the	  protesters	  (Spillius,	  




calls.	  It	  became	  clear	  at	  this	  point	  that	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  country	  was	  dire	  and	  left	  many	  
outside	  of	  Libya	  to	  wonder	  if	  foreign	  intervention	  should	  occur.	  On	  February	  22,	  2011,	  
Gaddafi	  addressed	  the	  nation	  in	  a	  speech	  that	  lasted	  more	  than	  an	  hour.	  He	  would	  never	  
leave	  Libya;	  he	  would	  “die	  [in	  the	  country]	  as	  a	  martyr”	  (Meikle	  and	  Black,	  2011).	  Gaddafi’s	  
refusal	  to	  leave	  the	  country	  like	  Tunisian	  President	  Ben	  Ali	  had	  done,	  foretold	  many	  future	  
events.	  These	  statements	  and	  the	  Libyan	  Government’s	  military	  action	  against	  the	  
protesters	  immediately	  raised	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  international	  community	  of	  
exactly	  how	  to	  resolve	  the	  conflict	  in	  Libya	  peacefully	  (Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  2011,	  p.838-­‐
839).	  	  
	  
3.2.	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  International	  Community	  
	  
The	   Libyan	   government’s	   actions	   outraged	   the	   international	   community	   and	   many	  
foreign	   governments	   publicly	   condemned	   the	   regime’s	   behaviour	   (Spillius,	   2013).	   The	  
Libyan	   government’s	   refusal	   to	   allow	   humanitarian	   aid	   into	   some	   besieged	   towns	  
aggravated	   the	   situation	   even	   further	   (Bellamy	   and	   Williams,	   2011,	   p.840).	   Gaddafi’s	  
inflammatory	  rhetoric,	  allegations	  of	  military	  action,	  and	   lack	  of	  compliance	  shattered	   the	  
notion	  that	  he	  could	  be	  persuaded	  by	  diplomacy.	  Consequently,	  the	  UNSC	  passed	  Resolution	  
1970	  unanimously	  four	  days	  after	  Gaddafi’s	  “rats”	  speech.	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1970	  imposed	  
sanctions,	   travel	  bans,	  and	  asset	   freezes	  on	  government	  officials	   loyal	   to	  Gaddafi;	   referred	  
the	   situation	   to	   the	   International	   Criminal	   Court	   (ICC);	   imposed	   an	   arms	   embargo;	   and	  
requested	   the	   facilitation	   of	   humanitarian	   aid	   delivery	   (UNSC	   SC/10187/Rev.1,	   2011).	   If	  
Gaddafi	  would	  not	  cooperate	  with	  the	  more	  informal	  diplomacy	  that	  had	  occurred	  prior,	  it	  
was	  hoped	  that	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1970	  would	  appeal	  to	  him.	  Meanwhile,	  a	  UN	  Special	  Envoy	  
and	  an	  AU	  High	  Level	  Panel	  would	  also	  be	  tasked	  with	  finding	  a	  diplomatic	  solution	  to	  the	  
conflict	  (Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  2011,	  p.840).	  	  
UNGA	   and	   UNHRC	   spoke	   up	   as	   well.	   UNHRC	   held	   a	   special	   session	   at	   the	   end	   of	  
February	  2011.	  The	   final	  Resolution	   that	  passed	   that	   session	  of	   the	  UNHRC	  called	   for	   “an	  
end	  to	  human	  rights	  violations	  …	  the	  release	  of	  the	  arbitrarily	  detained”	  and	  humanitarian	  
access	   “to	  meet	   its	   responsibility	   to	   protect	   its	   people”	   (A/HRC/RES/S-­‐15/1).	   Brazil	   (the	  
only	   IBSA	   member	   on	   the	   UNHRC	   at	   the	   time)	   voted	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   Resolution	  
(A/HRC/RES/S-­‐15/1,	  2011).	  In	  the	  following	  month,	  on	  March	  1,	  2011,	  UNGA	  unanimously	  




2011).	  Libya’s	  membership	  was	  later	  reinstated	  in	  November	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  Gaddafi.	  The	  
vote	   in	   November	   to	   reinstate	   Libya	   was	   nearly	   unanimous,	   only	   four	   countries	   voted	  
against	  and	  six	  countries	  abstained.	  All	  P3	  and	  BRICS	  states	  voted	  in	  favour	  of	  reinstating	  	  
Actor	   Action	   Date	  	  
Libyan	  people-­‐	  “Day	  of	  Rage”	   Protests	  begin	   February	  17,	  2011	  
United	  Nations	  Human	  Rights	  
Council	  	  
Special	  Session	  calls	  for	  end	  to	  
violence	  
February	  25,	  2011	  
League	  of	  Arab	  States	  (LAS)	   Suspends	  Libya’s	  membership	   February	  2011	  
United	  Nations	  General	  
Assembly	  
Suspends	  Libya	  from	  UNHRC	   March	  1,	  2011	  
Brazil	   Releases	  statement	  opposed	  
to	  military	  intervention	  	  
March	  4,	  2011	  
India	   Releases	  statement	  opposed	  
to	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  
March	  4,	  2011	  
United	  Kingdom	  and	  France	   Introduce	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  draft	   March	  7,	  2011	  
Gulf	  Cooperation	  Council	   Issues	  statement	  favouring	  no-­‐
fly	  zone	  
March	  7,	  2011	  
IBSA	  Dialogue	  Forum	   Issues	  statement	  cautioning	  
against	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  
March	  8,	  2011	  
Organization	  of	  Islamic	  
Cooperation	  
Issues	  statement	  in	  favour	  of	  
no-­‐fly	  zone	  
March	  8,	  2011	  
African	  Union	  Peace	  and	  
Security	  Council	  (AUPSC)	  
Warns	  against	  no-­‐fly;	  
establishes	  panel	  to	  resolve	  
conflict	  with	  Heads	  of	  State	  
March	  10,	  2011	  
League	  of	  Arab	  States	  	   Issues	  statement	  calling	  for	  no-­‐
fly	  zone	  
March	  12,	  2011	  
United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  	   Votes	  YES	  on	  Resolution	  1973	   March	  17,	  2011	  






Table	  1:	  Timeline	  of	  Events	  Before	  Vote	  on	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1973	  
Libya’s	  membership	  on	   the	  UNHRC;	  however,	   South	  Africa	  did	  not,	  but	  only	  because	   they	  
were	   absent	   at	   the	   time	   (A/RES/66/11,	   2011).	   However,	   despite	   the	   more	   formal	  
diplomatic	   actions,	  Gaddafi	   did	  not	   comply	  with	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1970	  or	   the	  Resolution	  
from	  the	  UNHRC,	  but	  continued	  to	  use	  force	  against	  the	  protesters	  (Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  
2011).	   The	   lack	   of	   persuasive	   power	   of	   UNSC	   Resolution	   1970,	   UNGA,	   and	   UNHRC	   over	  
Gaddafi	   prompted	  many	   in	   the	   international	   community	   to	   consider	   backup	   plans	   to	   the	  
negotiations.	  	  
	  Rumours	  began	  about	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  “no-­‐fly	  zone”	  when	  the	  Secretary	  General	  of	  
the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO)	  disclosed	  that	  discussions	  on	  how	  to	  enact	  
one	  in	  Libya	  were	  occurring	  within	  NATO	  walls	  (Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  2011,	  pp.840-­‐841).	  
Nearly	  simultaneously,	  on	  March	  7,	  2011,	  it	  was	  announced	  that	  UK	  and	  France	  were	  
drafting	  a	  UNSC	  Resolution	  that	  requested	  a	  “no-­‐fly	  zone”	  (NBC,	  2011).	  The	  UK	  and	  France,	  
both	  traditional	  powers,	  had	  historic	  relationships	  with	  Libya.	  France	  also	  had	  a	  history	  of	  
active	  military	  engagements	  overseas.	  A	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  would	  “impose	  a	  ban	  on	  all	  [non-­‐
military]	  flights	  in	  the	  country’s	  airspace”	  including	  fixed	  wing	  aircraft	  and	  force	  could	  be	  
used	  to	  impose	  it	  if	  necessary	  (UNSC/RES/1973,	  2011).	  The	  Resolution	  also	  included	  the	  
ability	  to	  use	  “all	  necessary	  measures	  ...	  to	  protect	  civilians	  and	  civilian	  populated	  areas	  
under	  threat	  of	  attack	  ...	  while	  excluding	  a	  foreign	  occupation	  force	  of	  any	  form	  on	  any	  part	  
of	  Libyan	  territory”	  (UNSC/RES/1973,	  2011).	  This	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  intense	  
discussion	  on	  the	  idea.	  	  
3.2.1.	  Role	  of	  Regional	  Organizations	  
	  
Three	  critical	  regional	  organizations	  voiced	  their	  backing	  for	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone.	  The	  first	  to	  
do	  so	  was	  the	  Gulf	  Cooperation	  Council	  (GCC),	  which	  is	  an	  intergovernmental	  regional	  
organization	  of	  states	  that	  are	  located	  on	  the	  Persian	  Gulf.	  The	  GCC	  requested	  that	  the	  UNSC	  
‘take	  all	  necessary	  measures	  to	  protect	  civilians,	  including	  enforcing	  a	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  over	  
Libya,”	  and	  condemned	  “crimes	  committed	  against	  civilians,	  the	  use	  of	  heavy	  arms	  and	  the	  
recruitment	  of	  mercenaries”	  by	  the	  Libyan	  regime	  (Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  2011).	  The	  mere	  
possibility	  of	  a	  no-­‐fly	  zone,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  statement	  from	  the	  GCC,	  prompted	  an	  




Organization	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Cooperation	  (OIC),	  an	  intergovernmental	  organization	  with	  57	  
member	  states	  representing	  the	  “collective	  voice	  of	  the	  Muslim	  world,”	  issued	  a	  statement	  
echoing	  the	  request	  “for	  a	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  over	  Libya,”	  but	  without	  utilizing	  “foreign	  military	  
operations	  on	  the	  ground”	  (Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  2011,	  p.841	  and	  OIC,	  2013).	  The	  views	  of	  
the	  OIC	  were	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  considered	  seriously	  because	  Libya	  was	  also	  a	  member.	  	  
Shortly	  after,	  the	  League	  of	  Arab	  States	  (LAS),	  an	  intergovernmental	  organization	  
consisting	  of	  Arab	  nations	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  despite	  traditionally	  being	  
considered	  an	  opponent	  of	  humanitarian	  intervention,	  issued	  what	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  
decisive	  statement.	  It	  requested	  that	  the	  UNSC	  “impose	  immediately	  a	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  on	  Libyan	  
military	  aviation,	  and	  to	  establish	  safe	  areas	  in	  places	  exposed	  to	  shelling	  as	  a	  precautionary	  
measure	  that	  allows	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  Libyan	  people	  and	  foreign	  nationals	  residing	  in	  
Libya”	  (Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  2011,	  pp.841-­‐842).	  Libya	  had	  been	  member	  of	  the	  LAS	  until	  
its	  membership	  had	  been	  suspended	  a	  month	  earlier	  in	  February	  (Aboagye,	  2012,	  p.39).	  
The	  LAS	  statement	  went	  on	  to	  accuse	  the	  Libyan	  government	  of	  committing	  “serious	  
violations	  and	  grave	  crimes”	  and	  said	  that	  the	  government	  had	  lost	  its	  legitimacy	  (Bellamy	  
and	  Williams,	  2011,	  pp.841-­‐842).	  This	  marked	  the	  third	  prominent	  regional	  organization	  in	  
the	  Middle	  East	  to	  make	  a	  statement	  in	  support	  of	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone.	  Bellamy	  and	  Williams	  
(2011,	  p.846)	  stated	  that	  the	  regional	  organizations	  served	  as	  “gatekeepers”	  and	  that	  
without	  the	  support	  from	  the	  LAS,	  “it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  [Resolution	  1973]	  would	  ever	  have	  
been	  tabled	  for	  a	  vote.”	  Other	  regional	  organizations	  would	  go	  on	  to	  make	  statements,	  but	  
the	  LAS	  statement	  would	  be	  the	  one	  to	  fundamentally	  sway	  the	  UNSC	  and	  permanent	  
members	  of	  the	  UNSC,	  such	  as	  China	  and	  Russia,	  who	  traditionally	  are	  opposed	  to	  any	  sort	  
of	  foreign	  military	  intervention	  (Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  2011).	  India	  and	  Brazil	  publicly	  
expressed	  concern	  about	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  as	  well.	  
3.3.	  IBSA’s	  Involvement	  
Before	  the	  March	  IBSA	  meeting	  occurred,	  a	  spokesperson	  from	  Itamaraty,	  Brazil’s	  
Foreign	  Affairs	  Ministry,	  stated	  the	  goals	  of	  Brazil’s	  position	  on	  the	  Libyan	  conflict:	  “the	  
need	  to	  avoid	  militarising	  and	  exacerbating	  the	  situation,	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  find	  a	  negotiated,	  
calm	  solution	  without	  foreign	  intervention”	  (Frayssinet,	  2011).	  According	  to	  Brazilian	  
Foreign	  Minister	  Antonio	  Patriota,	  Brazil	  appeared	  not	  to	  be	  opposed	  to	  a	  military	  initiative,	  
but	  very	  cautious	  as	  to	  how	  it	  was	  implemented:	  “Brazil	  believes	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  proposal	  




only	  be	  legitimate	  in	  a	  framework	  of	  strict	  respect	  for	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  within	  the	  Security	  
Council”	  (Frayssinet,	  2011).	  Foreign	  Minister	  Patriota	  issued	  another	  statement	  elaborating	  
on	  the	  Brazilian	  concerns	  that	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  “might	  be	  misused	  for	  purposes	  other	  than	  
protecting	  civilians,	  such	  as	  regime	  change”	  (Viotti,	  2011).	  India	  was	  much	  more	  explicitly	  
opposed	  to	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone,	  saying	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  The	  Hindu	  before	  the	  IBSA	  
Commission	  meeting,	  “it	  will	  oppose	  any	  move	  to	  enforce	  a	  no-­‐fly-­‐zone	  or	  use	  force	  to	  end	  
the	  civil	  war	  in	  the	  North	  African	  nation”	  (Dikshit,	  2011).	  	  
On	  March	  8,	  2011,	  IBSA	  concluded	  a	  Trilateral	  Ministerial	  Commission	  meeting	  in	  New	  
Delhi,	  India,	  which	  presented	  its	  first	  opportunity	  to	  make	  a	  coordinated	  public	  remark	  on	  
conflict	  in	  Libya	  and	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone.	  The	  meeting	  was	  a	  little	  more	  than	  a	  week	  before	  the	  
vote	  on	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1973	  and	  the	  matter	  was	  clearly	  discussed	  because	  the	  situation	  
in	  Libya	  was	  included	  in	  the	  Commission’s	  Communiqué	  (New	  Delhi	  Communiqué,	  2011).	  
In	  the	  Communiqué,	  the	  IBSA	  Foreign	  Ministers	  stated	  their	  desire	  that:	  	  
“The	  situation	  will	  be	  resolved	  in	  a	  peaceful	  manner,	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  
respective	  peoples…	  their	  deep	  concern	  with	  the	  present	  situation	  in	  Libya	  and	  
manifested	  hope	  that	  a	  peaceful	  solution	  for	  the	  crisis	  may	  be	  found,	  in	  the	  best	  
interests	  of	  the	  Libyan	  people.”	  (New	  Delhi,	  2011,	  pt.24)	  
	  
The	  above	  emphasis	  on	  a	  “peaceful	  solution”	  can	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  referring	  to	  the	  work	  of	  
the	  UN	  Special	  Envoy	  and	  the	  African	  Union	  team	  that	  had	  been	  deployed	  (New	  Delhi	  
Communiqué,	  2011,	  pt.24).	  When	  the	  Communiqué	  addressed	  the	  potential	  of	  establishing	  
a	  “no-­‐fly	  zone”	  over	  Libya;	  it	  said	  a	  “no-­‐fly	  zone”	  could	  “only	  be	  legitimately	  contemplated	  in	  
full	  compliance	  with	  the	  UN	  Charter	  and	  within	  the	  UNSC	  of	  the	  United	  Nations”	  further	  
showing	  IBSA’s	  desire	  for	  international	  cooperation	  and	  coordination	  on	  such	  a	  serious	  
matter	  (New	  Delhi	  Communiqué,	  2011,	  pt.24).	  The	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  went	  against	  the	  values	  of	  
diplomacy	  and	  development	  that	  IBSA	  strenuously	  professed	  its	  devotion	  to.	  As	  time	  would	  
show,	  this	  relatively	  cautious	  statement	  would	  be	  drowned	  out	  in	  the	  noise	  heard	  from	  
regional	  organizations	  that	  were	  yelling	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  
The	  Peace	  and	  Security	  Council	  of	  the	  African	  Union	  (AUPSC)	  distributed	  a	  
statement	  on	  March	  10,	  2011	  regarding	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  that	  was	  far	  less	  
favourable	  to	  the	  idea	  than	  their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  OIC	  and	  the	  GCC.	  The	  AU,	  to	  which	  
Libya	  and	  South	  Africa	  belong,	  “condemn[ed]	  the	  indiscriminate	  use	  of	  force	  and	  lethal	  




favouring	  a	  solution	  based	  on	  mediation	  (Wolf,	  2012,	  p.113).	  It	  laid	  out	  a	  “roadmap”	  that	  
called	  for	  “African	  action”	  and	  “cessation	  of	  all	  hostilities…	  cooperation	  of	  competent	  Libyan	  
authorities…	  adoption	  and	  implementation	  of	  the	  political	  reforms	  necessary”	  (African	  
Union,	  2011).	  It	  allowed	  President	  Gaddafi	  to	  gradually	  relinquish	  power	  and	  hand	  over	  the	  
reins	  to	  a	  provisional	  government	  before	  allowing	  new	  elections	  to	  occur	  (African	  Union,	  
2011).	  The	  AU	  Constitutive	  Act	  states	  in	  section	  4(j):	  “the	  right	  of	  member	  states	  to	  request	  
intervention	  in	  order	  to	  restore	  peace	  and	  security”	  implying	  that	  the	  AU	  would	  have	  only	  
supported	  such	  an	  intervention	  if	  the	  Libyans	  had	  been	  involved	  (Aboagye,	  2012,	  p.33).	  The	  
AU	  had	  even	  planned	  to	  send	  a	  mediation	  mission	  to	  Libya,	  but	  the	  mission	  had	  been	  
cancelled	  because	  the	  bombing	  had	  begun	  (Tisdall,	  2011).	  South	  African	  President	  Jacob	  
Zuma	  had,	  in	  fact,	  been	  a	  part	  of	  the	  cancelled	  AU	  mission	  to	  Libya	  (Tisdall,	  2011).	  
Unfortunately	  for	  the	  AU,	  the	  March	  10	  statement	  would	  not	  prove	  enough	  to	  affect	  the	  
UNSC.	  Given	  Gaddafi’s	  history	  as	  a	  critical	  financial	  supporter	  of	  the	  AU,	  the	  AUPSC’s	  
statement	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  conflict	  of	  interest	  and	  was	  not	  taken	  seriously	  (Bellamy	  and	  
Williams,	  2011).	  The	  lack	  of	  impact	  of	  this	  statement	  bothered	  IBSA.	  In	  a	  later	  statement	  
issued	  by	  IBSA’s	  Ministers	  in	  September	  2011,	  one	  point	  read	  of	  “The	  need	  for	  the	  UN	  to	  
ensure	  stronger	  cooperation	  and	  coordination	  with	  regional	  representative	  bodies	  such	  as	  
the	  African	  Union	  and	  its	  Peace	  and	  Security	  Council”	  (New	  York	  Ministerial	  Statement,	  
2011,	  pt.8).	  	  
3.4.	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1973	  
Surprisingly,	  South	  Africa	  voted	  in	  favour	  of	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1973,	  officially	  
authorizing	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  over	  Libya,	  the	  use	  of	  force	  for	  civilian	  protection,	  and	  an	  arms	  
embargo,	  while	  Brazil	  and	  India	  abstained	  (UNSC/RES/1973,	  2011).	  If	  South	  Africa	  had	  
abstained	  and	  Brazil	  or	  India	  had	  voted	  no,	  the	  Resolution	  would	  have	  failed.	  Such	  a	  
divergence	  among	  the	  IBSA	  states	  proved	  them	  to	  be	  entirely	  uncoordinated,	  though	  
possibly	  still	  maintaining	  similar	  values.	  Maite	  Nkoana	  Mashabane,	  the	  Foreign	  Affairs	  
Minister	  of	  South	  Africa,	  explained	  that	  the	  South	  Africans	  voted	  positively	  for	  UNSC	  
Resolution	  1973	  because	  the	  resolution	  text	  appeared	  to	  focus	  on	  civilian	  protection	  and	  
providing	  humanitarian	  assistance	  to	  affected	  populations	  and	  “exclud[ed]	  a	  foreign	  
occupation	  force	  of	  any	  form	  on	  any	  part	  of	  Libyan	  territory”	  (UNSC/RES/1973,	  2011).	  The	  
UK,	  one	  of	  the	  proponents	  of	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone,	  had	  insisted	  that	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  would	  be	  




explained	  that	  “They	  had	  been	  persuaded	  to	  abstain	  …	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  resolution	  
provided	  for	  a	  humanitarian	  mission”	  (Gates	  2014,	  p.530).	  In	  fact,	  the	  Resolution	  text	  did	  
not	  demand	  regime	  change,	  but	  rather	  encouraged	  political	  dialogue	  (UNSC/RES/1973,	  
2011).	  	  
Considering	  the	  initial	  caution	  and	  reticence	  from	  Brazil	  and	  the	  opposition	  from	  India,	  
one	  must	  wonder	  why	  the	  two	  countries	  merely	  abstained	  and	  did	  not	  vote	  against	  UNSC	  
Resolution	  1973	  entirely.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  abstentions	  from	  Brazil,	  Russia,	  India,	  and	  
China	  were	  not	  fruitless	  and	  could	  have	  reduced	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  intervention.	  It	  is	  also	  
possible	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  countries	  voted	  in	  favour	  of	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1970,	  which	  
included	  enforcement	  measures,	  showed	  that	  they	  believed	  in	  the	  word	  of	  the	  UNSC	  and	  
that	  it	  must	  be	  strictly	  followed.	  Since	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1970	  passed,	  unanimously	  with	  the	  
support	  of	  IBSA	  countries,	  it	  had	  welcomed	  international	  involvement	  by	  referring	  the	  
situation	  to	  the	  ICC.	  It	  also	  likely	  decreased	  the	  severity,	  if	  only	  marginally,	  to	  the	  resistance	  
to	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  because	  Gaddafi	  had	  refused	  to	  acquiesce	  to	  the	  Resolution’s	  demands.	  
Also,	  IBSA	  Declarations	  (Brasilia	  Declaration,	  2009,	  pt.4)	  that	  included	  commitments	  to	  
supporting	  regional	  organizations	  made	  it	  politically	  difficult	  for	  IBSA	  to	  ignore	  the	  pleas	  of	  
the	  LAS,	  OIC,	  and	  GCC,	  even	  though	  the	  AU	  cautioned	  against	  “any	  form	  of	  military	  
intervention”	  (Wolf,	  2012,	  p.113).	  This	  would	  evidence	  an	  IBSA	  that	  is	  uncoordinated	  in	  
voting,	  but	  still	  maintains	  similar	  values.	  	  
	  
3.4.1.	  Implementation	  of	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1973	  
	  
Problems	  began	  with	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1973	  nearly	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  was	  passed.	  
Implementation	  of	  a	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  is	  logistically	  extremely	  challenging	  and	  NATO	  was	  quickly	  
criticized	  for	  its	  “overly	  expansive	  interpretation	  of	  [the	  mandate]”	  (Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  
2011,	  p.846).	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone’s	  mandate	  from	  the	  Resolution	  divided	  the	  
involved	  member	  states	  (Bellamy	  and	  Williams,	  2011,	  p.845).	  As	  the	  intervention	  
lengthened,	  there	  was	  a	  growing	  sense	  that	  NATO	  was	  no	  longer	  serving	  as	  a	  defensive	  
shield	  for	  populations	  at	  risk,	  but	  rather	  acting	  to	  eliminate	  Gaddafi	  (Gates	  2014,	  p.530).	  An	  
ever-­‐growing	  list	  of	  bombing	  targets	  had	  revealed,	  “that	  very	  few	  targets	  were	  off-­‐limits”	  
(Gates	  2014,	  p.530).	  There	  were	  accusations	  of	  NATO	  arming	  the	  Libyan	  rebels	  and	  perhaps	  
even	  training	  them,	  and	  making	  unjustified	  bombing	  raids	  on	  non-­‐military	  targets	  and	  even	  




rebel	  fighters	  with	  serious	  munitions,	  including	  tanks,	  surprising	  even	  NATO	  (Hopkins,	  
2011	  and	  BBC	  News,	  2011).	  	  
The	  IBSA	  states,	  India	  in	  particular,	  expressed	  their	  concern	  at	  the	  perceived	  
manipulation	  of	  the	  UNSC	  that	  ran	  counter	  to	  IBSA’s	  professed	  devotion	  to	  diplomacy	  as	  a	  
method	  of	  resolving	  matters	  of	  international	  peace	  and	  security.	  The	  IBSA	  statement	  that	  
had	  been	  issued	  in	  March	  2011	  had	  only	  permitted	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  if	  it	  were	  in	  “full	  
compliance”	  with	  the	  UN	  (New	  Delhi	  Communiqué,	  2011).	  Such	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  IBSA	  
principles	  would	  no	  doubt	  evoke	  its	  ire	  and	  further	  action	  at	  the	  diplomatic	  level.	  Soon	  
after,	  the	  Indian	  government	  referred	  to	  NATO	  as	  the	  "armed	  wing"	  of	  the	  UNSC	  (Plett,	  
2011).	  It	  appeared	  that,	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  Indian	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  UN,	  Hardeep	  Puri,	  the	  
UN’s	  primary	  objective	  in	  Libya	  was	  no	  longer	  civilian	  protection	  or	  providing	  humanitarian	  
relief,	  but	  rather	  overthrowing	  the	  regime	  in	  Tripoli	  (Plett,	  2011).	  During	  a	  debate	  in	  the	  
UNSC	  in	  June	  2012	  (subject:	  protection	  of	  civilians),	  India	  stated	  it	  had	  a	  “considerable	  
sense	  of	  unease	  about	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  humanitarian	  imperative	  of	  protecting	  
civilians	  has	  been	  interpreted	  for	  actual	  action	  on	  the	  ground”	  (Puri,	  2012a).	  India	  was	  
concerned	  that	  this	  escalation	  would	  not	  ameliorate	  matters	  in	  Libya,	  but	  rather	  exacerbate	  
them	  (Tisdall,	  2011).	  To	  India,	  arming	  rebels	  went	  too	  far	  beyond	  the	  mandate	  of	  “all	  
necessary	  measures”	  to	  protect	  civilians	  (UNSC/RES/1973,	  2011).	  
Within	  days	  of	  the	  affirmative	  vote	  for	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1973,	  South	  Africa	  reversed	  its	  
original	  position	  and	  disassociated	  from	  support	  for	  the	  NATO-­‐led	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  (Aboagye,	  
2012,	  p.38).	  Dismissing	  the	  AU’s	  cautions	  rendered	  the	  AU	  bystanders	  to	  a	  conflict	  
occurring	  on	  their	  own	  soil.	  Soon	  South	  Africa	  became	  as	  vocal	  of	  a	  critic	  of	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  
as	  its	  IBSA	  partners	  had	  originally	  been,	  echoing	  their	  sentiments	  almost	  perfectly.	  South	  
African	  President	  Jacob	  Zuma,	  according	  to	  Tisdall	  (2011,	  p.2),	  also	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  suggest	  
the	  NATO	  mission	  had	  “more	  to	  do	  with	  regime	  change	  than	  humanitarian	  assistance.”	  In	  a	  
UNSC	  meeting	  that	  occurred	  the	  following	  year	  in	  2012,	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  involvement	  of	  
the	  LAS	  in	  resolving	  the	  on-­‐going	  Arab	  Spring	  conflicts,	  South	  African	  Foreign	  Affairs	  
Minister,	  Maite	  Nkoana-­‐Mashabane,	  said	  the	  UNSC	  should	  be	  “consistent	  in	  its	  collaboration	  
with	  the	  League,	  rather	  than	  cooperating	  selectively	  on	  issues	  that	  served	  the	  national	  
interests	  of	  its	  members”	  (SC/10775,	  2012).	  This	  emphasized	  the	  belief	  that	  certain	  




Meanwhile,	  in	  July	  2011,	  the	  UN	  hosted	  an	  informal	  debate	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  
Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  (R2P).	  R2P	  was	  a	  concept	  that	  had	  been	  officially	  included	  in	  the	  
2005	  World	  Summit	  Outcome	  document	  (Pattison,	  2013,	  p.1).	  The	  three	  points	  of	  R2P	  
represent	  three	  separate	  pillars.	  The	  points	  read:	  	  
“1.	  The	  State	  carries	  the	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  populations	  from	  
genocide,	  war	  crimes,	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  and	  ethnic	  cleansing.	  	  
	  
2.	  The	  international	  community	  has	  a	  responsibility	  to	  assist	  States	  in	  fulfilling	  this	  
responsibility.	  	  
	  
3.	  The	  international	  community	  should	  use	  appropriate	  diplomatic,	  humanitarian	  and	  
other	  peaceful	  means	  to	  protect	  populations	  from	  these	  crimes.	  If	  a	  State	  fails	  to	  protect	  
its	  populations	  or	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  perpetrator	  of	  crimes,	  the	  international	  community	  must	  
be	  prepared	  to	  take	  stronger	  measures,	  including	  the	  collective	  use	  of	  force	  through	  the	  
UN	  Security	  Council.”	  (World	  Summit	  Outcome	  Document,	  2005,	  pp.31-­‐32)	  	  
	  
From	  IBSA,	  only	  Brazil	  made	  a	  statement-­‐	  India	  and	  South	  Africa	  did	  not.	  Brazil	  accentuated	  
the	  “political	  subordination	  and	  chronological	  sequencing”	  of	  the	  R2P	  pillars	  in	  addition	  to	  
the	  “last	  resort	  character”	  of	  the	  third	  pillar	  (Viotti,	  2011).	  The	  French	  arming	  of	  the	  Libyan	  
rebels	  and	  rumours	  of	  other	  countries	  going	  beyond	  Resolution	  1973’s	  mandate	  upset	  
Brazil.	  It	  was	  seen	  as	  hypocritical	  to	  IBSA	  that	  the	  arms	  embargo	  and	  calls	  for	  cease-­‐fire	  that	  
had	  been	  applied	  were	  to	  Gaddafi’s	  forces,	  but	  France	  could	  send	  arms	  to	  the	  Libyan	  rebels	  
(Gaouette,	  2011).	  Brazil’s	  statement	  expressed	  their	  continued	  disappointment	  in	  UNSC	  
Resolution	  1973	  and	  the	  way	  it	  had	  been	  implemented.	  	  
UNGA	  and	  UNHRC	  passed	  Libya-­‐related	  resolutions	  as	  well.	  In	  July,	  the	  UNHRC	  adopted	  
a	  resolution	  without	  a	  vote	  comprehensively	  addressing	  all	  conflict-­‐related	  issues	  in	  Libya.	  
In	  short,	  the	  UNHRC	  Resolution	  called	  for	  an	  end	  to	  the	  violence	  and	  a	  resolution	  to	  the	  
conflict	  (A/HRC/RES/17/17,	  2011).	  	  Of	  the	  IBSA	  states,	  only	  Brazil	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
vote	  in	  favour	  (A/HRC/RES/17/17,	  2011).	  Tensions	  were	  high	  in	  September	  as	  UNGA	  
decided	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  accept	  the	  new	  government	  of	  Libya	  called	  the	  National	  
Transitional	  Council	  (NTC).	  South	  Africa	  diverged	  from	  the	  P3,	  China	  and	  Russia,	  and	  its	  
IBSA	  partners,	  but	  voted	  with	  AU	  when	  it	  voted	  against	  accepting	  the	  NTC’s	  leadership	  
(A/RES/66/1a.1,	  2011)-­‐	  presenting	  yet	  another	  Libya	  vote	  with	  an	  uncoordinated	  IBSA.	  	  
In	  October	  2011,	  the	  IBSA	  Summit	  occurred	  in	  Tshwane,	  South	  Africa.	  The	  Summit	  
contained	  Heads	  of	  State	  of	  IBSA	  countries.	  The	  conflict	  in	  Libya	  was	  not	  explicitly	  
mentioned	  in	  the	  final	  statement,	  but	  it	  did	  address	  the	  challenges	  faced	  by	  the	  Arab	  Spring.	  




with	  countries	  in	  transition	  to	  democracy”	  (Tshwane	  Declaration,	  2011).	  No	  mention	  was	  
made	  of	  the	  “responsibility	  to	  protect”	  or	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone.	  The	  diplomatic	  events	  
surrounding	  1973	  and	  the	  NATO	  enforced	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  later	  forced	  the	  international	  
community	  to	  revisit	  the	  concept	  of	  R2P	  and	  that	  discussion	  would	  be	  led	  by	  Brazil.	  
3.5.	  The	  “Responsibility	  While	  Protecting”	  
	  
Dramatically,	  on	  October	  20,	  2011,	  eight	  months	  after	  the	  revolution	  began	  and	  after	  
more	  than	  41	  years	  of	  rule,	  President	  Gaddafi	  aka	  the	  “King	  of	  Kings	  and	  Supreme	  Guide	  of	  
the	  Great	  Socialist	  People’s	  Libyan	  Arab	  Jamahiriya”	  was	  captured	  and	  murdered	  at	  the	  
hands	  of	  opposition	  forces	  (Hilsum,	  2012).	  	  The	  death	  of	  Gaddafi	  crystallized	  the	  
appearance	  of	  “regime	  change,”	  which	  further	  angered	  IBSA	  countries.	  In	  response,	  South	  
African	  President	  Zuma	  stated,	  “We	  expected	  him	  to	  be	  captured,	  given	  that	  everybody	  
knew	  there	  was	  a	  warrant	  of	  arrest	  issued	  against	  him”	  (Staff	  Reporter,	  2011).	  Brazilian	  
President	  Dilma	  Rousseff	  spoke	  out	  against	  celebrating	  Gaddafi’s	  death	  and	  rather	  
encouraged	  the	  processes	  of	  democratic	  reform	  taking	  place	  there	  (AFP,	  2011a).	  India,	  on	  
the	  other	  hand,	  never	  addressed	  the	  matter	  publicly.	   
Within	  weeks	  of	  Gaddafi’s	  death	  and	  two	  days	  of	  the	  November	  9	  UNSC	  debate	  on	  
civilian	  protection,	  the	  Brazilian	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  UN,	  Maria	  Luisa	  Ribieiro	  Viotti,	  released	  
a	  concept	  paper	  at	  the	  UN	  entitled,	  “Responsibility	  while	  protecting:	  elements	  for	  the	  
development	  and	  promotion	  of	  a	  concept”	  aka	  “RWP”	  (Viotti,	  2011a	  and	  S/2011/701,	  
2011).	  Brazil	  again	  expressed	  its	  feeling	  that	  the	  western	  world	  had	  mischaracterized	  their	  
interests	  to	  the	  international	  system	  in	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1973.	  Brazilian	  President	  Dilma	  
Rousseff	  had	  announced	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  idea	  at	  the	  September	  2011	  UNGA	  plenary	  
(Bellamy,	  2012).	  The	  November	  paper	  proposed	  a	  new	  framework	  of	  organizing	  the	  
“Responsibility	  to	  Protect”	  concept,	  not	  replacing	  it,	  but	  merely	  strengthening	  the	  idea.	  The	  
R2P	  pillar	  originally	  had	  no	  specific	  order	  to	  them.	  Building	  on	  their	  statement	  from	  the	  July	  
2011	  UN	  debate	  on	  R2P,	  Brazil	  proposed	  in	  its	  RWP	  paper	  that	  the	  pillars	  “must	  follow	  a	  
strict	  line	  of	  political	  subordination	  and	  chronological	  sequencing.”	  Naturally	  this	  would	  
make	  any	  sort	  of	  armed	  or	  military	  intervention	  the	  last	  possible	  resort	  and	  place	  that	  type	  
of	  decision-­‐making	  firmly	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  UNSC.	  	  RWP	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  make	  




support	  of	  the	  concept,	  the	  importance	  of	  “proper	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  Pillar	  
III”	  (Puri,	  2012).	  The	  bottom	  line	  was	  that	  armed	  intervention	  should	  always	  be	  considered	  
a	  measure	  of	  last	  resort	  with	  the	  implication	  that	  this	  was	  not	  done	  in	  Libya.	  	  
This	  sort	  of	  normative	  proposal	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  IBSA.	  India	  and	  South	  
Africa	  quickly	  made	  strong	  explanatory	  statements	  professing	  their	  support	  for	  this	  norm	  
creation.	  During	  the	  same	  November	  debate,	  when	  the	  Indian	  representative	  spoke,	  he	  
mentioned	  the	  same	  concern	  that	  Brazil	  had,	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  civilians	  within	  UNSC	  
Resolution	  1973	  being	  used	  to	  excuse	  actions	  on	  the	  ground.	  India	  was	  clearly	  concerned	  
about	  such	  an	  intervention	  happening	  again	  and	  closed	  by	  mentioning,	  “The	  Security	  
Council	  must	  also	  be	  clear	  that	  its	  responsibility	  for	  protecting	  civilians	  does	  not	  end	  with	  a	  
military	  or	  police	  response”	  (S/PV.6650,	  2011).	  South	  Africa	  was	  even	  more	  explicit:	  
“Regime	  change	  and	  the	  arming	  and	  harming	  of	  civilians	  cannot	  be	  justified	  in	  the	  name	  of	  
protecting	  civilians,	  and	  those	  entrusted	  with	  such	  responsibilities	  must	  uphold	  them	  while	  
protecting	  civilians,	  as	  clearly	  stated	  by	  the	  representative	  of	  Brazil”	  (S/PV.6650,	  2011).	  
This	  great	  degree	  of	  similarity	  in	  their	  remarks	  and	  references	  to	  each	  other’s	  concepts	  
suggests	  dramatically	  increased	  coordination	  and	  normative	  alignment	  compared	  to	  earlier	  
actions.	  Here	  IBSA,	  led	  by	  Brazil,	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  creating	  norms;	  not	  merely	  taking	  ownership	  
of	  norms	  already	  in	  existence.	  	  
According	  to	  academic	  Jeffrey	  Checkel,	  the	  effect	  of	  norms	  “reach[es]	  deeper:	  they	  
constitute	  actor	  identities	  and	  interests	  and	  do	  not	  simply	  regulate	  behaviour”	  (Checkel,	  
1998,	  p.328).	  When	  norms	  are	  created,	  they	  “make	  behavioural	  claims	  on	  actors.”	  This	  
establishes	  a	  set	  of	  actors	  that	  are	  based	  on	  the	  created	  norm.	  These	  states	  and	  global	  
norms	  interact	  and	  are	  “mutually	  constituted”	  (Checkel,	  1998,	  p.328).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  IBSA,	  
Brazil	  created	  the	  norm	  of	  RWP	  and	  the	  IBSA	  states	  rallied	  around	  it	  based	  on	  their	  rhetoric	  
and	  behaviour.	  Academics	  that	  study	  constructivist	  thought	  have	  found	  that	  regime	  norms	  
dictate	  much	  of	  a	  state’s	  behaviour	  and	  given	  that	  IBSA	  all	  have	  the	  same	  regime	  type,	  this	  
implies	  great	  similarities	  in	  behaviour	  and	  by	  extension,	  support	  for	  norms.	  	  
Brazil	  later	  aborted	  the	  “RWP”	  concept,	  but	  not	  before	  hosting	  a	  well-­‐attended	  informal	  
discussion	  at	  the	  UN	  and	  eliciting	  declarations	  of	  support	  for	  the	  norm.	  Brazil’s	  IBSA	  
partners	  attended	  and	  spoke	  (Benner,	  2013,	  p.10).	  South	  Africa’s	  statement	  “fully	  
associated”	  with	  RWP.	  South	  Africa	  accused	  NATO,	  consistent	  with	  previous	  statements,	  of	  
“operat[ing]	  beyond	  the	  provisions	  of	  international	  law”	  (Government	  of	  South	  Africa,	  




made	  a	  joint	  statement	  on	  March	  30,	  2012	  on	  RWP	  calling	  for	  “Enhanced	  Security	  Council	  
procedures	  in	  order	  to	  monitor	  and	  assess	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  resolutions	  are	  interpreted	  
and	  implemented.	  In	  this	  vein,	  they	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  concept	  …	  RWP	  should	  be	  
further	  discussed	  at	  the	  UN”	  (Rousseff,	  2012).	  And	  in	  the	  September	  2012	  meeting	  on	  R2P,	  
both	  India	  and	  South	  Africa	  included	  positive	  remarks	  on	  it	  within	  their	  statements.	  
Feelings	  of	  resentment	  from	  UNSC	  1973	  clearly	  still	  lingered	  with	  India,	  as	  even	  in	  
September	  2012,	  nearly	  a	  year	  after	  Gaddafi’s	  death,	  India	  still	  expressed	  concern	  that	  R2P	  
would	  be	  hijacked	  by	  big	  powers	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  accomplishing	  political	  objectives	  
(2012,	  p.4).	  The	  continual	  promulgation	  of	  the	  RWP	  norm,	  nearly	  a	  year	  after	  its	  release,	  
proved	  that	  IBSA	  does,	  despite	  the	  lack	  of	  institutionalization,	  share	  similar	  values	  and	  can	  
be	  capable	  of	  coordination	  and	  cooperation.	  
Implementation	  of	  a	  newly	  constructed	  norm,	  especially	  one	  as	  broad	  as	  RWP,	  can	  take	  
years.	  Norm	  growth	  occurs	  during	  robust	  dialogue	  and	  when	  emerging	  and	  powerful	  states,	  
like	  IBSA,	  vocalize	  their	  support.	  RWP,	  strengthened	  by	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  IBSA	  countries,	  
provided	  a	  catalyst	  for	  critical	  discussions	  in	  the	  international	  community	  about	  normative	  
issues	  such	  as	  an	  intervention's	  accountability,	  transparency,	  and	  regime	  change	  
(Hammann,	  2012).	  Being	  members	  of	  IBSA	  increased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  countries	  
providing	  support	  to	  the	  norm.	  IBSA	  countries,	  having	  shared	  norms	  and	  values,	  could	  
confidently	  speak	  their	  minds	  on	  the	  issues-­‐	  knowing	  that	  they	  would	  receive	  political	  
support	  from	  their	  partners.	  However,	  Brazil	  ceased	  to	  promote	  the	  norm	  or	  expand	  the	  
RWP	  coalition,	  largely	  limiting	  the	  norm’s	  possibility	  for	  growth	  (Benner,	  2013).	  	  
The	  next	  UNSC	  Resolution	  on	  Libya	  was	  UNSC	  Resolution	  2009,	  which	  established	  the	  
UN	  Support	  Mission	  in	  Libya,	  called	  UNSMIL.	  The	  mandate	  of	  the	  mission	  covered:	  
“Assisting	  national	  efforts	  to	  extend	  State	  authority,	  strengthen	  institutions,	  restore	  public	  
services,	  support	  transitional	  justice	  and	  protect	  human	  rights,	  particularly	  those	  of	  
vulnerable	  groups”	  (UNSC/RES/2009,	  2011).	  UNSC	  Resolution	  2009	  also	  kept	  the	  no-­‐fly	  
zone	  under	  review.	  In	  further	  demonstration	  of	  opposition	  to	  how	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  had	  been	  
implemented,	  South	  Africa	  took	  this	  opportunity	  to	  make	  a	  statement,	  in	  alignment	  with	  the	  
Russian	  Federation	  to	  “call	  for	  the	  early	  lifting	  of	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone”	  (SC/10389,	  2011).	  
Following	  the	  death	  of	  Gaddafi	  on	  October	  20,	  the	  UNSC	  voted	  unanimously	  for	  UNSC	  
Resolution	  2016	  to	  end	  the	  NATO	  civilian	  protection	  mandate	  and	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  on	  
October	  27	  and	  it	  would	  end	  officially	  on	  October	  31,	  2011	  (UNSC/RES/2016,	  2011,	  pp.2-­‐3).	  




3.6.	  Findings	  	  	  
	  
The	  results	  of	  this	  qualitative	  analysis	  show	  that	  despite	  the	  initial	  lack	  of	  
coordination	  and	  internal	  coherence	  around	  the	  Libyan	  conflict,	  IBSA	  does	  indeed	  share	  
similar	  values	  on	  international	  peace	  and	  security.	  Internal	  coherence	  appeared	  to	  improve	  
towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  as	  the	  countries	  came	  into	  agreement	  around	  their	  opposition	  
to	  foreign	  military	  intervention	  and	  especially	  foreign-­‐imposed	  regime	  change.	  At	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  international	  debate	  on	  the	  topic,	  it	  had	  appeared	  that	  the	  UNSC	  Resolution	  
1973	  would	  only	  concentrate	  on	  providing	  humanitarian	  relief	  to	  Libyans.	  This	  partially	  
explains	  why	  South	  Africa	  voted	  in	  favour	  of	  it.	  India	  and	  Brazil’s	  scepticism	  of	  the	  plan	  for	  
humanitarian	  intervention	  explains	  why	  both	  countries	  publicly	  expressed	  concern	  about	  
the	  establishment	  of	  a	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  before	  the	  vote	  on	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1973	  even	  occurred.	  
After	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  began,	  the	  countries	  quickly	  came	  into	  strong	  rhetorical	  alignment	  
around	  their	  problems	  with	  its	  implementation.	  Brazil’s	  correlative	  development	  of	  RWP	  
and	  India	  and	  South	  Africa’s	  support	  for	  it	  demonstrates	  their	  strong	  feelings	  and	  increasing	  
sense	  of	  identity	  around	  issues	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  and	  foreign	  intervention.	  As	  for	  
alignment	  with	  other	  major	  powers,	  IBSA’s	  politics	  and	  rhetoric	  were	  largely	  consistent	  
with	  China	  and	  Russia	  during	  these	  diplomatic	  negotiations.	  The	  debate	  over	  state	  
sovereignty	  and	  foreign	  intervention	  will	  play	  a	  huge	  role	  in	  how	  IBSA	  behaves	  during	  the	  
















CHAPTER	  4:	  THE	  CONFLICT	  IN	  SYRIA	  
4.1.	  Introduction	  	  
The	  Syrian	  Arab	  Republic	  was	  not	  immune	  from	  the	  fervour	  that	  unfurled	  through	  the	  
Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  during	  the	  Arab	  Spring.	  In	  the	  Syrian	  case,	  the	  catalytic	  event	  
that	  began	  the	  conflict	  was	  the	  arrest	  of	  15	  children,	  who	  had	  written	  anti-­‐regime	  graffiti	  on	  
the	  wall	  of	  a	  school	  in	  the	  Syrian	  town	  of	  Daraa,	  on	  March	  18,	  2011	  (Lesch,	  2011,	  p.424	  and	  
Sterling,	  2012).	  The	  town’s	  residents	  made	  an	  unprecedented	  move	  in	  an	  authoritarian	  
regime	  and	  protested	  because	  it	  was	  reported	  that	  the	  children	  had	  been	  “beaten	  and	  
tortured	  in	  prison”	  (Sterling,	  2012).	  It	  was	  reported	  that	  several	  protesters	  were	  killed	  on	  
the	  first	  day	  of	  the	  demonstrations	  and	  many	  more	  were	  injured.	  When	  the	  children	  were	  
released,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  accusations	  of	  torture	  were	  true	  (Sterling,	  2012).	  Inspired	  
by	  this	  incident,	  a	  history	  of	  past	  abuses,	  and	  concurrent	  uprisings	  in	  other	  Arab	  countries,	  
more	  Syrians	  throughout	  the	  country	  began	  protesting	  (Sterling,	  2012).	  In	  response,	  the	  
Syrian	  government	  forces	  fired	  into	  protesting	  crowds,	  cracking	  down	  against	  them.	  
Rumours	  of	  torture	  and	  arbitrary	  arrest	  persisted	  as	  the	  protest	  movement	  grew	  and	  
spread	  throughout	  the	  country	  (Sterling,	  2012).	  The	  protesters	  demanded	  increased	  
political	  and	  economic	  reforms	  and	  “increasingly	  call[ed]	  for	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  regime”	  
(S/PV/6524,	  2011).	  	  
In	  April,	  in	  a	  conciliatory	  gesture,	  the	  President	  of	  Syria,	  Bashar	  al-­‐Assad,	  inaugurated	  a	  
new	  government	  and	  lifted	  the	  nearly	  50	  year-­‐old	  state	  of	  emergency	  (S/PV/6524,	  2011).	  
Assad	  also	  “recognized	  the	  right	  to	  peacefully	  protest,”	  although	  strictly	  regulated	  
(S/PV6524,	  2011,	  p.1).	  However,	  the	  protesters	  were	  dissatisfied	  with	  how	  long	  it	  had	  
taken	  him	  to	  enact	  these	  measures	  (S/PV/6524,	  2011,	  p.1).	  To	  make	  matters	  worse,	  Assad	  
continued	  to	  allow	  his	  government	  security	  forces	  to	  use	  violence	  against	  the	  protests	  
(Spillius,	  2012	  and	  S/PV/6524,	  2011,	  p.1).	  In	  the	  days	  following	  President	  Assad’s	  
governmental	  reforms,	  reports	  surfaced	  of	  a	  terrible	  government	  crackdown	  on	  a	  large	  
demonstration.	  Within	  a	  two-­‐day	  period,	  the	  UN’s	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  
Human	  Rights	  (OHCHR)	  reported	  more	  than	  100	  deaths	  across	  the	  country	  (S/PV/6524,	  
2011,	  p.1).	  The	  violence	  intensified	  when,	  soon	  after,	  the	  Syrian	  government	  began	  a	  




p.1).	  This	  aggressive	  action	  from	  the	  Syrian	  government	  fuelled	  the	  protesters	  fires	  and	  the	  
clear	  lack	  of	  resolution	  motivated	  the	  interest	  of	  many	  in	  the	  international	  community.	  	  
What	  had	  emerged	  as	  disparate	  protests	  eventually	  transformed	  into	  a	  coherent	  
political	  and	  militaristic	  opposition	  and	  the	  Syrian	  “Arab	  Spring”	  into	  a	  civil	  war.	  The	  official	  
formation	  of	  the	  opposition	  force,	  the	  Syrian	  National	  Council,	  in	  July	  and	  August	  2011,	  in	  
Turkey,	  crystallized	  its	  demands	  and	  hardened	  its	  resolve	  (BBC	  News,	  2013).	  The	  on-­‐going	  
conflict	  and	  Assad’s	  violent	  response	  to	  the	  protests	  concerned	  the	  international	  
community	  and	  preventing	  the	  conflict	  from	  deteriorating	  further	  now	  preoccupied	  the	  
minds	  of	  many.	  	  
4.2.	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  International	  Community	  	  
The	  Syrian	  conflict	  proved	  another	  fundamental	  challenge	  for	  the	  UNSC	  and	  an	  
international	  community	  that	  was	  already	  concentrating	  on	  the	  Libyan	  uprising	  that	  had	  
begun	  a	  month	  earlier.	  The	  on-­‐going	  events	  in	  Libya	  coloured	  the	  international	  
community’s	  response	  to	  Syria,	  particularly	  those,	  such	  as	  IBSA,	  who	  had	  been	  displeased	  
with	  how	  the	  Libyan	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  had	  been	  implemented.	  A	  series	  of	  UNSC	  Resolutions	  
punctuated	  the	  Libyan	  uprising,	  while	  indecision,	  division,	  and	  draft	  resolutions	  plagued	  the	  
Syrian.	  Particularly	  after	  the	  death	  of	  Gaddafi,	  the	  international	  community	  found	  Syria-­‐
related	  discussions	  increasingly	  stalled;	  all	  states	  that	  were	  opposed	  to	  the	  “no-­‐fly	  zone”	  
were	  made	  “dubious	  that	  anything	  the	  UNSC	  passes	  that	  makes	  mention	  of	  Assad	  stepping	  
down	  could	  be	  used	  as	  carte	  blanche	  for	  folks	  interested	  in	  regime	  change”	  (Herszenhorn,	  
2012).	  China	  and	  Russia	  were	  most	  vocally	  opposed	  to	  any	  UNSC	  action	  in	  Syria	  and	  IBSA	  
was	  often	  suspected	  of	  giving	  them	  tacit	  political	  support.	  Thus	  began	  a	  dramatic	  year	  of	  
discussions,	  draft	  resolutions	  and	  debates	  on	  the	  conflict.	  	  
The	  IBSA	  Trilateral	  Commission	  met	  March	  7-­‐10,	  2011,	  which	  was	  10	  days	  before	  
the	  children	  were	  arrested	  in	  Daraa,	  sparking	  the	  initial	  revolts.	  Therefore,	  due	  to	  timing,	  no	  
meaningful	  remarks	  were	  included	  on	  the	  Syrian	  conflict	  within	  the	  final	  Communiqué.	  
However,	  the	  March	  IBSA	  meeting	  was	  late	  enough	  in	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  to	  warrant	  the	  
inclusion	  of	  a	  general	  statement,	  indicating	  the	  directionality	  of	  IBSA’s	  views:	  	  
“In	  the	  context	  of	  mass	  protests	  in	  countries	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  as	  
an	  expression	  of	  the	  aspirations	  of	  the	  peoples	  of	  these	  countries	  for	  reform,	  the	  
ministers	  expressed	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  situation	  will	  be	  resolved	  in	  a	  peaceful	  






The	  emphasis	  on	  a	  peaceful	  resolution	  reflects	  IBSA’s	  professed	  devotion	  to	  diplomacy	  over	  
military	  intervention	  in	  the	  preservation	  of	  international	  peace	  and	  security.	  After	  this	  
Communiqué	  was	  issued,	  there	  was	  no	  further	  action	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  from	  
IBSA,	  except	  for	  from	  within	  UNGA,	  UNHRC,	  and	  the	  UNSC.	  	  
On	  April	  27,	  the	  UNSC	  openly	  discussed	  the	  Syrian	  conflict	  for	  the	  first	  time;	  providing	  
valuable	  insight	  into	  the	  views	  of	  the	  international	  community.	  On	  April	  21,	  there	  had	  been	  
a	  UNSC	  debate	  on	  the	  Middle	  East	  conflict	  (the	  focus	  was	  on	  Palestine)	  and	  many	  states,	  
including	  India,	  Brazil	  and	  South	  Africa,	  mentioned	  briefly	  the	  importance	  of	  resolving	  the	  
situation	  in	  Syria	  (S/PV.6520,	  2011,	  p.25	  and	  27).	  Originally,	  the	  UNSC	  debated	  whether	  or	  
not	  to	  issue	  a	  press	  statement	  on	  Syria,	  but	  was	  unable	  to	  agree	  upon	  one	  because	  of	  
objections	  from	  Russia	  and	  Lebanon	  (Security	  Council	  Report,	  2011).	  Consequently,	  the	  
UNSC	  held	  a	  public	  debate	  instead.	  As	  non-­‐permanent	  members	  of	  the	  UNSC,	  IBSA	  members	  
participated	  and	  made	  statements	  (S/PV.6524,	  2011).	  Their	  statements	  are	  largely	  
consistent;	  all	  mentioned	  the	  need	  for	  political	  reforms,	  the	  fact	  that	  resolving	  the	  conflict	  
was	  largely	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Syrian	  government,	  and	  forbid	  the	  use	  of	  force.	  The	  
statements	  indicated	  possession	  of	  similar	  values.	  This	  debate	  occurred	  shortly	  after	  UNSC	  
Resolution	  1973	  passed	  and	  many	  countries	  were	  becoming	  concerned	  with	  the	  use	  of	  force	  
in	  civilian	  protection	  efforts	  in	  Syria.	  	  
India’s	  statement	  in	  the	  April	  27th	  public	  debate	  encouraged	  “political	  dialogue	  and	  
reform”	  and	  clarified	  that	  managing	  the	  protesters	  and	  their	  demands	  was	  the	  Syrian	  
government’s	  problem	  (S/PV/6524,	  2011,	  p.8).	  The	  role	  of	  the	  UNSC,	  in	  India’s	  view,	  was	  
simply	  to	  forbid	  violence	  in	  any	  form	  and	  “to	  seek	  a	  resolution	  of	  grievances	  through	  
peaceful	  means.”	  India	  concluded	  by	  highlighting	  the	  important	  role	  that	  regional	  and	  sub-­‐
regional	  organizations	  have	  to	  play	  in	  resolving	  the	  crisis	  (S/PV/6524,	  2011,	  p.8),	  possibly	  
referencing	  its	  role	  in	  IBSA	  or	  at	  the	  least	  highlighting	  India’s	  positive	  view	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
regional	  organizations.	  When	  Brazilian	  Representative	  Ambassador	  Viotti	  spoke,	  she	  
highlighted	  the	  vital	  role	  that	  regional	  organizations	  can	  play	  in	  resolving	  conflicts-­‐	  showing	  
again	  how	  valued	  regional	  organizations	  and	  cooperation	  are	  to	  the	  IBSA	  countries.	  
Ambassador	  Viotti	  included	  a	  condemnation	  of	  violence	  against	  protesters	  and	  encouraged	  
the	  Syrian	  government	  to	  be	  responsive	  to	  their	  demands	  (S/PV/6524,	  2011,	  p.9);	  she	  went	  
on	  to	  encourage	  the	  Syrian	  Government	  to	  “engage	  in	  a	  broad,	  inclusive	  political	  dialogue	  




IBSA	  members,	  the	  South	  African	  representative	  encouraged	  the	  Syrian	  government	  to	  
continue	  making	  “reforms	  towards	  democratization,”	  but	  did	  not	  mention	  regional	  
organizations.	  South	  Africa	  stressed	  peaceful	  protests	  and	  that	  the	  Syrian	  government	  be	  
responsive	  to	  them	  (S/PV/6524,	  2011,	  p.8).	  South	  Africa	  asked	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  
statement	  made	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  NAM,	  showing	  a	  lack	  of	  coordination	  of	  IBSA	  during	  this	  
debate	  (S/PV/6520,	  2011,	  p.25).	  However,	  the	  statements	  were	  all	  consistent	  with	  central	  
IBSA	  tenets	  of	  promoting	  the	  role	  of	  diplomacy	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  international	  peace	  
and	  security.	  
Meanwhile,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  April	  in	  a	  special	  session	  of	  the	  16th	  UNHRC,	  the	  UNHRC	  passed	  
a	  Resolution	  that	  was	  critical	  of	  the	  Syrian	  Government	  and	  mandated	  an	  investigation	  into	  
human	  rights	  violations	  occurring	  in	  Syria.	  The	  investigation’s	  goal	  was	  to	  hold	  those	  
responsible	  for	  the	  violence	  accountable.	  Aligned	  with	  the	  US,	  the	  UK	  and	  France,	  Brazil,	  the	  
only	  IBSA	  member	  on	  the	  UNHRC	  voted	  “Yes”	  on	  the	  Resolution.	  China	  and	  Russia,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  voted	  it	  down,	  likely	  because	  it	  was	  too	  critical	  of	  the	  Syrian	  Government	  and	  
did	  not	  address	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Syrian	  opposition	  was	  also	  alleged	  to	  have	  committed	  
abuses	  (A/HRC/RES/S-­‐16-­‐1,	  2011).	  A	  little	  more	  than	  a	  week	  after	  the	  Resolution	  had	  
passed,	  Syria	  withdrew	  its	  bid	  for	  membership	  in	  the	  UNHRC	  (Donnet,	  2011).	  	  
Months	  after	  the	  conflict	  began,	  on	  May	  25,	  2011,	  France,	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  
Kingdom	  presented	  the	  first	  draft	  resolution	  to	  the	  UNSC	  on	  the	  conflict	  in	  Syria.	  The	  
resolution	  was	  presented	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  some	  states,	  such	  as	  India,	  vocalizing	  concerns	  that	  
UNSC	  Resolution	  1973	  was	  overreaching	  its	  mandate	  in	  Libya	  (S/PV.6531,	  2011,	  p.11).	  IBSA	  
states,	  among	  others,	  were	  wary	  of	  any	  similar	  action	  the	  UNSC	  might	  take	  on	  Syria	  
(Security	  Council	  Report,	  2011,	  p.3)	  and	  wanted	  to	  avoid	  ‘another	  Libya’	  (Mabera,	  2012,	  
p.12).	  Using	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  conflict	  in	  Syria	  was	  an	  internal	  affair	  and	  outside	  
intervention	  might	  only	  make	  the	  situation	  worse,	  China	  and	  Russia	  threatened	  to	  veto	  
(Security	  Council	  Report,	  2011,	  p.3).	  The	  draft	  Resolution	  was	  never	  voted	  on	  so	  it	  is	  
unclear	  whether	  or	  not	  IBSA	  would	  have	  abstained	  or	  voted	  negatively.	  The	  situation	  in	  
Libya	  and	  the	  surrounding	  controversy	  illuminated	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  solution	  to	  Syria	  that	  did	  
not	  involve	  external	  military	  intervention	  would	  need	  to	  be	  found.	  As	  a	  result,	  versions	  with	  
alternative	  options	  such	  as	  sanctions	  circulated.	  This	  Resolution	  would	  face	  many	  revisions	  
before	  it	  was	  finally	  voted	  on	  in	  October	  2011.	  	  	  
	  





Driven	  closer	  together	  by	  shared	  frustration	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Libya	  situation,	  
IBSA	  coordination	  on	  peace	  and	  security	  heightened.	  In	  July	  2011,	  Brazil	  and	  South	  Africa	  
met	  bilaterally	  to	  discuss	  a	  series	  of	  issues,	  including	  multilateral	  cooperation,	  global	  
governance	  reform,	  and	  the	  conflict	  in	  Syria.	  Both	  countries	  promised	  to	  work	  for	  global	  
governance	  reform	  through	  their	  participation	  in	  IBSA	  and	  recognized	  that	  “A	  critical	  
avenue	  for	  cooperation	  also	  arises	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  Brazil	  and	  South	  Africa	  serve	  on	  
the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  this	  year”	  (Government	  of	  South	  Africa,	  2011).	  In	  the	  meeting,	  the	  
Brazilians	  and	  South	  Africans	  “discussed	  ways	  of	  engaging	  the	  Syrian	  Government	  with	  the	  
aim	  of	  finding	  an	  end	  to	  the	  violence	  in	  Syria	  and	  to	  promote	  a	  sustainable	  political	  
settlement	  that	  is	  inclusive	  and	  reflects	  the	  will	  of	  the	  Syrian	  people	  and	  addresses	  their	  
legitimate	  concerns”	  (Government	  of	  South	  Africa,	  2011).	  Shortly	  after	  this	  bilateral	  
meeting	  occurred,	  on	  August	  10,	  2011,	  IBSA	  would	  send	  its	  first	  diplomatic	  delegation	  to	  
meet	  with	  the	  Syrian	  leadership	  (Varner,	  2011).	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  IBSA	  had	  most	  recently	  
met	  in	  March	  2011	  and	  did	  not	  have	  another	  meeting	  scheduled	  until	  October	  2011,	  the	  
only	  way	  the	  delegation	  could	  have	  been	  planned	  is	  through	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  IBSA	  
outside	  of	  the	  formal	  meetings	  and	  within	  the	  bilateral	  meetings.	  This	  elevated	  degree	  of	  
planning	  implied	  IBSA’s	  most	  significant	  level	  of	  coordination	  yet	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  
international	  peace	  and	  security.	  	  
4.3.	  IBSA’s	  Involvement	  
On	  August	  3,	  2011,	  nearly	  six	  months	  after	  the	  start	  of	  the	  conflict,	  India,	  during	  its	  
month-­‐long	  term	  as	  President	  of	  the	  UNSC,	  issued	  the	  first	  UNSC	  statement	  on	  Syria.	  
Presidential	  statements,	  like	  resolutions,	  are	  adopted	  by	  the	  UNSC	  membership,	  and	  are	  
made	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  UNSC,	  but	  do	  not	  require	  a	  vote	  (United	  Nations,	  2014).	  Therefore,	  
although	  not	  a	  vote,	  this	  statement	  marked	  the	  first	  consensus	  that	  the	  UNSC	  had	  achieved	  
in	  terms	  of	  Syria.	  In	  fact,	  it	  was	  the	  most	  agreement	  the	  UNSC	  came	  to	  on	  the	  Syrian	  conflict	  
in	  the	  entire	  year.	  The	  rather	  limited	  statement	  “condemned	  widespread	  violations	  of	  
human	  rights	  …	  against	  civilians	  by	  the	  Syrian	  authorities”	  and	  asked	  “all	  sides	  to	  act	  with	  
utmost	  restraint”-­‐	  implying	  that	  even	  the	  opposition	  was	  using	  force	  (S/PRST/2011/16,	  
2011).	  Included	  in	  the	  statement	  was	  a	  plea	  for	  the	  Syrian	  authorities	  to	  “allow	  unhindered	  
access	  for	  international	  humanitarian	  agencies	  and	  workers”	  (S/PRST/2011/16,	  2011).	  The	  




intervention,	  such	  as	  those	  that	  abstained	  from	  the	  vote	  for	  UNSC	  1973.	  This	  statement	  
marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  an	  active	  month	  in	  the	  UNSC	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  conflict	  and	  
provoked	  a	  series	  of	  statements	  from	  Middle	  East-­‐based	  regional	  organizations.	  
As	  President	  Assad’s	  security	  forces	  continued	  to	  attack	  Syrian	  towns	  in	  early	  August,	  
the	  Arab	  League	  issued	  a	  statement	  that	  expressed	  their	  concern.	  The	  statement	  called	  for	  
an	  end	  to	  “military	  operations”	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  a	  political	  settlement	  (Perry,	  2011).	  	  
The	  Gulf	  Cooperation	  Council’s	  statement	  consisted	  of	  their	  fears	  over	  the	  “mounting	  
violence	  and	  the	  excessive	  use	  of	  force	  which	  resulted	  in	  killing	  and	  wounding	  large	  
numbers”	  (AFP,	  2011b).	  The	  Organization	  for	  Islamic	  Cooperation	  issued	  its	  statement	  on	  
August	  2,	  2011,	  calling	  for	  “all	  parties	  to	  preserve	  the	  unity	  and	  cohesion	  of	  their	  country	  
and	  to	  spare	  it	  the	  risks	  of	  infighting	  and	  external	  intervention”	  (Ihsanoglu,	  2011).	  As	  
evidenced	  by	  the	  situation	  in	  Libya,	  the	  UNSC	  tends	  to	  put	  great	  weight	  behind	  the	  words	  of	  
regional	  organizations.	  While	  no	  organization	  pushed	  for	  intervention,	  the	  push	  for	  political	  
dialogue	  from	  these	  organizations	  should	  have	  been	  considered	  and	  might	  have,	  if	  debates	  
were	  not	  so	  stalled,	  provided	  the	  catalyst	  for	  a	  UNSC	  resolution	  of	  a	  similar	  character.	  	  
4.3.1.	  The	  IBSA	  Delegation	  Visits	  Syria	  	  
	  
As	  a	  unified	  actor,	  IBSA	  sent	  a	  delegation	  composed	  of	  its	  Deputy	  Foreign	  Ministers	  
to	  Syria	  for	  meetings	  with	  Syrian	  President	  Assad	  and	  the	  Syrian	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Walid	  
Muallem,	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  August	  (New	  York	  Ministerial	  Communiqué,	  2011,	  pt.	  9).	  The	  
delegation	  expressed	  grave	  concern,	  asked	  for	  an	  “immediate	  end	  to	  all	  violence,”	  “for	  all	  
sides	  to	  act	  with	  utmost	  restraint,”	  and	  condemned	  the	  use	  of	  force	  by	  all	  parties,	  not	  just	  
the	  government	  (Embassy	  of	  India,	  Damascus,	  2011).	  This	  statement	  provided	  political	  
support	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  Syrian	  opposition	  was	  also	  using	  force	  in	  the	  protests,	  by	  
extension	  supporting	  the	  Chinese	  and	  Russians,	  the	  main	  opponents	  of	  any	  UNSC	  
resolution.	  These	  opponents	  fixated	  to	  this	  point	  in	  negotiations	  and	  any	  resolution	  that	  did	  
not	  acknowledge	  that	  both	  sides	  were	  using	  force-­‐	  not	  just	  the	  Syrian	  government-­‐	  was	  
doomed	  to	  fail.	  IBSA	  issued	  a	  statement	  after	  the	  meeting,	  stating	  that	  President	  Assad	  had	  
reassured	  them	  "of	  his	  commitment	  to	  reform,	  aimed	  at	  ushering	  in	  multiparty	  democracy,	  
including	  thorough	  revision	  of	  the	  constitution”	  (Embassy	  of	  India,	  Damascus,	  2011).	  IBSA	  
was	  told	  that	  free	  and	  fair	  elections	  would	  be	  held	  within	  the	  year	  and	  that	  Syria	  would	  be	  a	  




Damascus,	  2011).	  The	  belief	  that	  these	  assurances	  would	  be	  upheld,	  affirmed	  IBSA’s	  
commitment	  to	  non-­‐interference	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  another	  state,	  because	  Syria	  would	  
supposedly	  settle	  its	  own	  internal	  issues.	  	  
Even	  though	  RWP	  had	  not	  officially	  debuted	  as	  a	  concept	  at	  this	  point	  (it	  was	  only	  
August),	  the	  joint	  decision	  to	  make	  a	  diplomatic	  visit	  to	  Syria	  demonstrated	  a	  significant	  
degree	  of	  mutual	  support	  for	  the	  classic	  principles	  of	  conflict	  resolution.	  A	  diplomatic	  
delegation	  can	  fall	  within	  the	  first	  two	  pillars	  of	  Brazil’s	  proposed	  RWP	  framework	  that	  
places	  all	  available	  options	  before	  military	  intervention.	  As	  the	  South	  African	  Ambassador	  
to	  the	  UN	  later	  said	  in	  the	  February	  2012	  UNGA	  debate	  on	  R2P:	  “The	  dispatching	  of	  eminent	  
persons,	  envoys	  or	  political	  groupings	  such	  as	  the	  Arab	  League	  or	  IBSA	  or	  influential	  
bilateral	  partners,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Syria,	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  first	  line	  of	  approach”	  
(South	  African	  Mission	  to	  the	  UN,	  2012).	  The	  fact	  that	  South	  Africa	  mentioned	  IBSA	  in	  this	  
statement,	  showed	  its	  pride	  in	  IBSA’s	  action	  and	  solidified	  IBSA’s	  increasing	  interest	  and	  
sense	  of	  importance	  around	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  issues.	  In	  this	  case,	  without	  
IBSA	  as	  an	  organizing	  mechanism,	  it	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  the	  countries	  would	  have	  made	  
the	  same	  visit.	  As	  IBSA	  valued	  diplomacy	  highly,	  they	  inevitably	  hoped	  that	  their	  visit	  would	  
cause	  a	  cessation	  of	  violence.	  IBSA	  had	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  progress	  would	  be	  made	  as	  
President	  Assad	  said	  to	  them	  "that	  some	  mistakes	  had	  been	  made	  by	  the	  security	  forces	  and	  
that	  efforts	  were	  under	  way	  to	  prevent	  their	  recurrence”	  (Embassy	  of	  India,	  2011).	  
However,	  despite	  the	  visit,	  the	  promises,	  and	  the	  primacy	  in	  diplomacy,	  the	  violence	  and	  
repression	  in	  Syria	  aggravated.	  No	  actions	  or	  statements	  came	  from	  IBSA	  until	  the	  next	  IBSA	  
Summit	  in	  October	  2011.	  The	  lack	  of	  further	  action	  and	  follow-­‐up	  with	  the	  Syrian	  
government	  begged	  the	  question	  of	  how	  serious	  IBSA	  really	  was	  about	  diplomacy	  and	  the	  
genuineness	  of	  its	  desire	  for	  a	  leadership	  role	  in	  international	  peace	  and	  security.	  	  
In	  August,	  discussions	  continued	  within	  the	  UNSC	  on	  the	  draft	  resolution	  that	  had	  been	  
initiated	  in	  May	  by	  Western	  countries.	  The	  P3	  (UK,	  US,	  and	  France)	  and	  Portugal	  and	  
Germany	  disseminated	  a	  version	  containing	  sanctions	  against	  the	  Syrian	  authorities,	  
including	  President	  Assad	  and	  22	  of	  his	  affiliates	  (Charbonneau,	  2011	  and	  Mabera,	  2011).	  It	  
also	  proposed	  an	  arms	  embargo-­‐	  severing	  the	  arms	  trade	  between	  Russia	  and	  Syria	  
(Charbonneau,	  2011).	  The	  measures	  included	  in	  the	  draft	  resolution	  were	  not	  reported	  to	  
be	  as	  severe	  as	  a	  proposed	  European	  Union	  step	  to	  “forbid	  the	  import	  of	  Syrian	  oil”	  or	  the	  
sanctions	  that	  the	  US	  had	  in	  place	  against	  Syria	  (Charbonneau,	  2011).	  Although	  India,	  Brazil,	  




reportedly	  were	  “constructively	  engaging	  on	  the	  text”	  (Charbonneau,	  2011).	  A	  Russian-­‐
oriented	  draft	  resolution	  also	  circulated.	  This	  draft	  resolution	  did	  not	  include	  sanctions,	  but	  
focused	  on	  Libya-­‐related	  concerns	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  non-­‐intervention.	  It	  did	  not	  ask	  for	  
sanctions,	  but	  encouraged	  faster	  reform	  processes	  and	  the	  opposition	  to	  dialogue	  with	  the	  
Syrian	  government	  (Charbonneau,	  2011).	  It	  is	  unclear	  exactly	  how	  IBSA	  was	  aligned	  at	  this	  
point.	  	  
Meanwhile,	  Brazil,	  India	  and	  South	  Africa	  continued	  to	  worry	  about	  ‘another	  Libya’	  in	  
Syria,	  because	  some	  states	  felt	  that	  NATO	  was	  operating	  beyond	  the	  mandate	  of	  UNSC	  
Resolution	  1973	  (Benner,	  2013).	  China	  and	  Russia	  were	  still	  strongly	  opposed	  to	  any	  
external	  intervention	  in	  Syria	  (Benner,	  2013).	  Russia	  and	  China	  believed	  that	  international	  
pressure	  from	  the	  UNSC	  was	  merely	  a	  screen	  for	  changing	  the	  regime	  in	  Syria	  and	  
expanding	  the	  Western	  sphere	  of	  influence	  to	  Syria	  (Benner,	  2013).	  On	  August	  23,	  2011,	  in	  
the	  special	  session	  of	  the	  17th	  UNHRC,	  a	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  for	  Syria	  was	  established	  
that	  held	  more	  weight	  than	  the	  previous	  fact-­‐finding	  mission	  (UNHRC/RES/S-­‐17-­‐1).	  The	  
Commission	  would	  investigate	  human	  rights	  violations	  with	  a	  view	  of	  holding	  accountable	  
those	  responsible	  (UNHRC/RES/S-­‐17-­‐1).	  This	  time,	  the	  lone	  IBSA	  representative	  on	  the	  
UNHRC,	  India,	  abstained	  from	  the	  vote,	  lending	  tacit	  support	  to	  China	  and	  Russia,	  who	  had	  
voted	  against	  the	  Resolution	  (UNHRC/RES/S-­‐17-­‐1).	  The	  Syrian	  government	  would	  later	  be	  
accused	  of	  not	  cooperating	  fully	  with	  the	  Commission	  (A/RES/66/176).	  	  
	  
4.3.2.	  IBSA	  after	  its	  Delegation	  Visits	  Syria	  	  
	  
On	  October	  4,	  2011,	  the	  draft	  resolution,	  which	  had	  originally	  circulated	  in	  May,	  was	  
finally	  voted	  on	  and	  (S/2011/612,	  2011)	  failed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Chinese	  and	  Russian	  vetoes.	  
The	  draft	  resolution	  (S/2011/612,	  2011)	  “condemned	  the	  violent	  Syrian	  government	  
crackdown	  on	  protesters	  and	  called	  for	  an	  end	  to	  the	  violence	  against	  civilians”	  essentially	  
the	  same	  language	  as	  the	  UNSC	  Presidential	  statement	  from	  August	  3	  (S/2011/612,	  2011).	  
It	  did	  not	  mention	  sanctions	  nor	  intervention,	  and	  had	  no	  references	  to	  the	  use	  of	  force	  
(S/2011/612,	  2011).	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	  all	  abstained	  from	  the	  vote,	  while	  China	  
and	  Russia	  used	  their	  veto.	  The	  draft	  resolution’s	  opposition	  believed	  that	  it	  did	  not	  
prioritize	  political	  dialogue	  and	  that	  the	  UNSC	  should	  not	  intervene	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  
Syria.	  Concern	  still	  strong	  about	  how	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1973	  was	  implemented,	  the	  Russian	  




UNSC	  separately	  from	  the	  Libyan	  experience.”	  The	  supporters	  of	  the	  draft	  resolution	  
contended	  that	  it	  addressed	  sufficiently	  the	  requests	  for	  political	  reform	  and	  dialogue,	  
incorporated	  provisions	  for	  protection	  of	  civilians,	  and	  was	  in	  line	  with	  Arab	  League	  
requests.	  	  
The	  UNSC	  debate	  on	  the	  situation	  presented	  a	  public	  opportunity	  for	  the	  IBSA	  
countries	  to	  address	  the	  situation	  in	  Syria	  and	  explain	  their	  votes.	  All	  the	  IBSA	  states	  had	  
abstained	  from	  the	  vote	  and	  all	  of	  their	  statements	  pushed	  for	  political	  dialogue	  as	  a	  
solution	  to	  the	  conflict.	  What	  follows	  below	  are	  brief	  summaries	  of	  their	  statements	  in	  the	  
debate:	  	  
	  
South	  Africa	  	  
Consistent	  with	  many	  of	  their	  earlier	  statements	  and	  the	  public	  opposition	  to	  the	  
implementation	  of	  UNSC	  1973,	  the	  South	  African	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  Nations,	  
Baso	  Sangqu,	  continued	  to	  support	  the	  “sovereignty	  and	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  
Syria”	  and	  “expressed	  their	  grave	  concern”	  and	  condemned	  the	  violence	  
(S/PV.6627,	  2011,	  p.10).	  The	  South	  African	  statement	  pressed	  for	  a	  Syrian-­‐led	  
solution	  to	  the	  crisis	  avoiding	  any	  foreign	  intervention.	  	  South	  Africa	  stated	  concern	  
about	  including	  accountability	  measures	  on	  the	  Syrian	  authorities	  but	  not	  the	  
opposition	  forces	  (SC/10403,	  2011).	  The	  Resolution’s	  supporters	  rejected	  including	  
language	  unambiguously	  opposed	  to	  a	  military	  intervention	  (SC/10403,	  2011).	  This	  
made	  it	  appear	  that	  the	  draft	  resolution	  could	  have	  hidden	  an	  agenda	  for	  removing	  
the	  Assad	  regime.	  South	  Africa	  clearly	  believed	  that	  UNSC	  resolutions	  could	  be	  
manipulated	  in	  order	  to	  accomplish	  political	  objectives.	  South	  Africa’s	  statement	  
called	  for	  access	  to	  affected	  populations	  for	  international	  humanitarian	  agencies.	  
Sangqu	  firmly	  stated	  that	  a	  political	  process	  “must	  be	  launched	  to	  guarantee	  that	  
fundamental	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  were	  respected”	  (Sangqu,	  2011).	  Finally,	  Sangqu	  
stressed	  that	  Syria’s	  “unity,	  sovereignty	  and	  territorial	  integrity”	  must	  be	  




The	  Brazilian	  statement,	  given	  by	  UN	  Ambassador	  Viotti,	  referenced	  their	  work	  in	  




successes	  of	  the	  August	  delegation	  (S/PV.6627,	  2011,	  p.11).	  Brazil,	  like	  many	  other	  
states,	  demanded	  an	  end	  to	  all	  types	  of	  violence	  and	  access	  to	  be	  granted	  to	  
humanitarian	  aid	  agencies	  (SC/10403,	  2011).	  At	  the	  time,	  Brazil	  was	  set	  to	  chair	  the	  
recently	  established	  UNHRC	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  on	  Syria.	  Brazil	  would	  not	  
receive	  the	  requested	  cooperation	  from	  the	  Syrian	  authorities	  (A/HRC/RES/176).	  
Ambassador	  Viotti	  expressed	  regret	  that	  more	  time	  had	  not	  been	  spent	  discussing	  
some	  of	  the	  more	  contentious	  aspects	  of	  the	  text	  in	  order	  that	  the	  UNSC	  could	  have	  
demonstrated	  better	  cooperation	  (SC/10403,	  2011).	  In	  short,	  Brazil	  maintained	  its	  
position	  that	  a	  “meaningful,	  inclusive	  dialogue”	  within	  international	  institutions	  
would	  be	  the	  most	  realistic	  way	  to	  solve	  the	  crisis	  (SC/10403,	  2011).	  	  
	  
India	  
The	  Indian	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  Nations,	  Hardeep	  Puri,	  explained	  that	  the	  
“threat	  of	  sanctions	  did	  not	  accommodate	  New	  Delhi’s	  concerns”	  and	  while	  
condemning	  the	  violence,	  it	  did	  not	  condemn	  the	  violence	  from	  the	  Syrian	  
opposition	  forces.	  Like	  its	  IBSA	  partners,	  Puri	  addressed	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  situation	  
in	  Syria,	  but	  emphasized	  that	  a	  constructive	  political	  dialogue	  that	  included	  all	  
parties	  was	  the	  only	  way	  forward	  rather	  than	  sanctions	  or	  regime	  change	  
(SC/10403,	  2011).	  India’s	  democratic	  identity	  is	  also	  revealed	  when	  in	  its	  
statement,	  it	  calls	  on	  the	  Syrian	  authorities	  to	  “listen	  to	  the	  aspirations	  of	  their	  
people”	  (SC/10403,	  2011).	  In	  an	  expanded	  version	  of	  its	  explanation,	  Indian	  
Ambassador	  Puri	  referenced	  its	  diplomatic	  work	  in	  Syria	  as	  a	  part	  of	  IBSA	  as	  one	  of	  
the	  ways	  India	  is	  attempting	  to	  “engag[e]	  Syria	  in	  a	  collaborative	  and	  constructive	  
dialogue	  and	  partnership”	  (S/PV.6627,	  2011,	  p.6).	  
	  
In	  abstaining	  from	  the	  October	  vote,	  the	  IBSA	  states	  tacitly	  sided	  with	  Russia	  and	  China	  and	  
away	  from	  the	  UK,	  France,	  and	  US.	  The	  IBSA	  statements	  encouraged	  a	  dialogue	  and	  
provided	  political	  cover	  to	  China	  and	  Russia.	  The	  rhetoric	  and	  action	  did	  not	  go	  without	  
attention	  from	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations.	  	  On	  October	  16,	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  
(HRW)	  called	  into	  question	  the	  utility	  of	  IBSA’s	  push	  for	  a	  private	  dialogue	  and	  time	  for	  
further	  discussion,	  given	  that	  the	  violence	  in	  Syria	  continued	  to	  compound	  by	  the	  day:	  “IBSA	  
leaders	  shouldn’t	  sit	  by	  and	  watch	  as	  Syria	  implodes…	  Their	  efforts	  at	  private	  dialogue	  have	  




However,	  IBSA	  states	  were	  not	  “sitting	  by”,	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  resolve	  the	  conflict	  in	  the	  
way	  they	  thought	  was	  best.	  The	  unanimous	  IBSA	  abstention	  and	  parallels	  in	  their	  
statements	  showed	  the	  high	  level	  of	  coordination	  and	  normative	  agreement	  at	  the	  time	  
between	  the	  countries.	  Unlike	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1973,	  South	  Africa	  sided	  with	  IBSA	  and	  not	  
with	  the	  UNSC’s	  other	  African	  members,	  Nigeria	  and	  Gabon.	  However,	  despite	  the	  emphasis	  
on	  diplomacy	  and	  development	  from	  IBSA,	  the	  violence	  in	  Syria	  endured,	  causing	  great	  
consternation	  in	  the	  international	  community.	  	  
The	  declaration	  issued	  after	  the	  October	  2011	  IBSA	  Summit	  in	  Tshwane,	  South	  
Africa	  did	  not	  include	  an	  explicit	  mention	  of	  the	  Syrian	  conflict,	  but	  it	  did	  include	  a	  reference	  
to	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  within	  its	  opening	  statement	  (Tshwane	  Declaration,	  2011).	  Given	  earlier	  
enthusiasm	  for	  a	  resolution	  to	  the	  Syrian	  conflict,	  it	  is	  surprising	  that	  it	  was	  not	  explicitly	  
mentioned	  in	  their	  statement.	  The	  countries	  shared	  again	  their	  fundamental	  belief	  in	  the	  
power	  of	  diplomacy	  and	  development	  to	  bring	  peace	  and	  security.	  IBSA	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  
volunteer	  their	  “democratic	  and	  inclusive	  development	  model”	  with	  Arab	  Spring	  countries	  
(Tshwane	  Declaration,	  2011).	  Working	  together	  to	  help	  Arab	  Spring	  countries	  transition	  to	  
democracy	  marked	  an	  even	  further	  step	  forward	  in	  their	  coordination	  regarding	  
international	  peace	  and	  security	  issues.	  	  Serious	  debate	  occurred	  over	  Syria	  that	  year	  and	  
this	  would	  prove	  not	  to	  be	  the	  end	  of	  IBSA’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  conflict	  negotiations.	  	  
The	  beginning	  of	  November	  was	  marked	  with	  the	  suspension	  of	  Syria	  from	  the	  LAS	  due	  
to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  brutal	  government	  crackdowns	  had	  not	  stopped	  (Batty	  and	  Shenker,	  
2011).	  The	  Arab	  League’s	  suspension	  of	  Syria	  would	  galvanize	  those	  opposed	  to	  the	  Assad	  
regime	  and	  further	  divide	  the	  UNSC-­‐	  meaning	  the	  vetoed	  and	  draft	  resolutions	  of	  2011	  
would	  not	  be	  the	  only	  ones.	  Attacks	  on	  the	  foreign	  embassies	  during	  the	  month	  provoked	  
the	  UNSC	  into	  issuing	  one	  of	  its	  few	  statements	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  Syrian	  conflict,	  where	  they	  
simply	  condemned	  attacks	  on	  the	  foreign	  embassies	  (SC/10321,	  2011).	  By	  this	  point,	  IBSA	  
was	  viewed	  by	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  as	  acting	  as	  a	  unit,	  separately	  from	  China	  
and	  Russia.	  HRW	  even	  made	  a	  set	  of	  targeted	  recommendations	  to	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  
Africa	  in	  an	  official	  organizational	  report	  issued	  in	  November	  (HRW,	  2011).	  The	  US	  
Ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  Nations,	  Susan	  Rice,	  expressed	  disappointment	  in	  the	  IBSA	  
country’s	  actions	  and	  credited	  the	  countries	  with	  blocking	  the	  UN’s	  attempt	  to	  put	  pressure	  
on	  the	  Assad	  regime,	  showing	  how	  influential	  IBSA	  had	  become	  (Gaouette,	  2011).	  	  
December	  2011	  marked	  yet	  another	  violent	  month	  in	  the	  Syrian	  conflict.	  The	  beginning	  




for	  Human	  Rights,	  Navi	  Pillay,	  who	  is	  South	  African,	  citing	  that	  5,000	  people	  had	  died	  since	  
the	  start	  of	  the	  conflict	  and	  warned	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  major	  assault	  on	  Homs,	  one	  of	  the	  
largest	  towns	  in	  Syria	  (Pillay,	  2011).	  Pillay	  indicated	  after	  the	  briefing	  “crimes	  against	  
humanity	  had	  likely	  been	  committed	  by	  Syrian	  government	  force”	  (Pillay,	  2011).	  	  This	  was	  
yet	  another	  comment	  that	  divided	  the	  UNSC	  by	  providing	  fuel	  to	  Western	  countries	  to	  take	  
measures	  in	  Syria	  to	  protect	  civilians.	  In	  December	  2011,	  Syria	  finally	  agreed	  to	  and	  
implemented	  an	  LAS	  initiative	  allowing	  LAS	  observers	  into	  Syria.	  The	  observers	  arrived	  in	  
Syria,	  but	  unfortunately,	  the	  LAS	  suspended	  the	  mission	  the	  following	  month	  because	  the	  
situation	  had	  so	  severely	  deteriorated	  (BBC	  News,	  2013).	  In	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  month,	  Russia	  
called	  emergency	  informal	  consultations	  in	  the	  UNSC	  to	  discuss	  a	  draft	  resolution	  that	  they	  
had	  proposed	  on	  Syria.	  The	  draft	  would	  not	  be	  voted	  on	  that	  month.	  	  
In	  the	  special	  session	  of	  the	  18th	  UNHRC	  in	  December,	  another	  Syria-­‐related	  resolution	  
passed.	  This	  time	  it	  condemned	  the	  violence	  by	  the	  Syrian	  Government	  (HRC/RES/S-­‐18/1,	  
2011).	  It	  insinuated	  that	  even	  high	  levels	  of	  the	  Syrian	  armed	  forces	  were	  guilty	  of	  abuses	  
such	  as	  obstructing	  medical	  assistance	  and	  committing	  sexual	  violence	  (HRC/RES/S-­‐18/1).	  
Russia	  and	  China	  voted	  against	  the	  resolution	  likely	  because	  it	  did	  not	  address	  the	  human	  
rights	  violations	  that	  had	  allegedly	  been	  committed	  by	  the	  Syrian	  oppositions	  forces.	  The	  
United	  States	  voted	  in	  favour	  of	  it;	  the	  UK	  and	  France	  were	  not	  sitting	  on	  the	  UNHRC	  at	  the	  
time.	  India,	  siding	  neither	  with	  the	  P3	  nor	  Russia	  and	  China,	  abstained	  (HRC/RES/S-­‐18/1,	  
2011).	  India	  was	  the	  only	  IBSA	  member	  on	  the	  UNHRC	  at	  the	  time.	  That	  same	  month	  
provided	  another	  opportunity	  to	  evaluate	  the	  status	  of	  IBSA’s	  alignment.	  UNGA	  voted	  on	  
Resolution	  176	  that	  addressed	  the	  human	  rights	  situation	  in	  Syria.	  In	  this	  instance,	  IBSA	  
diverged-­‐	  Brazil	  voted	  with	  the	  United	  States,	  while	  India	  and	  South	  Africa	  aligned	  with	  
China	  and	  Russia	  by	  abstaining	  (UNGA/RES/66/176,	  2011).	  Also	  in	  this	  Resolution,	  the	  
Syrian	  authorities	  had	  been	  singled	  out	  for	  committing	  human	  rights	  abuses,	  but	  the	  Syrian	  
opposition	  had	  not	  (UNGA/RES/66/176,	  2011,	  pp.1-­‐2).	  This	  was	  a	  sticking	  point	  for	  Russia	  
and	  China,	  who	  wanted	  to	  make	  sure	  Syrian	  opposition	  forces	  were	  also	  held	  accountable.	  	  
4.5.	  Findings	  	  
The	  Libyan	  conflict	  undeniably	  had	  a	  massive	  effect	  on	  the	  role	  of	  IBSA	  and	  the	  
international	  community	  in	  Syria.	  The	  decisions	  that	  were	  made	  relatively	  rapidly	  by	  the	  
UNSC	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Libya	  were	  never	  even	  agreed	  upon	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Syria.	  IBSA	  had	  




military	  intervention	  in	  Libya.	  During	  the	  Libya	  negotiations,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  IBSA	  
demonstrated	  many	  shared	  values,	  it	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  translate	  into	  coordinated	  action.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  Syria,	  IBSA	  acted	  with	  the	  greatest	  coordination	  seen	  thus	  far	  by	  
sending	  an	  actual	  diplomatic	  delegation	  to	  Syria	  to	  discuss	  the	  conflict.	  Clearly,	  IBSA	  was	  
seen	  as	  a	  significant	  actor	  because	  the	  delegation	  was	  able	  to	  hold	  audiences	  with	  Syrian	  
President	  Assad	  and	  the	  Foreign	  Minister.	  The	  media	  even	  believed	  IBSA	  to	  have	  been	  
strong	  enough	  to	  have	  blocked	  UN	  action	  in	  Syria	  (Gaouette,	  2011).	  IBSA	  increased	  in	  
stature	  regarding	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  further	  when	  it	  received	  targeted	  
recommendations	  from	  HRW	  in	  its	  November	  2011	  report	  on	  the	  Syrian	  conflict	  (HRW,	  
2011a).	  HRW	  perceived	  IBSA	  to	  be	  an	  actor	  that	  could	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  resolution	  of	  
the	  Syrian	  conflict	  and	  IBSA	  wanted	  to	  be	  seen	  this	  way.	  In	  an	  IBSA	  statement	  issued	  in	  New	  
York	  in	  September	  2011,	  the	  Ministers	  expressed	  their	  desire	  that	  “three	  democracies	  from	  
the	  South	  make	  a	  meaningful	  and	  unique	  contribution	  to	  global	  peace	  and	  security”	  (New	  
York	  Ministerial	  Statement,	  2011,	  pt.2).	  In	  the	  same	  statement,	  the	  countries’	  Ministers	  also	  
emphasized	  their	  “constructive”	  involvement	  in	  the	  UNSC	  deliberations	  “to	  find	  permanent	  
solutions	  to	  highly	  complex	  issues”	  such	  as	  the	  conflicts	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  (New	  York	  
Ministerial	  Statement,	  2011,	  pt.	  9).	  
Although	  many	  considered	  IBSA	  to	  have	  been	  backing	  China	  and	  Russia	  during	  the	  
Syria	  negotiations,	  IBSA	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  having	  been	  completely	  aligned	  with	  China	  
and	  Russia	  or	  against	  human	  rights	  or	  democratic	  tradition	  (Gaouette,	  2011).	  In	  fact,	  IBSA	  
explained	  its	  August	  2011	  delegation	  visit	  to	  Syria	  as	  centred	  on	  “encouraging	  democratic	  
changes	  	  …a	  peaceful	  resolution	  …	  the	  promotion	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  
protection	  of	  civilians”	  (New	  York	  Ministerial	  Statement,	  2011,	  pt.9).	  Civil	  society	  
spokespersons	  Fabienne	  Hara	  and	  Mark	  Quarterman	  said	  that	  when	  it	  seemed	  like	  India,	  
Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	  were	  opposed	  to	  the	  US	  actions	  on	  Syria,	  it	  was	  not	  rooted	  in	  
opposition	  to	  human	  rights,	  rather	  sourced	  in	  their	  reluctance	  to	  allow	  another	  Western	  
military	  intervention	  on	  foreign	  soil	  (Charbonneau,	  2011	  and	  Gaouette,	  2011).	  This	  was	  
phrased	  well	  by	  the	  South	  African	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  UN,	  Baso	  Sangqu,	  who	  explained	  that	  
South	  Africa	  abstained	  from	  the	  October	  vote	  because	  “the	  trajectory,	  the	  template	  for	  the	  
solution	  (in	  Syria)	  was	  very	  clear,	  it	  was	  along	  similar	  lines	  to	  Libya”	  (Plett,	  2011).	  It	  was	  
crucial	  to	  IBSA	  to	  see	  cooperation	  in	  international	  law	  and	  not	  any	  one	  side	  dictating	  the	  
actions.	  Brazil’s	  explanation	  for	  its	  abstention	  vote	  on	  October	  4,	  2011	  showed	  that	  it	  would	  




(Benner,	  2013,	  p.5).	  This	  aligns	  with	  neoliberal	  institutionalist	  thinking,	  as	  these	  states	  
believe	  that	  repeated	  meetings	  and	  interactions,	  whether	  positive	  or	  negative,	  can	  help	  
states	  come	  to	  mutual	  cooperation,	  which,	  in	  this	  case,	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  promising	  hope	  
































CHAPTER	  5:	  A	  QUANTITATIVE	  
ANALYSIS	  OF	  2011’S	  UN	  VOTING	  	  
5.1.	  Introduction	  
The	  study	  now	  transitions	  to	  analyse	  IBSA’s	  internal	  coherence	  and	  alignment	  
during	  the	  year	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  votes	  of	  IBSA	  and	  the	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  UNSC.	  It	  
can	  show	  the	  degree	  that	  IBSA	  voted	  like	  a	  “bloc.”	  Internal	  coherence	  displays	  the	  degree	  of	  
coordination	  and	  cooperation.	  Alignment	  displays	  IBSA	  independence	  or	  whether	  or	  not	  
IBSA	  followed	  China	  and	  Russia	  or	  the	  P3	  –	  on	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  and	  in	  
regards	  to	  Libya	  and	  Syria.	  This	  analysis	  can	  reveal	  how	  IBSA’s	  statements	  and	  actions	  
manifested.	  While	  this	  will	  not	  prove	  causality,	  it	  can	  explore	  the	  strength	  and	  make-­‐up	  of	  
IBSA	  alignment	  and	  internal	  coherence.3	  
5.2.	  Why	  Examine	  Voting?	  
Voting	  is	  important	  to	  examine	  because	  while	  IBSA	  and	  its	  members	  may	  make	  
statements	  professing	  their	  policy	  beliefs,	  these	  do	  not	  always	  automatically	  reflect	  in	  their	  
behaviour.	  Voting	  presents	  an	  opportunity	  to	  examine	  a	  state’s	  manifested	  policy	  
preferences	  and	  it	  is	  directly	  comparable	  to	  other	  states.	  Foreign	  policy	  is	  often	  decided	  in	  
secret	  or	  “cloaked	  in	  ambiguity	  and/or	  non-­‐repeated”;	  therefore,	  public	  votes	  in	  the	  UN	  
become	  one	  of	  the	  best	  options	  (Voeten	  et	  al	  2013).	  While	  actions	  and	  statements	  show	  one	  
aspect	  of	  an	  engagement,	  votes	  are	  “comparable	  and	  observable”	  and	  a	  “state’s	  policy	  
preferences	  manifested”	  (Graham,	  2012,	  p.3).	  In	  2012,	  the	  first	  analysis	  of	  IBSA’s	  voting	  in	  
the	  United	  Nations	  focusing	  on	  the	  relative	  alignment	  of	  South	  Africa	  to	  India	  and	  Brazil	  was	  
completed	  (Graham,	  2012).	  The	  study,	  done	  by	  South	  African	  academic	  Suzanne	  Graham,	  
concentrated	  on	  UNGA	  sessions	  that	  occurred	  from	  2003	  till	  2008,	  which	  were	  IBSA’s	  initial	  
five	  years	  of	  operation	  (Graham,	  2012).	  No	  similar	  study	  has	  been	  done	  since,	  so	  after	  this	  
time,	  little	  is	  known	  of	  the	  actual	  level	  of	  IBSA	  amalgamation	  (Long,	  2013).	  The	  results	  of	  
Graham’s	  study	  found	  a	  small	  bump	  in	  IBSA’s	  internal	  coherence	  during	  that	  time.	  Graham	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  This	  research	  is	  based	  on	  an	  empirical	  research	  project	  that	  was	  submitted	  in	  2011	  as	  part	  
of	  the	  “Political	  Behavior”	  course	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Cape	  Town	  (Long,	  Abigail,	  2013	  





acknowledged	  that	  the	  increase	  was	  most	  likely	  part	  of	  a	  trend	  of	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  
Africa’s	  increasing	  convergence	  and	  was	  not	  caused	  by	  IBSA’s	  2003	  formation	  alone	  
(Graham,	  2012,	  p.421).	  While	  the	  formation	  of	  IBSA	  was	  indeed	  significant,	  it	  probably	  
correlated	  with,	  but	  did	  not	  cause	  the	  upsurge	  of	  collaboration	  in	  multilateral	  diplomacy.	  
Graham’s	  study	  also	  revealed	  divergence	  in	  IBSA	  voting	  within	  UNGA	  committees	  that	  focus	  
on	  international	  security	  issues	  (Graham,	  2012,	  pp.422-­‐423).	  Deviating	  IBSA	  behaviour	  on	  
international	  security	  issues	  will	  be	  a	  central	  postulation	  that	  this	  research	  project	  can	  
either	  confirm	  or	  deny.	  	  
5.3.	  Conceptualization	  and	  Operationalization	  
The	  dependent	  variable	  of	  IBSA	  internal	  cohesion	  will	  be	  measured	  by	  how	  often	  
IBSA	  votes	  in	  a	  unified	  manner.	  If	  IBSA	  votes	  unanimously	  consistently	  at	  least	  66%	  of	  the	  
time,	  I	  shall	  deem	  this	  to	  be	  a	  high	  level	  of	  internal	  coherence.	  The	  second	  dependent	  
variable	  is	  the	  degree	  of	  IBSA	  alignment-­‐	  either	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  or	  the	  P3;	  the	  
alignment	  will	  be	  measured	  by	  how	  often	  IBSA	  voted	  with	  or	  against	  those	  states.	  If	  IBSA	  
voted	  independently,	  with	  China	  and	  Russia,	  or	  with	  the	  P3	  at	  least	  66%	  of	  the	  time	  in	  any	  
way,	  I	  deem	  it	  to	  have	  been	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  alignment	  or	  independence.	  Politically,	  China	  
and	  Russia	  generally	  represented	  one	  perspective	  in	  the	  discussions	  on	  the	  Syrian	  and	  
Libyan	  conflicts	  and	  the	  P3	  stood	  for	  the	  other	  perspective.	  All	  three	  of	  the	  voting	  blocs-­‐	  
China	  and	  Russia,	  IBSA,	  and	  the	  P3-­‐	  actively	  participated	  in	  the	  discussions	  and	  debates;	  
therefore,	  by	  comparing	  all	  of	  their	  votes,	  a	  reasonable	  estimate	  of	  alignment	  among	  the	  
states	  can	  be	  glimpsed.	  All	  will	  be	  measured	  by	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  votes	  
within	  the	  UN-­‐	  the	  independent	  variable.	  	  
All	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  resolutions	  were	  categorized	  by	  substance	  and	  
these	  were	  double-­‐coded	  by	  a	  fellow	  researcher	  until	  we	  came	  to	  a	  100%	  agreement	  on	  the	  
proper	  categorization.	  When	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  resolution	  meant	  it	  could	  have	  applied	  to	  
more	  than	  one	  category,	  we	  reviewed	  the	  resolutions	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  most	  
pertinent	  code	  (Long,	  2013).	  The	  categories	  are	  'International	  Law	  and	  Justice,’	  'On-­‐going	  
Conflicts	  including	  Sanctions,’	  'Disarmament	  and	  Terrorism',	  and	  ‘Human	  Rights.’	  This	  
includes	  all	  votes	  related	  to	  international	  peace	  and	  security.	  Votes	  that	  occurred	  but	  were	  




5.4.	  Evidence	  	  
While	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	  served	  in	  2011	  on	  the	  UNSC,	  in	  UNGA	  in	  the	  
65th	  and	  66th	  sessions,	  they	  did	  not	  serve	  simultaneously	  in	  the	  UNHRC	  in	  2011.	  Therefore,	  I	  
only	  consider	  IBSA	  members	  that	  served	  on	  the	  UNHRC	  at	  the	  time.4	  	  When	  just	  one	  IBSA	  
country	  is	  on	  UNHRC,	  I	  exclude	  those	  resolutions	  from	  the	  internal	  coherence	  
measurements,	  but	  for	  alignment,	  I	  use	  those	  votes	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  IBSA	  voting.	  
The	  total	  dataset	  contains	  a	  total	  of	  496	  votes;	  370	  of	  which	  were	  adopted	  without	  a	  vote	  
(Long,	  2013).	  For	  internal	  coherence,	  the	  dataset	  contains	  73	  votes	  and	  for	  alignment,	  the	  
dataset	  contains	  59	  votes.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  limitations	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  contention	  and	  
instances	  when	  only	  one	  IBSA	  was	  present	  or	  voting.	  I	  will	  only	  examine	  those	  votes	  that	  
pertain	  to	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  issues.	  The	  votes	  are	  either	  “Yes”	  indicating	  
support;	  “No”	  indicating	  opposition;	  or	  an	  abstention,	  indicating	  neutrality.	  The	  variables	  
are	  categorical	  and	  will	  either	  be	  Yes,	  No,	  Abstain,	  or	  Absent.	  Resolutions	  adopted	  without	  a	  
vote	  are	  marked	  “Yes,”	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  “adopted	  without	  a	  vote”	  typically	  implies	  a	  
consensus	  agreement	  was	  reached.	  	  
I	  compiled	  the	  data	  unobtrusively	  and	  ex	  post	  facto	  directly	  from	  United	  Nations	  
websites.	  Based	  on	  the	  aforementioned	  literature,	  IBSA,	  China	  and	  Russia	  and	  the	  P3	  are	  
considered	  their	  own	  voting	  blocs.	  According	  to	  academic	  Peter	  Ferdinand,	  he	  found	  that	  
China	  and	  Russia	  and	  the	  P3	  have	  common	  objectives,	  interests,	  and	  a	  history	  of	  
convergence	  at	  the	  UN,	  supporting	  this	  choice	  (Ferdinand,	  2013,	  pp.2-­‐3).	  The	  data	  was	  
collected	  systematically	  using	  the	  official	  UN	  websites	  and	  it	  is	  replicable.	  Numerous	  
academics	  have	  used	  UN	  votes	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  of	  “internal	  
cohesion”	  and	  /	  or	  “alignment,”	  proving	  that	  this	  is	  indeed	  a	  reliable	  method	  (Russett,	  1966;	  
Graham,	  2012;	  Hosli	  et	  al,	  2010;	  Voeten	  et	  al,	  2013;	  Ferdinand,	  2013;	  and	  Robinson,	  1966).	  
Factor	  analysis	  has	  also	  been	  deemed	  an	  imperfect,	  but	  adequate	  method	  for	  determining	  
voting	  groups	  (Russett,	  1966,	  p.328;	  Alker	  and	  Russett,	  1965;	  and	  Newcombe	  et	  al,	  1970).	  
The	  votes	  gauge	  the	  same	  action-­‐	  support	  or	  opposition	  to	  a	  policy-­‐	  when	  the	  data	  is	  
reproduced	  elsewhere.	  Also,	  in	  every	  case,	  each	  vote	  of	  yes,	  no,	  or	  abstain,	  means	  the	  same	  
thing.	  In	  general,	  due	  to	  the	  regulated	  nature	  of	  the	  UN	  voting	  system,	  it	  cannot	  be	  biased.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Brazil	  served	  in	  the	  16th	  Session,	  16th	  Special	  Session,	  and	  17th	  session;	  India	  served	  in	  the	  
17th	  Special	  Session,	  18th	  Session,	  	  and	  18th	  Special	  Session;	  and	  South	  Africa	  did	  not	  serve	  




I	  reclassify	  the	  eight	  absent	  votes	  in	  my	  dataset	  as	  “abstentions”	  because	  I	  consider	  
abstentions	  to	  be	  neutral	  votes	  and	  unlikely	  to	  seriously	  alter	  the	  data	  (Russett,	  1966,	  
pp.329-­‐330).	  Voeten	  advocates	  for	  classifying	  the	  absent	  votes	  as	  missing	  data	  due	  to	  the	  
fact	  that	  most	  absences	  are	  simply	  nonappearances,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  state	  attending	  a	  
different	  event.	  According	  to	  Voeten,	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  when	  a	  state	  attends	  another	  event	  
and	  misses	  multiple	  roll	  call	  votes	  in	  a	  row	  (Voeten,	  2012,	  p.5).	  Thus,	  multiple	  roll	  call	  votes	  
missed	  in	  a	  row	  are	  not	  demonstrations	  of	  neutrality	  or	  opposition,	  but	  only	  absence	  (Long,	  
2013).	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  unrealistic	  to	  classify	  the	  eight	  votes	  as	  neutral	  votes,	  according	  to	  
Voeten	  (2012,	  p.5).	  However,	  in	  this	  case,	  since	  only	  8	  of	  the	  total	  496	  votes	  are	  absent	  
(1.6%),	  and	  none	  of	  the	  absences	  occur	  for	  two	  or	  more	  consecutive	  votes,	  it	  appears	  that	  
Voeten’s	  rule	  does	  not	  apply	  (Long,	  2013).	  	  
5.5.	  The	  Voting	  Analysis	  
5.5.1.	  Factor	  Analysis	  
Although	  I	  have	  selected	  my	  voting	  blocs	  based	  on	  the	  literature	  review	  and	  
qualitative	  analysis,	  I	  still	  deploy	  a	  factor	  analysis,	  which	  is	  a	  method	  that	  has	  been	  
previously	  used	  in	  UN	  voting	  studies	  (Newcombe	  et	  al,	  1970,	  p.101).	  I	  perform	  a	  Principal	  
Component	  Analysis	  (PCA)	  that	  identifies	  and	  computes	  composite	  variables	  based	  on	  my	  
eight	  country	  variables	  (Brazil,	  China,	  France,	  India,	  Russia,	  South	  Africa,	  the	  UK,	  and	  the	  
US).	  The	  PCA	  “assumes	  the	  latent	  variables	  are	  determined	  independently	  of	  one	  another”	  
(Long,	  2013,	  p.19).	  Using	  orthogonal	  Varimax	  rotation	  and	  Kaiser	  Normalization,	  the	  PCA	  is	  
performed.	  The	  “Kaiser	  Meyer	  Olkin”	  test,	  measuring	  sampling	  adequacy	  in	  factor	  analysis,	  
is	  .798,	  which	  is	  higher	  than	  Field’s	  required	  score	  of	  .7	  (Field,	  2009).	  At	  p<0,	  the	  test	  done	  
for	  equal	  variance,	  called	  Bartlett’s	  Test	  of	  Sphericity,	  also	  proves	  significant.	  After	  the	  
factor	  analysis	  extracted	  two	  factors,	  the	  results	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  follows:	  
“The	  resultant	  scree	  plot	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  inflecting	  at	  two	  factors.	  The	  factor	  
analysis	  revealed	  two	  eigenvalues	  with	  factors	  larger	  than	  Kaiser’s	  criterion	  of	  1.	  
The	  largest	  factor	  had	  a	  value	  of	  3	  and	  the	  smallest	  had	  a	  value	  of	  1.	  These	  two	  
factors	  explain	  a	  combined	  73.8%	  of	  the	  variance.	  The	  first	  factor	  exhibited	  strong	  
loadings	  from	  the	  P3	  countries	  (US,	  UK,	  France)	  and	  the	  second	  factor	  exhibited	  





Table	  2	  contains	  factor	  loadings	  after	  the	  rotation	  and	  three	  iterations.	  As	  confirmed	  by	  
Peter	  Ferdinand,	  the	  voting	  record	  of	  the	  UK	  and	  France	  correlated	  most	  highly	  of	  the	  eight	  
countries	  tested,	  emphasizing	  the	  similarities	  of	  their	  voting	  records	  (Ferdinand,	  2013).	  
South	  Africa,	  India,	  and	  Brazil	  load	  onto	  one	  latent	  variable	  with	  Russia	  and	  China;	  however,	  
this	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  me	  to	  consider	  the	  five	  countries	  to	  be	  a	  single	  voting	  bloc	  in	  my	  
study.	  As	  one	  of	  IBSA’s	  goals	  is	  obtaining	  a	  permanent	  seat	  on	  the	  UNSC	  and	  the	  Chinese	  and	  
Russians	  already	  have	  one,	  this	  will	  likely	  mean	  IBSA	  will	  make	  some	  decisions	  differently	  
than	  China	  and	  Russia	  and	  it	  is	  important	  to	  the	  study	  to	  isolate	  any	  differences	  (Stephen,	  
2010,	  p.306).	  Consequently,	  I	  elect	  to	  use	  these	  three	  separate	  variables	  in	  my	  analysis.	  	  
To	  certify	  the	  internal	  consistency	  of	  the	  two	  factors,	  “China	  and	  Russia	  +	  IBSA”	  and	  
the	  “P3,”	  a	  reliability	  test	  was	  conducted	  and	  both	  received	  high	  reliability	  measures.	  “China	  
and	   Russia	   +IBSA”	   received	   a	   Cronbach’s	   α	   of	   .848	   (Table	   3)	   and	   the	   “P3”	   received	   a	  
Cronbach’s	  α	  of	   .911	  (Table	  4);	  both	  surpassing	   the	  α	   level	  of	   .7,	  deemed	  reliable	  by	  Field	  
(2009).	   Thus,	   I	   use	   the	   two	   latent	   variables,	   divided	   into	   three,	   for	   the	   above	   theoretical	  
motives.	  	  
Table	  2:	  Factor	  Analysis	  of	  Brazil,	  China,	  France,	  India,	  Russia,	  UK,	  and	  US	  Variables	  	  
Rotated	  Component	  Matrixa	  
	   Component	  
1	   2	  
China	   .906	   .103	  
Brazil	   .838	   .101	  
Russian	   .811	   .299	  
India	   .705	   .205	  
South	  Africa	   .683	   -­‐.025	  
France	   .198	   .940	  
UK	   .171	   .949	  
USA	   .047	   .870	  
Extraction	  Method:	  Principal	  Component	  Analysis.	  	  












5.5.2.	  Internal	  Coherence	  
According	   to	   the	   frequency	   analysis	   of	   the	   constructed	   variable	   for	   IBSA	   internal	  
cohesion	  (Table	  5),	  IBSA	  never	  voted	  in	  complete	  disagreement-­‐	  where	  one	  country	  voted	  
yes,	  the	  other	  abstained,	  and	  the	  final	  country	  voted	  no.	   IBSA	  was	  unanimous	  in	  vote	  57%	  
(42	  out	  of	  73	  votes)	  of	   the	   time	  and	   IBSA	  “trended”	   toward	  unanimity	  33%	  (24	  out	  of	  73	  
votes)	   of	   the	   time,	   meaning	   the	   third	   member	   did	   not	   vote	   in	   opposition,	   but	   rather	  
abstained.	   Abstaining	   is	   a	   neutral	   vote,	   likely	   meaning	   that	   the	   party	   wanted	   to	   avoid	  
offending	  either	  side	  and	  preferred	  to	  be	  impartial.	  Therefore,	  since	  90%	  of	  the	  time,	  IBSA	  
voted	   in	   complete	   agreement	   or	   two	   members	   voted	   in	   complete	   agreement	   and	   one	  
abstained,	   it	   exceeds	   my	   requirement	   of	   66%	   to	   be	   considered	   high-­‐level	   of	   internal	  
coherence.	  In	  the	  remaining	  10%	  of	  the	  votes,	  two	  IBSA	  members	  agreed,	  while	  one	  voted	  
opposite,	  showing	  the	  least	  coordination	  among	  them.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  when	  all	  votes	  
are	  considered,	  IBSA	  exceeds	  my	  required	  level	  of	  internal	  coherence.	  
There	  are	  clearly	  areas	  where	  IBSA	  is	  in	  more	  agreement	  than	  others.	  Therefore,	  to	  
further	  examine	  the	  nuances	  of	   IBSA’s	   internal	  coherence,	   I	  executed	  a	  cross-­‐tabulation	  of	  
the	   IBSA	   internal	  coherence	  variable	  with	   the	  substance	  of	   the	  resolution	  seen	   in	  Table	  6.	  
This	  can	  show	  if	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  resolution	  affected	  the	  degree	  of	  alignment.	  The	  total	  
set	  of	  votes	  in	  this	  cross-­‐tabulation	  is	  73.	  IBSA’s	  highest	  level	  of	  unanimity	  (92%)	  occurred	  
a. Rotation	  converged	  in	  3	  iterations	  
Table	  3:	  Reliability	  Statistics:	  the	  P3	  
Cronbach's	  Alpha	   Cronbach's	  Alpha	  Based	  on	  
Standardized	  Items	  
No.	  of	  Items	  
.911	   .930	   3	  
Table	  4:	  Reliability	  Statistics:	  China	  and	  Russia	  +IBSA	  
Cronbach's	  Alpha	   Cronbach's	  Alpha	  Based	  
on	  Standardized	  Items	  
No.	  of	  Items	  




when	  the	  resolution	  is	  on	  an	  on-­‐going	  conflict	  or	  related	  to	  sanctions.	  The	  “Human	  Rights”	  
category	  has	  a	  high-­‐level	  of	  alignment	  with	  none	  of	  the	  states	  voting	  in	  complete	  opposition,	  
four	   occurrences	   where	   one	   state	   votes	   absentee,	   and	   in	   the	   remaining	   seven,	   all	   states	  
voted	   unanimously.	   IBSA	   showed	   the	   most	   disagreement	   within	   the	   “Disarmament	   and	  
Terrorism”	   category.	   This	   divergence	   is	   remarkable	   and	   likely	   reflects	   India’s	   stances	   on	  
nuclear	   weapons	   and	   energy-­‐related	   issues	   (Graham,	   2012,	   p.425). Despite	   the	   fact	   that	  
disarmament	   and	   non-­‐proliferation	   are	   one	   of	   the	   target	   areas	   for	   increased	   IBSA	  

























Unanimous	   Any	  two	  unanimous,	  
other	  abstains	  







Table	  6:	  Cross-­‐tabulation	  of	  IBSA	  based	  on	  Resolution	  Substance	  	  
	  
5.5.3.	  Overall	  Alignment	  
Table	  7:	  IBSA’s	  Overall	  Alignment	  Compared	  to	  the	  P3	  (UK,	  US,	  and	  France)	  and	  China	  



































0	   0	   7	   0	   7	  
2/3s	  or	  1/3	  
abstain,	  other	  
aff	  or	  neg	  
2	   1	   17	   4	   24	  
Unanimous	   2	   12	   21	   7	   42	  





Overall,	   IBSA	  aligned	  more	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	   than	  the	  P3.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	   fact,	  
IBSA	  voted	  more	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  than	  it	  voted	  independently.	  A	  frequency	  analysis	  of	  
the	   constructed	   alignment	   variable	   (Table	   7),	   demonstrates	   that,	   of	   the	   59	   international	  
peace	  and	  security	  votes	  with	  sufficient	  contention	  to	  validate	  a	  comparison	  (excluding	  the	  
resolutions	   adopted	   unanimously	   and	   those	   without	   a	   vote),	   IBSA	   voted	   in	   complete	  
alignment	  or	  partial	  alignment	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  66%	  (39	  votes	  out	  of	  59)	  of	  the	  time,	  
perfectly	  meeting	  my	   requirement	   to	   be	   deemed	   a	   high	   level	   of	   alignment.	   On	   the	   other	  
hand,	  IBSA	  voted	  in	  complete	  or	  partial	  alignment	  with	  the	  P3	  17%	  (10	  out	  of	  59	  votes)	  of	  
the	   time.	   IBSA	   also	   voted	   independently	   17%	   (10	   out	   of	   59	   votes)	   of	   the	   time.	  However,	  
when	   viewed	  with	  my	   qualitative	   analysis,	   this	   shows	   there	  was	   indeed	   independence	   in	  
IBSA’s	  and	  its	  members’	  statements	  and	  actions.	  	  	  
Table	  8	  presents	  a	  cross-­‐tabulation	  of	  IBSA	  alignment	  with	  resolutions	  categorized	  
and	  all	  related	  to	  international	  peace	  and	  security.	  There	  is	  found	  to	  be	  immense	  variation	  
of	   alignment	   within	   resolution	   substance	   areas.	   It	   reveals	   IBSA’s	   strong	   alignment	   with	  
China	  and	  Russia	  under	  resolutions	  concerning	  conflicts	  and	  sanctions,	  or	  human	  rights.	  On	  
human	  rights-­‐related	  votes,	  IBSA	  at	  least	  partially	  aligned	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  68%	  of	  the	  
time,	  exceeding	  my	  designated	  66%	  mark	  to	  register	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  alignment.	  Different	  
still,	   of	   the	  25	  votes	   in	   the	  Human	  Rights	   category,	   IBSA	  voted	   independently	  16%	  of	   the	  
time	  and	  at	  least	  partially	  with	  the	  P3	  16%	  of	  the	  time.	  Once	  IBSA	  partially	  aligned	  with	  the	  
P3	  on	  UNGA	  Resolution	  176,	  which	  condemned	  human	  rights	  violations	  in	  Syria	  and	  “called	  
upon	   the	   Syrian	   authorities	   to	   end	   all	   human	   rights	   violations”	   (A/RES/66/176,	   2011).	  
China	   and	   Russia	   had	   most	   likely	   voted	   against	   UNGA	   Resolution	   176	   because	   it	   only	  
addressed	  accountability	   for	  human	   rights	   violations	   committed	  by	   the	  Syrian	  authorities	  
and	   not	   the	   Syrian	   opposition.	   In	   the	   “Disarmament,	   Non-­‐Proliferation,	   and	   Terrorism”	  
category,	  IBSA	  aligned	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  thrice	  as	  often	  as	  it	  did	  with	  the	  P3.	  The	  high	  
variation	   in	   alignment	   is	   likely	   a	   result	   of	   India’s	   unique	   stance	   on	  nuclear-­‐related	   issues	  











Table	  8:	  Cross-­‐tabulation	  of	  Alignment	  Based	  on	  Resolution	  Substance	  	  















China	  and	  Russia	  
16	   4	   4	   1	   25	  
Partial	  Alignment	  
with	  China	  and	  
Russia	  
1	   12	   1	   0	   14	  
IBSA	  Votes	  
Independently	  
4	   5	   1	   0	   10	  
Partial	  Alignment	  
with	  P3	  




2	   0	   2	   0	   4	  
Total	   25	   25	   8	   1	   59	  
5.5.4.	  The	  Conflicts	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  	  
Analysis	  of	  the	  votes	  on	  the	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  related	  resolutions	  reveals	  the	  majority	  
were	  adopted	  with	  great	  consensus;	  therefore	  there	  was	  not	  enough	  contention	  to	  draw	  
serious	  conclusions.	  Of	  the	  13	  Libya-­‐related	  resolutions,	  five	  were	  adopted	  without	  vote	  and	  
seven	  of	  the	  remaining	  resolutions	  were	  voted	  on,	  but	  with	  great	  agreement	  among	  all	  eight	  
countries.	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  diplomatic	  negotiations	  on	  the	  conflict	  
in	  Libya	  began	  with	  more	  momentum	  than	  with	  Syria.	  On	  only	  one	  Libya-­‐related	  resolution,	  
UNSC	  Resolution	  1973,	  did	  the	  IBSA	  states	  trend	  toward	  voting	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  
(Table	  9).	  On	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  Libya-­‐related	  resolutions,	  China,	  Russia,	  the	  P3	  and	  IBSA	  
were	  all	  in	  complete	  agreement.	  China	  and	  Russia	  tended	  to	  vote	  against	  intervention	  in	  
other	  states	  (Ferdinand,	  2013),	  but	  have	  been	  known	  to	  defer	  to	  the	  views	  of	  relevant	  
regional	  organizations,	  as	  happened	  with	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1973	  when	  the	  LAS	  lent	  its	  
support	  to	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone.	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	  have	  anti-­‐intervention	  tendencies,	  
rooted	  in	  their	  colonial	  histories,	  but	  this	  was	  believed	  to	  have	  been	  an	  intervention	  for	  
humanitarian	  and	  civilian	  protection	  purposes.	  IBSA	  countries	  became	  even	  more	  cautious	  




hesitancy	  to	  allow	  any	  sort	  of	  UNSC	  Resolution	  1973	  to	  pass	  regarding	  Syria.	  Five	  
resolutions	  on	  the	  Libyan	  conflict	  passed	  the	  UNSC,	  but	  none	  did	  on	  the	  Syrian.	  	  
Russia	  and	  China	  expressed	  extreme	  reluctance	  in	  allowing	  any	  resolutions	  to	  pass	  
the	  UNSC	  that	  allowed	  for	  foreign	  intervention	  into	  Syria.	  After	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  
no-­‐fly	  zone	  in	  Libya,	  Russia	  and	  China	  seriously	  mistrusted	  “Western”	  intentions	  in	  the	  
region.	  IBSA	  unanimously	  abstained	  from	  the	  one	  Syria	  vote	  that	  occurred	  that	  year	  in	  the	  
UNSC.	  Some	  considered	  the	  abstention	  to	  be	  in	  support	  of	  China	  and	  Russia	  (Benner,	  2013,	  
p.5),	  but	  I	  argue	  that	  not	  voting	  in	  complete	  alignment	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  showed	  a	  
measure	  of	  independent	  thought	  for	  IBSA	  countries.	  In	  fact,	  IBSA	  voted	  unaligned	  with	  the	  
P3	  or	  China	  and	  Russia	  in	  three	  out	  of	  the	  five	  votes	  on	  Syria-­‐related	  resolutions.	  In	  the	  
remaining	  two	  votes	  concerning	  the	  human	  rights	  situation	  in	  Syria,	  IBSA	  tended	  towards	  
alignment	  with	  the	  P3	  instead	  of	  China	  and	  Russia	  (A/HRC/RES/S-­‐16/1,	  2011	  and	  
A/RES/66/176,	  2011).	  Benner	  argued	  that	  IBSA	  maintained	  independence	  out	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  
push	  for	  more	  time	  for	  the	  UNSC	  to	  negotiate,	  in	  order	  that	  the	  UNSC	  could	  have	  acted	  in	  a	  
more	  united	  fashion	  (Benner,	  2013,	  p.5).	  Finally,	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  internal	  consistency,	  of	  
the	  12	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  votes	  where	  at	  least	  two	  IBSA	  members	  were	  voting,	  IBSA	  voted	  
unanimously	  75%	  (9	  votes)	  of	  the	  time,	  evidencing	  coordination	  that	  exceeds	  my	  required	  
66%	  level	  (Table	  10).	  	  
Table	  9:	  Crosstabulation:	  Alignment	  (IBSA)	  on	  Syria	  and	  Libya	  Votes	  
	   Libya	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Syria	   Total	  
	  
Votes	  deemed	  irrelevant	   5	   0	   5	  
2/3	  IBSA	  Votes	  China	  and	  Russia,	  One	  Abstains	   1	   0	   1	  
IBSA	  Votes	  Independently	   0	   3*	   3	  
Partial	  Alignment	  with	  P3	   0	   1	   1	  
Aligns	  Completely	  with	  P3	   0	   1	   1	  
2/3	  Agree	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  and	  P3	   3	   0	   3	  
IBSA	  Fully	  Agrees	  with	  Both	   4	   0	   4	  
Total	   13	   5	   18	  







Table	  10:	  Crosstabulation:	  IBSA	  Internal	  Consistency	  on	  the	  Conflicts	  
in	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  	  
	  
	   Libya	   Syria	   Total	  	  
SA,	  India,	  and	  
Brazil	  Vote	  
Together	  
Any	  two	  unanimous,	  other	  
disagrees	  
2	   0	   2	  
2/3s	  or	  1/3	  abstain,	  other	  
aff	  or	  neg	  
1	   0	   1	  
Unanimous	   7	   2	   9	  
Only	  one	  Member	  voting	   3	   3	   6	  
Total	   13	   5	   18	  
	  
5.6.	  Results	  of	  Analysis	  	  
The	  frequency	  analysis	  of	  the	  alignment	  variable	  confirmed	  my	  hypothesis	  by	  
showing	  that	  overall	  IBSA	  is	  extremely	  strongly	  aligned	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  and	  votes	  in	  
alignment	  with	  the	  P3	  very	  infrequently.	  Surprisingly,	  IBSA	  did	  manage	  to	  vote	  
independently	  from	  the	  P5	  in	  17%	  of	  the	  votes	  that	  occurred	  under	  enough	  contention	  to	  
validate	  a	  comparison.	  As	  long	  as	  IBSA	  lacks	  a	  permanent	  seat	  on	  the	  UNSC,	  it	  can	  be	  
expected	  they	  will	  exhibit	  at	  least	  a	  degree	  of	  independence	  from	  the	  P3	  and	  China	  and	  
Russia.	  Moreover,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  differences	  in	  opinion	  on	  disarmament-­‐related	  issues	  
among	  IBSA	  states,	  the	  countries	  still	  have	  some	  issues	  to	  reconcile	  internally.	  The	  
empirical	  results	  of	  the	  quantitative	  analysis	  largely	  support	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  IBSA	  
maintained	  strong	  internal	  coherence.	  IBSA	  demonstrated	  strong	  internal	  consistency	  
within	  the	  three	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  categories,	  but	  indeed	  showed	  variation	  
when	  those	  votes	  concerned	  nuclear	  weapons.	  Unfortunately,	  when	  evaluating	  the	  internal	  
consistency	  of	  the	  votes	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  separately,	  there	  were	  too	  few	  votes	  to	  make	  any	  
serious	  conclusions.	  	  When	  the	  vote	  totals	  are	  combined,	  it	  is	  enough	  to	  show	  that	  IBSA	  then	  
did	  show	  strong	  internal	  consistency.	  From	  the	  qualitative	  analysis	  portion,	  it	  can	  be	  shown	  
that	  IBSA	  was	  attentive	  to	  both	  conflicts	  and	  increased	  their	  coordination	  on	  certain	  aspects	  
of	  the	  Libyan	  conflict	  and	  around	  the	  negotiations	  on	  the	  Syrian	  conflict	  in	  particular.	  Also	  
on	  alignment,	  the	  limited	  votes	  make	  any	  serious	  conclusions	  difficult	  to	  draw	  from	  voting	  




CHAPTER	  6:	  Conclusion	  	  
6.1.	  Summary	  of	  Findings	  
Overall,	  the	  qualitative	  analysis	  of	  Libyan	  and	  Syrian	  conflicts	  paired	  with	  the	  
quantitative	  analysis	  of	  IBSA	  voting	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  that	  this	  study	  produced	  painted	  a	  
detailed	  picture	  of	  IBSA’s	  strength	  and	  role	  in	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  issues.	  An	  
exclusively	  qualitative	  examination	  of	  IBSA’s	  actions	  and	  statements	  in	  2011	  would	  have	  
only	  offered	  an	  inchoate	  picture	  of	  IBSA’s	  manifested	  behaviour.	  The	  study	  has	  revealed	  
what	  can	  be	  expected	  of	  this	  emerging	  power	  coalition	  when	  they	  have	  increased	  power	  
and	  now	  reasonable	  estimates	  can	  be	  made	  of	  their	  future	  strength	  and	  role.	  However,	  each	  
conflict	  is	  unique	  and	  complex	  so	  exact	  behaviour	  cannot	  be	  predicted,	  but	  a	  sensible	  
estimate	  of	  the	  possibilities	  is	  now	  within	  reach.	  	  
My	  analysis	  reveals	  that,	  while	  not	  perfect,	  IBSA	  did	  indeed	  have	  strong	  internal	  
coherence.	  However,	  it	  was	  found	  that	  internal	  coherence	  could	  be	  stronger	  or	  weaker	  
depending	  on	  the	  aspect	  of	  international	  peace	  and	  security.	  The	  findings	  from	  the	  study	  as	  
a	  whole	  revealed	  that	  IBSA	  aligned	  with	  China	  and	  Russia	  strongly-­‐	  confirming	  my	  
hypothesis	  on	  alignment.	  IBSA	  also	  demonstrated	  a	  degree	  of	  independence	  in	  voting	  and	  
voted	  with	  the	  P3	  on	  several	  occasions.	  The	  conclusion	  now	  proceeds	  to	  explore	  the	  
theoretical	  reasoning	  behind	  IBSA’s	  behaviour	  in	  2011.	  It	  ends	  with	  a	  series	  of	  policy	  
implications	  and	  possible	  areas	  for	  future	  research	  that	  could	  advance	  the	  serious	  study	  of	  
emerging	  powers	  in	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  even	  further.	  	  
6.2.	  Making	  Sense	  of	  IBSA’s	  Behaviour:	  Soft	  Balancing	  
	  
A	  possible	  strategy	  that	  could	  explain	  IBSA’s	  behaviour	  is	  soft	  balancing.	  According	  
to	  the	  strategy,	  there	  exists	  within	  the	  global	  community,	  a	  dominant	  military	  power	  that	  
does	  not	  pose	  a	  direct	  threat	  and	  provides	  irreplaceable	  public	  goods	  to	  the	  international	  
community,	  yet	  is	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  retaliate	  (Paul	  2005,	  pp.57-­‐58).	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  
dominant	  power	  is	  the	  United	  States	  (Haass,	  2008).	  Second-­‐tier	  states	  can	  attempt	  to	  
balance	  the	  power	  of	  the	  dominant	  power	  /	  United	  States	  by	  forming	  diplomatic	  coalitions	  
within	  multilateral	  forums	  because	  the	  “hard	  power”	  of	  the	  dominant	  country	  will	  be	  




Proponents	  of	  ‘soft	  balancing’	  argue	  that	  middle	  powers,	  such	  as	  the	  IBSA	  countries,	  resort	  
to	  international	  institutions	  because	  it	  is	  the	  only	  way	  it	  can	  relegate	  super	  powers	  to	  a	  level	  
where	  they	  can	  compete	  on	  equal	  footing	  (Flemes,	  2007,	  p.14).	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  
Africa	  want	  to	  balance	  the	  power	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  their	  ability	  to	  
promote	  the	  norms	  and	  values	  most	  important	  to	  them.	  During	  the	  conflicts	  in	  Libya	  and	  
Syria,	  IBSA	  states	  used	  their	  position	  on	  the	  UNSC	  to	  affect	  US	  and	  Western	  policies	  that	  
were	  “perceive[d]	  as	  imperial	  and	  sovereignty	  limiting”	  (Paul,	  2005,	  p.58).	  When	  an	  
intervention	  does	  not	  receive	  support	  from	  the	  full	  UNSC,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  it	  will	  happen.	  If	  
an	  intervention	  is	  led	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  it	  is	  especially	  reliant	  on	  post-­‐intervention	  
support	  by	  the	  members	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  (Paul,	  2005,	  p.58).	  This	  is	  where	  support	  
from	  IBSA	  countries	  is	  critical	  given	  their	  robust	  participation	  in	  United	  Nations	  
peacekeeping.	  Therefore,	  when	  IBSA	  cooperates	  in	  opposition	  to	  a	  Western-­‐pushed	  
intervention,	  they	  are	  able	  to	  be	  very	  effective.	  If	  an	  intervention	  is	  given	  support	  from	  the	  
full	  UNSC	  and	  the	  mandate	  is	  followed,	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  “transcend[ing]	  the	  sovereignty	  norm	  
temporarily”	  (Paul,	  2005,	  p.58).	  	  
Critically,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  emerging	  powers	  are	  working	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  
international	  system,	  so	  they	  are	  not	  challenging	  the	  international	  system,	  but	  rather	  the	  
strength	  of	  the	  current	  hegemon	  and	  the	  norms	  and	  values	  that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  dictate	  	  
(Alden	  and	  Vieira,	  2005,	  p.1079).	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  IBSA	  feels	  they	  do	  not	  have	  equitable	  
representation	  in	  the	  system,	  the	  countries	  operate	  in	  accordance	  within	  the	  system	  and	  its	  
values	  and	  principles.	  	  
6.3.	  Theoretical	  Underpinning:	  Neoliberal	  Institutionalism	  	  
	  
IBSA’s	  formation	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  neoliberal	  institutionalism.	  The	  countries	  
desired	  greater	  cooperation	  amongst	  themselves	  and	  knew	  the	  best	  way	  to	  accomplish	  this	  
was	  through	  forming	  a	  trilateral	  coalition,	  which	  has	  given	  them	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  
coordination.	  This	  theory	  could	  also	  explain	  why	  academics,	  such	  as	  Daniel	  Flemes,	  so	  
strongly	  encourage	  IBSA	  to	  institutionalize	  further	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  more	  of	  its	  goals	  
(2007).	  Regular	  coordination	  would	  no	  doubt	  allow	  their	  coordination	  and	  influence	  to	  
surge	  and	  possibly	  even	  allow	  them	  to	  develop	  a	  serious	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  




coordination	  level	  of	  IBSA,	  as	  the	  countries	  would	  sit	  together	  regularly-­‐	  in	  fact,	  meeting	  
more	  often	  than	  they	  do	  now.	  Cooperation	  must	  have	  institutionalization	  in	  order	  to	  be	  
sustainable.	  	  
Much	  of	  IBSA’s	  behaviour	  in	  these	  instances	  can	  also	  be	  explained	  by	  neoliberal	  
institutionalism.	  Proponents	  of	  the	  school	  believe	  the	  benefits	  of	  international	  institutions,	  
such	  as	  the	  United	  Nations,	  are	  many.	  International	  institutions	  “can	  provide	  information,	  
reduce	  transaction	  costs,	  make	  commitments	  more	  credible,	  establish	  focal	  points	  for	  
coordination,	  and	  in	  general	  facilitate	  the	  operation	  of	  reciprocity”	  (Keohane	  and	  Martin,	  
1995,	  pp.	  40-­‐41).	  By	  providing	  the	  aforementioned	  services,	  international	  institutions	  can	  
help	  states	  attain	  considerable	  goals	  that	  they	  never	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  attain	  while	  
working	  alone.	  The	  cooperation	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  mutual	  among	  all	  participants	  in	  the	  
international	  institution	  (Keohane	  and	  Martin,	  1995,	  pp.40-­‐41).	  IBSA	  does	  not	  want	  to	  work	  
around	  international	  institutions	  because	  it	  understands	  their	  value.	  This	  can	  also	  explain	  
IBSA’s	  push	  for	  global	  governance	  reform,	  because	  it	  wants	  to	  work	  better	  within	  them.	  
International	  institutions	  can	  help	  states	  overcome	  barriers	  to	  cheating	  and	  the	  simple	  act	  
of	  meeting	  in	  these	  forums	  makes	  cooperation	  more	  possible.	  International	  institutions	  can	  
also	  perform	  valuable	  tasks	  without	  violating	  state	  sovereignty	  and	  can	  punish	  cheaters	  by	  
employing	  sanctions	  (Grieco,	  1988,	  pp.490	  &	  495).	  In	  general,	  these	  shared	  institutions	  
increase	  cooperation	  among	  states	  and	  are	  the	  best	  hope	  of	  resolving	  conflict	  in	  the	  world	  
(Keohane	  and	  Martin,	  1995).	  
6.4.	  Policy	  implications	  
Given	  the	  results	  of	  the	  analysis,	  speculation	  about	  a	  future	  without	  IBSA	  should	  be	  
considered	  less	  valid.	  IBSA’s	  critics	  call	  it	  merely	  a	  “gathering	  of	  friends;	  that	  it	  possesses	  no	  
real	  clout	  internationally	  and	  is	  merely	  a	  ‘lofty	  dream	  predicated	  on	  the	  tired	  and	  much	  
touted	  political	  rhetoric	  of	  South	  solidarity”	  (Graham,	  2012,	  p.416).	  The	  results	  of	  my	  
research	  show	  strong	  internal	  coherence,	  which	  implies	  coordination	  whether	  it	  is	  through	  
meetings	  or	  merely	  possessing	  strong	  enough	  shared	  values	  and	  norms.	  High	  internal	  
coherence	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  IBSA	  being	  able	  to	  impact	  the	  direction	  of	  an	  
international	  peace	  and	  security	  issue.	  IBSA	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  increasing	  in	  relevance	  in	  
the	  media.	  In	  a	  study	  done	  by	  Soule-­‐Kohndou,	  she	  found	  that	  “the	  IBSA	  process	  has	  been	  




outlets	  based	  outside	  of	  IBSA	  countries	  (Soule-­‐Kohndou,	  2013,	  p.17).	  As	  a	  result,	  states,	  
NGOs,	  academics,	  and	  international	  or	  regional	  organizations	  and	  the	  like	  should	  consider	  
when	  and	  how	  to	  engage	  IBSA	  in	  the	  diplomatic	  process	  and	  earlier	  speculation	  about	  the	  
future	  of	  IBSA	  should	  be	  considered	  invalid.	  For	  instance,	  these	  actors	  could	  engage	  IBSA	  as	  
an	  effective	  actor	  to	  work	  with	  to	  accomplish	  a	  goal	  (Hosli	  et	  al,	  2010,	  p.5).	  If	  states	  see	  IBSA	  
as	  a	  useful	  actor	  to	  work	  with,	  it	  will	  rely	  on	  IBSA	  more	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  IBSA	  is	  more	  likely	  
to	  continue	  operating	  together.	  
In	  addition,	  a	  strong	  IBSA	  provides	  another	  avenue	  for	  non-­‐Western	  states	  to	  follow,	  
besides	  China	  and	  Russia,	  when	  voting	  in	  the	  UN.	  This	  is	  part	  of	  IBSA’s	  goal:	  to	  provide	  a	  
voice	  for	  developing	  countries.	  As	  was	  highlighted	  earlier	  by	  Alden	  and	  Vieira,	  IBSA	  wants	  
to	  serve	  as	  an	  “intermediary	  for	  those	  states	  excluded	  from	  the	  ranks	  of	  power”	  (2005,	  
p.1079).	  IBSA	  has	  value	  when	  it	  balances	  those	  major	  international	  powers	  (Graham,	  2012,	  
p.417).	  IBSA’s	  behaviour	  in	  the	  Syria	  negotiations	  evidences	  this	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  If	  IBSA	  
continues	  to	  balance	  emerging	  powers,	  it	  shows	  that	  the	  world	  is	  shifting	  to	  a	  different	  
international	  order.	  Many	  academics	  have	  reported	  that	  declining	  American	  influence	  
moves	  the	  world	  toward	  “nonpolarity”-­‐	  which	  means	  new	  actors,	  such	  as	  the	  emerging	  
powers,	  will	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  play	  a	  greater	  role	  (Haas,	  2008	  and	  Hart	  and	  Jones,	  
2011).	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  alignment	  of	  emerging	  powers	  is	  important	  as	  Hart	  and	  Jones	  state	  
that	  “the	  relationship	  between	  US	  (and	  to	  a	  degree,	  European)	  strategy	  and	  the	  rising	  
powers	  will	  shape	  global	  order	  in	  the	  era	  that	  is	  now	  upon	  us”	  and	  provide	  new	  leadership	  
or	  at	  least	  new	  options	  in	  the	  resolution	  of	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  issues	  (2011,	  
p.64).	  	  
Compared	  to	  other	  diplomatic	  instruments,	  IBSA	  meets	  relatively	  infrequently.	  This	  
coupled	  with	  its	  extremely	  limited	  institutionalization-­‐	  no	  common	  staff	  and	  no	  
international	  headquarters-­‐	  reduces	  the	  possibilities	  of	  diplomatic	  coordination.	  Regularly	  
scheduled	  meetings	  of	  high-­‐level	  IBSA	  leadership	  could	  give	  IBSA	  the	  wherewithal	  needed	  
to	  act	  in	  a	  more	  strategic	  fashion	  on	  the	  international	  stage.	  Ministerial	  and	  Summit-­‐level	  
meetings	  present	  the	  best	  opportunities	  for	  countries	  to	  align	  their	  norms	  and	  values	  and	  
agree	  upon	  controversial	  topics.	  For	  instance,	  the	  controversial	  nuclear-­‐related	  issues	  are	  
reducing	  IBSA’s	  internal	  coherence	  score.	  Although	  this	  is	  an	  area	  that	  IBSA	  professes	  to	  
have	  an	  interest	  in	  cooperating	  on,	  in	  the	  UN	  voting	  analysis,	  it	  was	  found	  that	  India’s	  votes	  
diverged	  significantly	  from	  its	  IBSA	  partners.	  The	  issue	  is	  clearly	  sensitive	  and	  IBSA	  




coherence	  is	  seen.	  While	  nuclear-­‐related	  issues	  are	  a	  serious	  topic	  of	  concern	  at	  the	  
moment,	  there	  are	  other	  issues	  that	  will	  inevitably	  come	  along	  and	  divide	  IBSA.	  	  
To	  truly	  increase	  its	  coordination	  and	  sustainability	  and	  impact	  its	  many	  goals,	  IBSA	  
should	  consider	  further	  full-­‐time	  institutionalization	  (Alden	  and	  Vieira,	  2005,	  p.1091).	  IBSA	  
must	  also	  consider	  expanding	  the	  scope	  of	  its	  working	  groups	  to	  include	  foreign	  policy	  
issues.	  This	  could	  give	  the	  countries	  more	  credibility	  in	  their	  push	  for	  a	  permanent	  seat	  on	  
the	  UNSC.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  even	  with	  the	  limited	  institutionalization,	  IBSA	  has	  exhibited	  
surprising	  coordination.	  IBSA	  believed	  that	  in	  2011,	  the	  countries	  had	  played	  a	  “positive	  
role	  …	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  peace	  and	  security”	  (New	  York	  Ministerial	  Statement,	  2011,	  
pt.4).	  IBSA	  was	  also	  perceived	  by	  outsiders	  as	  having	  had	  a	  serious	  impact	  on	  negotiations	  
at	  the	  UN	  (Gaouette,	  2011).	  Perhaps	  the	  shared	  values	  and	  norms,	  in	  addition	  to	  practical	  
similarities,	  are	  strong	  enough	  that	  meetings	  of	  the	  senior	  leadership	  are	  rendered	  
unnecessary.	  Likewise,	  weak	  institutionalization	  could	  simply	  mean	  that	  the	  countries	  are	  
able	  to	  remain	  flexible	  and	  uninhibited.	  This	  is	  where	  future	  research	  showing	  the	  evolution	  
of	  IBSA	  internal	  coherence	  and	  alignment	  could	  be	  useful.	  	  
6.5.	  Areas	  for	  Future	  Research	  
IBSA	  and	  other	  emerging	  powers	  voting	  blocs	  should	  continue	  to	  be	  analysed	  in	  the	  
future.	  As	  the	  literature	  review	  revealed,	  these	  studies	  provide	  an	  accurate	  picture	  of	  global	  
political	  dynamics.	  Knowing	  and	  understanding	  the	  status	  of	  power	  dynamics	  and	  alliances	  
is	  useful	  for	  academics,	  politicians,	  policymakers,	  and	  researchers	  alike.	  Russett	  stated	  that	  
information	  on	  UN	  voting	  analysis	  “may	  give	  information	  which	  can	  assist	  American	  policy-­‐
makers	  to	  in-­‐	  crease	  their	  gains	  in	  the	  UN	  political	  process”	  (Russett,	  1966,	  p.327).	  This	  can	  
doubtless	  be	  applied	  to	  diplomats	  from	  other	  countries	  as	  well.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  research	  
could	  prove	  especially	  useful	  to	  diplomats	  from	  emerging	  powers	  countries	  as	  they	  work	  to	  
increase	  their	  influence	  within	  the	  international	  system.	  The	  IBSA	  countries	  could	  
particularly	  find	  this	  useful	  as	  they	  continue	  to	  campaign	  for	  their	  seats	  on	  the	  UNSC.	  The	  
factor	  analysis,	  in	  particular,	  is	  revealing	  as	  it	  shows	  how	  closely	  aligned	  Brazil	  is	  with	  China	  
and	  Russia.	  This	  could	  be	  useful	  for	  policymakers	  who	  are	  interested	  in	  engaging	  IBSA,	  but	  
are	  not	  sure	  of	  the	  proper	  avenue.	  	  
While	  UN	  voting	  analysis	  is	  often	  criticized,	  this	  study	  proves	  the	  results	  can	  be	  




Further	  research	  should	  be	  done	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  IBSA’s	  internal	  
coherence	  and	  alignment	  has	  evolved.	  The	  analysis	  should	  be	  extended	  into	  2012	  and	  2013	  
because	  there	  continued	  to	  be	  violence	  and	  involvement	  in	  the	  conflicts	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria	  
from	  the	  international	  community	  even	  then.	  A	  finding	  of	  increasing	  internal	  coherence	  
over	  the	  course	  of	  2012	  and	  2013	  could	  strengthen	  the	  main	  argument	  of	  this	  paper;	  
decreasing	  internal	  coherence	  in	  2012	  and	  2013	  would	  disprove	  the	  argument.	  And	  
although	  the	  causal	  inferences	  would	  be	  limited,	  possible	  differences	  in	  IBSA	  behaviour,	  on	  
account	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  IBSA	  states	  were	  not	  on	  the	  UNSC	  in	  2012	  and	  2013,	  could	  be	  
gleaned.	  In	  fact,	  adding	  another	  in-­‐depth	  case	  study	  could	  develop	  an	  even	  clearer	  picture	  of	  
IBSA’s	  internal	  coherence	  and	  cooperation.	  Finally,	  a	  fuller	  data	  analysis	  could	  also	  reveal	  
changes	  in	  alignment	  among	  all	  United	  Nations	  members.	  Due	  to	  limitations	  to	  the	  scope	  
and	  resources	  of	  this	  paper,	  the	  data	  collection	  was	  limited	  to	  the	  key	  targets	  states	  of	  this	  
study.	  An	  expansion	  of	  the	  dataset	  in	  the	  study	  could	  evaluate	  all	  of	  the	  states	  in	  the	  United	  
Nations	  and	  members	  of	  the	  UNSC.	  	  
6.6.	  Conclusion	  	  
	   In	  the	  world	  of	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  diplomacy,	  IBSA	  made	  its	  mark	  in	  
2011.	  A	  serious	  discussion	  occurred	  on	  the	  merits	  of	  “RWP”	  and	  the	  IBSA	  countries	  
provided	  an	  alternative	  perspective	  for	  states	  within	  the	  international	  community	  to	  
consider.	  This	  study	  helps	  show	  how	  differently	  the	  UNSC	  looked	  that	  year	  because	  of	  the	  
presence	  of	  the	  IBSA	  states.	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  sped	  up	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  
conflicts,	  IBSA	  brought	  new	  ideas	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  debate	  and	  tried	  new	  diplomatic	  
tactics.	  IBSA,	  it	  seems,	  is	  here	  to	  stay	  and	  its	  ideas	  should	  be	  valued	  in	  international	  debate.	  
The	  countries	  bring	  a	  unique	  perspective	  compared	  to	  China	  and	  Russia	  and	  even	  still	  
compared	  to	  the	  P3.	  As	  the	  emerging	  powers	  community	  welcomes	  new	  members,	  the	  
leadership	  of	  IBSA	  within	  that	  community	  will	  become	  gradually	  more	  important.	  Also,	  
IBSA’s	  push	  for	  permanent	  seats	  on	  the	  UNSC	  is	  unlikely	  to	  disappear	  any	  time	  soon-­‐	  
meaning	  these	  countries	  will	  continue	  to	  campaign	  to	  rightfully	  represent	  their	  respective	  
regions.	  Global	  governance	  reform,	  not	  just	  of	  the	  UNSC,	  but	  also	  of	  the	  G8	  should	  happen.	  
These	  institutions	  still	  reflect	  a	  post-­‐World	  War	  Two	  world	  and	  need	  to	  be	  updated.	  In	  short,	  
IBSA,	  despite	  its	  limited	  roots,	  has	  proved	  remarkably	  resilient	  and	  should	  be	  considered	  a	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